Of Reason, Romance and Ruin: A Conceptual History of the ‘Pakistan Ideology’
By Nadeem Farooq Paracha
Vanguard Books
ISBN: 978-969-402-682-4
170 pp.

It is generally professed in our country that ours is the one of the two (the other, arguably, being Israel), ideological states in the world. However, almost all states utilise ideology — liberal democracy, social welfare, secularism, socialism or Hindutva — to legitimise their existence and inspire people’s allegiance.

Pakistan’s uniqueness does not stem from its claim to be an ideological state, but rather from its persistent inability to clearly define or consistently uphold the ideological parameters it professes.

Nadeem Farooq Paracha has been addressing the issues of ideology and statecraft for years. He draws on his deep knowledge and critical inquiry to trace the origins of the ideological crisis, carefully analysing original sources and their evolving political contexts.

He explores the ‘Two Nation Theory’ as a founding myth of Pakistan by exploring its origins. In 1924, Lala Lajpat Rai recommended two separate states should be created to house two separate nations of the Hindus and Muslims. Sixteen years hence, the Muslim League propounded the theory in its Lahore Resolution of 1940 to demand two Muslim majority territories within a loose Indian arrangement, some form of a confederation, even though the term was not used in the Resolution.

What is the ‘Pakistan Ideology’ and is it the same as ‘Islamic Ideology’, as it is sometimes represented? The latest book by Nadeem Farooq Paracha explores the origins of Pakistan’s ideological crisis

Despite the ideological origin of the theory, Paracha maintains that the Resolution of 1940 was a political rather than an ideological statement. The theory outlived its use, so that on August 11, 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah maintained that Pakistan would consider all its citizens equal in the eyes of the state and law, and religion would be immaterial in the political sense. However, Jinnah’s vision faded with his death.

Despite this clear departure, the term ‘Islamic ideology’ is used simultaneously with ‘Pakistan Ideology.’ The author argues that the term ‘Pakistan Ideology’ first appeared officially in the 1962 National Assembly, uttered by a Jamaat-i-Islami member who equated it with ‘Islamic Ideology.’ He contends this was a departure from the founding fathers’ modernist, anti-theocratic vision of Islam, contrasting it with the theocratic or “theo-democratic” version promoted later. While ideological debates began in the 1950s, the concept was formally institutionalised under Gen Ziaul Haq’s military regime.

After tracing the emergence of the term ‘Ideology of Pakistan’, the author explores three key ideological strands from pre-Partition India. He discusses Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, whom he calls an “Iconoclast” for challenging traditional ulema [scholars of religion] and advocating modern English education. Sir Syed reinterpreted Islam rationally, aligning it with scientific knowledge, and argued that past theological decrees were time-bound, calling for a new theology — his Ilmul Kalam being an example.

Though declared heretical by traditional ulema, his modernist views supported the socio-political aspirations of the Muslim middle class. The author notes that Sir Syed partially inspired a secular form of Muslim nationalism, which brought Islam into the public sphere while sidelining its theocratic dimensions. Post-Independence, his modernist legacy faded from public and state narratives, reduced largely to symbolic praise.

Iqbal, representing the second ideological strand, is described by the author as the “Egoist” for his emphasis on selfhood and critique of rationalism, distancing himself from Sir Syed. While advocating for the revival of Islam in line with contemporary needs, his Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam drew on Western idealists such as Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche rather than rationalists.

Iqbal believed Indian Muslims had lost their ‘self’, leading to their decline, and called for self-actualisation through ego (“khudi”). Though he sought a reinterpretation of Islam beyond both orthodoxy and modernism, his deeper philosophical vision failed to embed itself in popular discourse. Instead, his legacy was reduced to poetic symbolism — exalting “ishq” [love] over “aql” [rational thought] — criticising the West, and being revered as a poet-philosopher.

The author argues that Iqbal the ideologue survived, while Iqbal the modernist faded. Attempts to revive him — under Bhutto as a socialist and later under Gen Zia and Imran Khan — only reshaped his image to fit political ends.

The third strand — represented by Abul Ala Mawdudi, termed the “Leviathan” following Iranian-American political scientist Vali Reza Nasr — rejected both secularism and Islamic modernism. Mawdudi Islamicised modern Western political concepts — sovereignty, democracy and ideology — to formulate a vision of an Islamic state or “Hakumat-i-Ilahi” [Governance of God].

Opposing nationalism, he distinguished between “aqli” (intellective) and “nasali” (by birth) Muslims and rejected Pakistan’s creation, calling it “napakistan.” However, post-Independence, he claimed Pakistan’s foundation was Islamic and demanded that Islamic ideology become its cornerstone. This view was eventually embraced by the state and military elite, particularly under Zia, who used it to justify centralised authoritarianism.

The author concludes that Pakistan’s ideological crisis stems from the failure of any ideology to reflect its socio-political realities: modernist Islam was abandoned by the elites and was never popularised; Iqbal’s vision remained unrealised; and Mawdudi’s Islamic state was incompatible with the modern nation-state.

The author suggests that a “pragmatic fusion” of the more reasonable elements of the three ideological strands might offer a viable path forward. However, one must stress that the ideological debates must be understood as products of socio-political conditions, reflecting specific class and power interests.

Past ideologies failed because they were imposed without grounding them in the real Pakistani realities. Any new fusion risks the same fate if it remains disconnected with the socio-political conditions seen from the perspective of the country’s common people, and the diverse cultural and regional determinants of society.

Instead, a return to the modernist spirit of Jinnah’s August 11, 1947 speech and Iqbal’s vision — emphasising democratic reform, parliamentary sovereignty and modernism — could lay the foundation for a just, inclusive and viable ideological framework.

Ideologies, it must be realised, are not superimposed under whatever garb; they are human constructions and claim viability only if they correspond to the actual socio-political and economic characteristics of the state and society.

The reviewer is Director, Institute of Historical and Social Research, Karachi, and Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Sohail University. He can be reached at drsjahmed@yahoo.com

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, April 27th, 2025