Public spat between the government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Wapda over the raising of Mangla Dam by 30 feet may appear to have been contained, even if one ignores the protests inside Kashmir that coincided with its inauguration on 30th September.

The government of AJK had raised its volume of protest by few decibels on each successive occasion at the dislocation of about 45000 people, 8000 houses and 15780 acres of land. WAPDA has treated AJK shabbily in the past and has been charging a higher tariff besides denying it profits from Mangla on the pattern of NWFP. The controversy may only have been postponed until after the stone laying ceremony when the issues underlying the calculation of profits and the tariff charged to AJK will be sorted out.

The country has experienced a total loss of reservoir capacity of the order of 4 million acre feet (maf) at Tarbela and Mangla, which constitutes about 23 per cent of the combined gross storage capacity. The proposed project is to recoup the lost live storage in Mangla as a result of sedimentation over the past 35 years. Mangla when constructed in 1967 had a gross storage capacity of 5.88 maf and it has lost 20 per cent of this capacity over the past 35 years The capacity lost to sedimentation is of the order of 1.18 maf, although it was based on a higher estimate of sedimentation. But unpredictably the advance of delta down the main Jhelum branch has been faster than anticipated. Sedimentation issues, therefore, should have a crucial influence on the decisions regarding raising of the dam.

The new project aims to increase gross storage capacity by 2.9 maf to 7.6 maf. Thus allowing for recompense of the lost storage, there will be a net addition to the original storage capacity of 1.72 maf.

Mangla is also a source of hydropower through 10 units of 100-mega watt (mw) each. Spill-over effects of the project would include ‘providing cheap hydel electricity of 772 gega watt hour (GWh), increasing the present energy yield by 14 per cent. The second spin-off will be to absorb low-to-medium floods and reduce the intensity of high floods.Yet a third benefit would be increase in lake area by about 44 per cent and raising of minimum pool level so as to provide ‘new avenues for higher and sustained fish production’. That is not all. A fourth fallout, almost comical in concept, of this mega project would be ‘recreation facilities along the reservoir water line which could not be developed in the past will now develop rapidly. This will attract the tourists from all over the country and also from abroad, particularly the Mirpuris from the UK’.

The PC-I is supposed to be a part of 10 years ‘Wapda perspective plan (2001-11)’ and its three years development programme (project life 4 years), which were approved by the national economic council (NEC) on June 07, 2001. Against a provision of Rs53 billion only under the perspective plan Rs59.45 billion have been approved for this project alone. An expenditure of 53 per cent (Rs31.7 billion) of the total project cost will be on rehabilitation and resettlement. Local component of the estimated cost is Rs50 billion and foreign exchange component Rs9.7 billion.

Financing which should have been central to any planning has been treated very superciliously. The PC-I is based on speculative financing. Two sources have been identified: donors and the government of Pakistan. The Economic Affairs Division has been saddled with the responsibility of finding foreign financing and the GOP to line-up the local funds. The breakup of expenditure is as follows:-

(a) Physical works Rs27.8bn (47 per cent of the cost)

(b) Compensation for resettlement Rs31.7bn (53 per cent of the cost) Rs59.5 billion

This amount of Rs27.8 billion include a foreign component of Rs9.7 billion. Preparatory work will take 25 months, construction 40 and resettlement 50. The project will be completed in 2007, provided it starts this year. Raising Mangla by 30 feet would extend the life of the dam to 2060 A.D.

Various options varying between 10ft and 40ft were considered. 10ft option was given up because this would not compensate even for the capacity lost due to silt deposits.Twenty feet option was given up to avoid the need for a second rising in the future.Forty feet option, although technically feasible and economically viable, was given up because “the incremental benefits of raising the dam are relatively small” and cost comparatively substantial including the needed displacement of population. Therefore Wapda settled on 30ft option. It has been stated in the PC-I that Mangla catchments is the region of the heaviest rainfall. It lies in the path of active monsoon track as well as winter westerly winds. Winter precipitation in the form of snow provides 60 per cent of the water. Rainfall occurs in short spells with dry intervals. Extremely high flows are associated with heavy flooding. The flows are the lowest during winter (October to January) and highest in summer between (May and June). Floods occur during July to September. Monthly minimum inflow volume recorded in October 1997 is 0.19 maf and maximum in June 1996 of 6.52 maf. Annual minimum and maximum inflows have been 13.5 and 32.0 maf, recorded in 1971-72 and 1992-93 respectively. The average inflow is 23.35 maf. The variation in different years is considerable ranging between 1.9 million cusecs in 1992 and a minimum of 135,190 cusecs in 1999.

According to Ahmed Faraz Khan reporting in “The Review” of Dawn (September 19 - 25, 02), Mangla Dam did not have assured water supply to fill the dam to its present capacity. In case storage capacity increased to 7.6 maf, the efficiency level will only be 67 per cent, which means the dam will not fill in three out of ten years.

Cost per acre of irrigation at Rs20,500 makes the undertaking costly. Benefit-cost ratio has been worked out at 1.84:1 and EIRR at 19.82 per cent, which is a gross over estimate of financial viability of the project and is a result of economy with facts. On the assumption that power rates will increase by 6 per cent per annum, it has been estimated that Rs163 billion will accrue as revenues in 25 years. The claimed increase in generation of electricity by precisely 772 GWh from year to year is mathematical impossibility. Wapda has to have supernatural powers to be able to ensure the desired inflows in precise quantity year in and year out. A low generation has been experienced for want of sufficient reservoir storage particularly during the last three years.

The project makes no economic sense considering not only the financial cost of $1.0 billion, as currently estimated, but also the benefits, which are predicated on supernatural control of Wapda over elements. There is a point of view that 3 to 4ft raise of level could cater for additional supplies without additional financial expenditure or dislocation of the population. With a much lower level, say 10ft, the huge cost could be avoided and lost storage recouped. The maximum conservation level of 1202 feet has been attained only in 10 out of 35 years of its life. Only in freak years could one hope to fill the existing dam to capacity. Data for 25 years (1975 - 2000) indicates that only in 1992 - the first 10 days of September did the conservation level rise beyond 1202 feet to 1207.83. These incidentally were the only floods, which the dam or its management could not handle, not because of structural defect of design but on account of gross mismanagement.

The flows in river Jhelum are not adequate even to fill the existing storage capacity and do not reach the present maximum conservation level of 1202’. In the last three years the reservoir could not be filled to that level. In the year 2001-02 it could only fill to 75 per cent of its capacity. Uncertainty in hydrology of the upper catchment area and freak rainfall do not make the project viable. Raising Mangla will serve no useful purpose. There is an irony inherent in the situation. In dry years the demand for water will be higher than the reservoir could satisfy, and in wet years the demand will be much less than the storage.

One single project costing about $ 1 billion (Rs. 60 billion) exceeds the provision of Rs. 53 billion in the so-called perspective plan. We gave up following plans— perspective or annual- - long time back. Other projects including development of storage on tributaries of Jhelum could offer better economic benefits and would be less controversial. According to Mr. S.S. Kirmani and Chaudhry Gulzar Ahmad, the Jhelum River has a mean annual flow of 22 maf. It went on to say, “When the Mangla Dam is ultimately raised to its full height, it can be fully regulated in 18 years out of 40. Complete regulation of the Jhelum River would be possible through the construction of additional storage on the main river and its tributaries”. Not much attention has been paid to the tributaries.

A geo-technical expert associated with the designing of Kalabagh had warned against raising the level of Mangla because the rock below the orifice spillway at Mangla and Kalabagh being of similar formation, ‘the height of the concrete structure should be such that the maximum retained head of water does not exceed 160ft’. With the proposed raise, that limit will be exceeded. Extreme reservoir level during the probable maximum flood would be another matter. Mangla and Tarbela dams were designed to withstand very low earthquakes, using pseudo static analyses.

Hydrodynamic analysis of Tarbela was carried out after its construction, which revealed that some of its structures were unsafe against the maximum credible earthquake. Similar exercise was not attempted for Mangla. The raised embankment could cause deformation/displacement of the guides of intake gates or their concrete support and result in jamming, creating in turn disastrous conditions similar to the 1974 episode. Even the effect of annual change in loading the powerhouse due to rise and fall in the reservoir level could cause tilting of the powerhouse and the axes of the generating units.

Another important aspect referred to in the press relates to the treatment of the project as “development”. In that case, Punjab will be forced to surrender the equivalent of any increase in water in Mangla from its share in Tarbela because Sindh will then claim exclusive right to the use of Indus water resources including Tarbela.

Much less glamorous option would be an improvement in delivery system in the canals through assurance of good governance practices in the departments of irrigation and save approximately 70 per cent of the water lost. Optimum use of water entailing huge benefits is another area worthy of consideration as another alternative. Even otherwise the project will become sick much before it gets started. The money could very well be spent on supporting the financially bankrupt universities with wider spin-off effects.

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