DEVIATING somewhat from his usual mantra — that fighting terrorism is in Pakistan’s own interest — President Bush recently laid the ‘responsibility’ of fighting terrorism at Pakistan’s doorstep. This raises questions about the terms on which Pakistan joined the war.

In democracies, such questions are decided in parliament. But unfortunately, in Pakistan, most wars have been fought under one or the other military ruler. The decision to join the current war was also taken by Gen Musharraf on the spur of moment. Since then a pall of secrecy has surrounded the terms of engagement. The official line is that Pakistan joined the war in its own interest. In reality, the war was godsend for Gen Musharraf especially when Pakistan was dubbed as America’s ‘non-Nato ally’ in the war.

But the country paid a heavy price for Gen Musharraf’s political indebtedness to the West. The Americans, it seems, were given a free hand in running the war, using our facilities, intruding our territory, killing our civilians, destroying the tribal and administrative structure of Fata, and thus fanning fury against the state. Yes, in return Pakistan did receive millions of dollars a month, but to what end?

Apparently, the war on terror was the outcome of the events of 9/11, but analysts hold that such a war exemplifies one long conceived by the neo-con votaries of the Bush doctrine. Its purpose was to achieve political objectives using awesome US military power and violating human rights and international laws including the Geneva Conventions.

Therefore, instead of using ground forces to mop up Al Qaeda – Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan, the tactics used were to inspire awe and terror through massive aerial bombing, killing thousands of innocent civilians and destroying their homes and hamlets. It is no surprise that the hostility towards the Americans arising from such attacks allowed the Taliban to continue their sway over large swathes of territory running from southeastern Afghanistan to Pakistan’s tribal regions in the northwest.

On the civilian front, President Karzai has utterly failed to develop the civil and political institutions of his own country in order to build a viable state. He has ruled with the support of warlords. Therefore, instead of political parties, it is powerful groups based on tribal, sectarian or ethnic lines that dominate.

The so-called provincial reconstruction teams installed by the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan to run developmental projects have also proved ineffectual. Finally, the eradication of poppy production in Afghanistan that fetches billions of dollars per annum and thus feeds much of the Al Qaeda–Taliban insurgency is far from being accomplished.

No wonder that after having fought a seven-year futile war, killing thousands of innocent people and squandering billions of dollars, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen has admitted that America is “not winning” the war in Afghanistan.

But he has not owned US military and political failures in Afghanistan, and has instead concentrated on terrorist attacks on Nato, launched from safe havens in Fata. Therefore, pursuing a new military strategy the US has initiated ground and aerial attacks in Fata, ignoring the reservations of its Nato allies.

Although Gen Kayani and Prime Minister Gilani have stood up against this violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, a difficult question has arisen for the fledgling government: how does one resist US aggression?

Predictably, some leaders are expounding a quid pro quo approach, and have suggested a blockade on US transit cargo to Afghanistan and retaliating militarily. Such bravado may earn them public support, but will prove detrimental if not suicidal for the country. Even if Pakistan succeeded in resisting US military attacks, it could not withstand the economic and political fallout of such a confrontation, especially in view of its floundering economy and worsening law and order situation.

Moreover, we may all share anti-US sentiments, but we do not share a national outlook on the war, as did the Vietnamese in their fight against the US. The conduct of our politics has divided us into disparate political, sectarian and ethnic groups. We cannot confront a superpower on the issue of terrorism that has all but ruined our polity.

Therefore, prudence is needed to steer the country out of its predicament. We should use our being a front-line state in this war to our own advantage and engage the US-led West in a long-term constructive partnership on the lines of what once front-line states like Germany and Japan did after the Second World War.

Luckily, the Americans also seem to think along these lines. Already, the administration has come up with a large aid package over the next decade. The Saudis have also pledged funds to ease Pakistan’s oil burden. Given that the war on terror is a global menace, the Europeans and powers like Russia should also be convinced of the need to share the financial burden in this region.

A national consensus must also be forged through parliament on renegotiating the terms of engagement with the US. The consensus would enable the government to negotiate from a position of strength. The new terms should clearly define operational areas and objectives.

Each party should restrict its operations to the Durand Line; sharing resources and intelligence, the objective should be not only to destroy terrorist infrastructure, but also to reconstruct the social and political infrastructure of Fata — a place where most are out of a job, illiteracy prevails and where there are no modern political institutions.

There is little doubt that development in Fata and the defeat of terrorism there holds the key to at least temporary success. If Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are at stake in Fata, then the future of the war on terror and the credibility of the Bush doctrine are also at stake.

A point to remember is that even if the war is won along the Afghan and Pakistan frontier, terrorism will still not be defeated as long as injustices continue in Kashmir, Palestine and the Arab countries — just as it will not as long as the US continues with its hostilities towards Iran and supports dictators the world over.

shahabusto@hotmail.com

AS if the prospect of a global recession isn’t enough, consider the latest threat to world economic stability: an alliance between Russia and Opec, the oil-producing cartel dominated by Saudi Arabia.

That’s a scary possibility, as Russia supplies one third of Europe’s energy needs, while Opec accounts for nearly 40 per cent of global oil production. Together they produce half the world’s oil, so any pact that paves the way for Russia to become a full member of the cartel would present a threat to many countries, which are becoming increasingly dependent on their energy imports.

But is such a merger really on the cards? The Russians would clearly like one: last week, it sent its energy minister Igor Sechin to attend Opec’s meeting in Vienna and proposed ‘extensive co-operation’ with the cartel. A memorandum of understanding is being prepared for signature in the coming months.

Oil is Russia’s biggest bargaining chip, as the soaraway price has done more than anything else to give it the confidence and clout to re-assert itself on the world stage. A pact with Opec would strengthen Moscow at a time when it has lost friends in the West following its invasion of Georgia and its harassment of foreign companies, such as BP, which have business interests in Russia.

An extension of the oil cartel to include Russia, however, will be hard to pull off. Saudi Arabia, by far the most important Opec member, is a conservative state supposedly aligned with the United States, and may be reluctant to alienate such a powerful ally. But it is not impossible: Opec already comprises countries hostile to the US, notably Iran and Venezuela. So why not add Russia?

Hidden from the debate, however, is the fact that Saudi Arabia is a cartel within a cartel. With 21 per cent of all Middle Eastern proven oil reserves, it is the only country with significant surplus capacity. That means it can cushion itself from price falls by bumping up volume in a way that other countries can’t. No doubt that was one reason why Russia has been frantically lobbying behind the scenes for Opec to cut production to keep prices high, as it faces capacity restraints and stands to lose billions in foreign reserves.

Last week, the cartel said it would cut production by around 500,000 barrels, bringing a rebuke from the International Energy Agency, which claimed the move would undermine the price relief that consumers have enjoyed in the last month.

But Opec may have overreached itself: by trying keep the price of oil at around $100 a barrel, it has stoked fears that a recession will be deeper than anticipated and will lead to a slump in demand. As a consequence, oil closed on Friday at just under $100 a barrel and could slide further.

— The Guardian, London