Lucius Flavius Arrianus or Arrian’s account of Alexander’s campaigns, written about five hundred years after the death of the warrior-king, is one of the best sources of his campaign. He was a front-line general himself in the Roman army and relied for his history on the memoirs of two generals who had fought under Alexander. The editing and annotations of a new edition of his account, The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander, have been done by the specialists of the subject.

Greece of the fourth century BCE had achieved a rare combination of socio-economic unity and an advanced military machine and aspired to overthrow the mighty Persia.

The dominant mode of production in ancient Greece was slavery, which, with its periodic surfeit of production, comes nearest, among the pre-capitalist modes, to modern capitalism.

The slaves imported by it from the northern shores of Black Sea were mainly used for handicrafts and the cultivation of olives and wine. Their remuneration was low. But the value of their products was based upon the remuneration of free labour, with the result that their demand for their own produce fell far short of supply. The surplus was exchanged for importing cereals. But “over-production” was a constant threat. Greece’s freedom, much acclaimed by its historians and the European romantics of 19th century, rested upon this slavery.

There was barbarism to Greece’s north. But, to its east, there was the huge Persian empire, stretching from the Aegean Sea to the Indus. The mode of production in Persia was dependent, not “early medieval feudalism”, as claimed by some modern western historians. In this mode, the differentiation between the agricultural and industrial production has not yet begun or is in very early stage. Slavery was marginal in Persia, being confined to the domestic sphere.

Persia’s army, as was to be expected of a great power, was huge and cumbersome. Its various arms were massive. But they could not manoeuvre once the battle had been joined. So, for it, the battle consisted of crushing the enemy with its mass.

Greece’s military organisation was, undoubtedly, far advanced, not in arms but in tactics and flexibility. Hilly Greece was made up of valleys, Athenian, Theban and Spartan extended spaces being exceptions. Usually, a valley had one state, some two. They fought constantly among themselves. The battle-fields, being confined to the valleys, were constricted. The Greeks had, therefore, evolved strict rules of war, such as fighting had to end in one day, there was no combat during harvests etc. The one-day-fight rule called for tight control of the armies, good communication and development of new tactics. In the fourth century BCE, they developed what later came to be called the “Arbela tactic”. This was used successfully by Alexander’s father, Philip, King of Macedonia, to establish his hegemony over entire Greece.

Here infantry and cavalry are used in combined operations. On the battle-field, the commander concentrates the bulk of his strength against one of the enemy’s flanks. As the enemy’s other troops move to aid that flank, a gap opens in his center. A combined cavalry-infantry force drives through it to break the enemy’s axis.

Alexander succeeded his father at the age of 20. His kingdom, Macedonia, was poor but possessed of a highly trained, battle-tested army. It had united Greece under Philip but the coalition was tenuous. It had been created to fight Persia, a menace weighing perpetually upon Greece. If the war was inordinately delayed, the coalition would crumble.

Alexander attacked Persia immediately and defeated what was, in effect, a Persian frontier garrison at Granicus. And it was only a year later that a proper battle was fought between the two sides at Issus. Here the Persian army, about 10 times as strong as the Greek one, was led by King Darius himself. Apparently the Persians had learnt nothing from their encounter with the enemy at the previous battle and seemed helpless before the Greek tactics. They were defeated quickly. In fact, the rout may not have come so early if the Persian ruler had not fled precipitately from the field upon seeing a Greek cavalry unit making for his position. In the process, he even abandoned his wife and children in the camp. The decisive battle was fought, two years later, at Gaugamela (near Arbela). Here again Darius ran away, deserting his soldiers in the midst of the battle. As a result, he lost both his kingdom and his head.

Now Alexander recruited some Persian soldiers too, adopted the Persian royal dress and generally acted like he proposed to unite Persia with Greece. Subjugating Central Asia, he took a wife there. (Her name was Roshanak, meaning “daughter of light.” It was corrupted by Greeks into Rhoxan.)

Taxila had submitted to Alexander even before his arrival in the Indus Valley. But Poros, the ruler of Potohar and the area between Jhelum and Ravi, refused to do so. And, indeed, in him, the Greek met a worthy opponent. In the battle on the left bank of River Jhelum, Alexander applied the now tested “arbela” technique and succeeded up to the point of driving his main force through the gap in Poros’ line. But then, unlike the Persian soldiers earlier, Poros’ soldiers stood and fought instead of running away. There were heavy casualties. This so demoralised the Greeks that they refused to cross Satluj and Alexander had to take the way home, first down the Indus and then by sea to Iraq. He died in Babylon at the age of thirty-two, apparently of malaria.

Alexander was a great warrior. But he was also lucky in having a coward opposite him in Persia. The story was different when he met his match on the bank of Jhelum.

Secondly, it is not understood why Darius and Poros both waited to be attacked instead of attacking him when he maneuvered for days before the battles of Gaugamela and the Jhelum. Perhaps this had something to do with their military organisations.

Alexander inherited a highly trained and well-organised army from his father. And he used it brilliantly, commanding fully the loyalty of his officers and men. His supply system, providing 255 tons of food and 160,000 gallons of water to the troops daily, even when operating in arid areas, was efficient by any standard. Lastly, his personal courage inspired his troops, though, in later stages, he tended to use terror too.

Alexander has been built to his full height. But the fact remains that he became “great” only when Western Europe, bursting upon the world in the modern colonial era, accepted him as its fore-runner and guide, as its hero.