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WHEN the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) wrested away power from the Awami National Party (ANP) in KP in general elections last year, it had been hoped that the politics of expediency would give way to good governance and clear policies in the province. However, at least with regard to the menace of terrorism, the hopes of the citizens seem to have been misplaced.
The PTI, for all its rhetoric, has remained slow in tackling the issue of terrorism, or in even devising a coherent policy to effectively neutralise internal threats. Conversely, the Pakistani Taliban have increased their attacks on policemen, the military, successfully carried out a brazen jail-break, and increased activities that entail extortion, threats and intimidation in order to frighten the populace into submission.
In fact, the law and order situation is perhaps worse than what it was under previous governments, with terrorists turning their sights on settled areas, violence returning to parts of Swat, and attacks on political workers and officials continuing unabated.
Despite this, it appears the PTI believes that peace can only be restored through the process of dialogue, by which the ‘non-threatening’ militant groups can be separated and isolated from those hell-bent on destroying the Pakistani state. Once separated, the remaining militant groups can be engaged through military force, if need be.
However, this policy in and of itself appears flawed. For example, although separating certain non-threatening militant groups from the rest may be strategically wise, once the other groups are dealt with, what shall be the fate of those pardoned outfits who also seek enforcement of the Sharia in one form or the other?
The said process of negotiating and separating certain groups from others appears more of an act of appeasement than an actual counterterrorism strategy.
Ironically, the PTI strategy appears to be eerily in consonance with the much criticised perceived policy of the PML-N to isolate groups that it deems are not presently posing a threat to Punjab from those that it feels cannot be ‘controlled’.
Although the PTI has censured the PML-N for such actions in Punjab, it seems to want to emulate the same policy at a national level in relation to the Taliban.
Even if we were to take the PTI stance at face value, it doesn’t cater for a situation in which no single group is willing to engage in any dialogue with the government. Despite its recent talks ‘offer’ after the Bannu incident, the TTP has made it clear that they do not wish to engage in any unconditional talks with the Pakistan government. In fact, the very selection of Mullah Fazlullah as its head should have been seen as an alarming indicator of this.
When confronted with such a situation where there appears to be only one party sitting at the negotiating table, the PTI appears dumbfounded. With no solution in sight, the party, rather than offering a way forward, resorts to blasting the US for sabotaging the peace process by killing Hakeemullah Mehsud. Interestingly enough, there is little or scarce evidence that Hakeemullah Mehsud was in fact serious about any negotiations with the Pakistan government.
Although certain initial statements of his did indicate a willingness to engage in dialogue, what the PTI seems to forget is that such dialogue had been subjected to various alarming preconditions, such as the withdrawal of forces from Fata, the cessation of hostilities vis-à-vis the Taliban, the ending of drone attacks, and the release of all Taliban prisoners.
In fact, the logical derivative of the argument of the PTI would be that in a situation where it is next to impossible to identify and separate those militant groups amenable to peace, the practical alternative would be to take on those identifiable groups that are clearly and openly fighting against the state.
However, the PTI does not seem to have the stomach to actually declare war on elements that have literally spurned those who offered peace and attacked them in return. In fact, they can barely even name them, perhaps in part due to the fear of reprisals by the Taliban against the PTI’s workers.
All in all, the PTI seems unable to chart a course of action in the face of a foreseeable dead-end on the road to peace. It is this inability in relation to the issue of terrorism that appears to render the PTI a rudderless ship unable to show even a glimmer of hope to a nation desperately seeking a leader of credibility.
Although many in the PTI would severely disagree with this assessment, it is undeniable that a party which cannot even name its enemy is an unlikely candidate to deliver peace to a nation that is unable at the moment to differentiate between friend and foe.
The writer is a freelance contributor.
