WHILE the world remains preoccupied with Syria, I want to devote this column, which appears on the 12th anniversary of 9/11, to an examination of the current situation in Afghanistan and by extension in the ‘AfPak’ region.

Today in Afghanistan, progress towards reconciliation remains stalemated. Karzai and his cohorts want Pakistan to deliver the Taliban to the negotiating table, ignoring perhaps with some justification Pakistan’s protests that it does not have that measure of influence over the Taliban even though its leaders are said to be in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s release of seven Afghan Taliban from custody, was welcomed in Kabul as “a positive but small step”. But it was added: “We expect additional and more significant steps … including the release of Mullah Baradar and other senior Taliban leaders currently in Pakistani jails.”

It is known that Pakistan arranged for the Afghan ambassador to meet Baradar who apparently told the envoy he did not want to talk to Karzai’s people or to play the role of intermediary.

A member of the Afghan High Peace Council believes that Pakistan has not released Baradar because of American reservations. Notwithstanding these factors it is in Pakistan’s interest to release Baradar and let the current Afghan administration discover for itself whether or not Baradar is really the magic key Karzai believes him to be.

If nothing else it may serve to convince the world, if not the Afghans, that Pakistan genuinely and without reservations wishes to contribute to an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process.

There is much talk of Karzai wanting the Taliban to set up their office in a country other than Qatar presumably because he does not trust the Qataris. The problem is that setting up offices and transporting people around takes time, and time is not an available luxury.

Karzai also wants that only the Afghans should talk to each other. But he knows that if there is any chance of persuading the Taliban to talk to him it will only be after they have talked to the Americans to work out the release of Taliban held in Guantanamo and the removal of Taliban names from the UN sanctions list.

More and more it appears that Karzai wants the issue of negotiations with the Taliban to be left to his successor who is to be elected on April 5, 2014.

He has already said the same thing as regards the finalisation of the bilateral security agreement with the Americans even though the latter have told him they need to have the agreement in place by October so that they can make the necessary plans.

Sadly, preparations for the presidential election also appear to be fraught. The newly selected election commission, which Karzai’s critics say is packed with Karzai supporters, has said that of the total of 6,845 polling stations, security has been guaranteed for only 3,435, and the rest face some level of threat.

There have been well-publicised meetings of tribal leaders who have recommended that given the security situation elections should be postponed till 2018. Most critics believe these recommendations flow from the exercise of Karzai’s influence.

Three different alliances have been formed and unfortunately they are very ethnic in their composition. The Afghan electoral alliance is entirely composed of Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks — in other words, the former Northern Alliance. The other as yet unnamed coalition comprises such prominent Pakhtuns as Zalmay Khalilzad, Ashraf Ghani, Jalali, Hanif Atmar and Ahady.

The third, the Association of National Amity of Afghanistan, led by Syed Ishaq Gillani, claims that the Taliban had endorsed the party and therefore their candidates would not have anything to fear from the Taliban insurgency. More parties and alliances are likely to appear before the Sept 16 to Oct 6 period during which candidates have to register.

Will the battle become ethnic is one question. Will Karzai throw his weight, which remains considerable, behind a Pakhtun candidate and if so who will this be? Will the Taliban permit voting in the south and east? If not, will the election have any legitimacy and will the Pakhtun majority wrongly termed a plurality get lost in the process?

The Afghan National Security forces that have taken over security responsibilities in 90pc of the country from Nato and Isaf have not proved equal to the task. The UN estimates that civilian casualties were 23pc higher in the first half of this year as compared to the last.

The new interior minister announced that this year 1,792 police have been killed in six months or about the same number as were killed in the whole of the preceding year. Army casualty figures are no longer announced for fear that they will be demoralising but one tally puts it at 487 killed this year up to August.

Desertions have grown with the police losing about 15pc of their members every year. A recent US government report found that in the six months to March 2013, the Afghan army lost men at an average rate of over 3pc each month or over a third of its total strength each year.

Economic conditions are deteriorating as foreign NGOs leave the country and the flow of foreign aid declines. The Afghans have said that the Chinese want the Aynak copper mine contract renegotiated. The Indian consortium that has bid for the Hajigak iron ore mines has cut down its initial investment to less than one-third of what was originally envisaged. Clearly security is a consideration.

Ominous reports are appearing about preparations for a civil war not only within Afghanistan but across the border in Pakistan. Only reconciliation offers the prospect of stopping what seems to be an inexorable drive towards chaos and mayhem in Afghanistan.

Pakistan cannot afford to stand by as an idle spectator and must work harder with the Afghan administration which admittedly raises hackles by reviling Pakistan at every opportunity even while requiring Pakistan’s assistance and goodwill for achieving its avowed objectives.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.