Pact risks
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THE Saudi defence pact is being called a huge game changer. But will it make both sides more secure or open big economic vistas for us as hoped? Many other pacts have not lived up to expectations. While the details of the agreement aren’t out yet, it’s still useful to see what it may cover to meet the two aims and the risks we must be prepared for.
One clause shared publicly says that war against one will be seen as war against both. It may not face war soon, but risk-averse Saudi Arabia still wants this pact given the US inaction in Qatar after the Israeli attack and against Houthi salvos. But as Saudi Arabia lacks firepower, it may only fund us to defend it and ourselves better. Will it want short- and long-term air and land forces? If so, that may cut our defences against our many foes as new forces take time to raise and train well. Any muscle we lend must ace those of many well-armed foes. Matching a US-aided, high-tech and nuclear Israel may be the hardest but it may be the top Saudi hope as the US may defend it against its other foes but never against Israel. Our ability to do so will depend on how much aid it gives us and what Israel gets from the US in response.
Saudis must pay to cover any deployment forces, but, ideally, also boost our defence against our foes. We held our own against India in May with our own money. India may react if we raise our capacity via Saudi aid. So, it must be high and durable enough to keep outpacing India with its current defence budget of about $75 billion and hard reserves of $700bn (versus Saudi Arabia’s $70bn and $450bn).
Pacts among states with different foes can turn a partner’s foes against one. This risk may be low for the Saudis as they won’t fight India directly and have good ties with it but may be high for us. Irking a vicious Israel may risk ruthless covert actions by it, as in Iran, and an indirect tiff with the US as it blindly aids Tel Aviv. We may see more co-action among the foes of both partners, which could hurt us. Our foes, too, are security-centred and can react strongly to even minor risks even if they don’t oppose a pact now. So, the pact can make us more secure if Saudi Arabia covers for the replacement of any deployed forces, offsetting increased defence expenditure by India and countering any new threats we may face from Saudi Arabia’s foes. In short, it must give us economic aid. This is a big list.
Any muscle we lend must ace those of foes.
Some see the pact as later including the UAE and Qatar. But this will raise risks too as Israel could attack Qatar again. Some even foresee a Muslim Nato. But Nato binds 32 rich, mostly closely located states (three of them nuclear) that have one key common foe (Russia) and one small border to defend. The 50-plus Muslim states have separate local foes. Most are poor; many have failed due to civil war. They span 13,000 kilometres east to west and 7,500 km north to south. Only a big force can defend them all. But who will lend it troops, key arms and money? A pact among rich Gulf and big Muslim states like Pakistan and Turkiye would see risks too: technical and financial as well as the risk of irking the foes of pact partners. Such pacts work well for nearby states facing one common big foe. But even that model failed the Arabs in 1967.
There are economic and political risks too. Shunning reforms, our selfish rulers have long chased geostrategic rents to thrive themselves. Shrinking rents were forcing reforms but given this new option they may well stall them again. So, we may fail to benefit from Saudi economic flows. The pact may also make us more of a security state, cut civilian sway and raise autocracy — something that has yet to be debated publicly and in parliament, which in any case has a controversial mandate. We are still paying dearly for past such secret deals struck by set-ups with low legitimacy. A muffled media has largely avoided detailed debate too and toed the official hype by inflating uncertain gains while ignoring the risks.
As the public would have to bear the fallout of such risks, the latter must be debated publicly — more so, if as some say, the pact came out prematurely after the Qatar attack. The key issue is whether a struggling economy torn by many nearer threats can bear new risks to protect rich states in the Middle East quagmire. Both partners risk endless ego-led arms races that give them no edge but to cut other budgets. It is only through debate, necessary changes and consensus that the pact can be enabled to truly aid our masses. Or else, it may even raise external risks and internal repression.
The writer has a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley, in political economy and 25 years of grassroots to senior-level experiences across 50 countries.
Published in Dawn, September 30th, 2025
