AMID the many geopolitical shifts underway, the turnaround in the Pak-US relationship has struck some observers as particularly surprising. It has also, understandably, prompted questions about the extent to which this turnaround signals a genuine reset.

For at least two decades, Washington had largely adhered to a familiar script on Pakistan. That script rested on two Western narratives: an alleged double game on Afghanistan, and the country’s unfavourable closeness to China. That script also became harder to rewrite as successive US administrations made a hard pivot to the Indo-Pacific and advanced a case for India as a net security provider in the belief that it could eventually erode New Delhi’s incentives for strategic autonomy.

But in recent months, a lot has changed. After years, Islamabad seems to have some equity with a US administration. The US has shown a growing willingness to re-hyphenate Pakistan with India. And the overarching US attitude towards the latter, borne, at least on paper, over frustration over trade and immigration, but also over a lack of acknowledgment of President Donald Trump’s role in ending the four-day May conflict, has been much cooler.

To what extent then has Washington’s script on Pakistan undergone a genuine rewrite?

Has there been a genuine reset in ties?

Examination of sentiment both up and down Washington suggests some caution on this front might be wise. A generation of US diplomats and officials, many of whom rose through the ranks in the Obama years and had a front row seat to unattained US objectives in Afghanistan, remain broadly pro-India. And years of close engagement with India’s strategic community have also made American policymakers more attuned to understanding India’s grievances vis-à-vis Pakistan, rather than Pakistan’s vis-à-vis India.

This is worth bearing in mind for two reasons:

One, given that the default setting in Washington below the level of the executive is what it is, it may be prudent to prepare for the contingency that, when the pendulum swings back, there may be a scramble to overcompensate and placate New Delhi for what will likely be viewed as the undue excesses of Trump-era policy on South Asia.

Two, despite its newfound closeness with the Trump administration, Pakistan’s own constraints make it unlikely for Islamabad to ever exclusively be in a US camp. If the Trump administration presses Pakistan to distance itself from China, Pakistan may likely experience friction of the sort that India is currently experiencing over its ties with Russia. For these reasons, Pakistan has an enormously high stake in continued Sino-US cooperation.

That said, recent events still present three consequential openings that policymakers in Islamabad could do well to take advantage of.

First, events in the Middle East have diverted much of Washington’s attention away from the Indo-Pacific and back towards West Asia. This, together with Pakistan’s recent agreement with Saudi Arabia and regional efforts to end the war in Gaza, make Pakistan, more than India, the more consequential regional protagonist in the quieter work of anchoring geopolitical stability. That by default enhances America’s stakes in reaffirming the Pak-US relationship and should strengthen Pakistan’s imperative to remain an important interlocutor in the Middle East.

Second, there is no denying that India’s confidence in its relationship with the US has been shaken. Even when a trade agreement between the two countries is reached, Indian str­ategists may be far more hesitant abo­ut attaching weight to future overtures out of Washington. This presents a somewhat rare window for Islamabad to strengthen its bid for a more balanced US strategic posture in South Asia.

Third, if Pakistan can concertedly follow through on its proposed joint investments in critical minerals, trade and energy during the remainder of Trump’s time in office, the visibility and dividends of those enterprises might incentivise political support for bilateral collaboration into the next American administration. It is also likely that the longer the US rift with New Delhi persists, the less likely it is that such collaborations with Pakistan will be seen as cost prohibitive.

Finally, it is worth remembering for any truly meaningful reset with the US to be sustainable and not linked to short-term gain, Pakistan must first be able to credibly guarantee returns on democratic, social and economic governance at home. If it can, everything else will follow much more naturally.

The writer is an assistant professor of political science at Tufts University, US.

Published in Dawn, October 3rd, 2025