ARTIFICIAL intelligence (AI) means different things to different people: risk and opportunity, job losses and job creation, energy waste and economic growth, climate disaster and future of the planet. Debates on the shape of AI governance are equally fraught.

That debate became more interesting recently with the launch of the World AI Cooperation Organisation in Shanghai. Chinese President Xi Jinping made the geopolitical implications of global AI governance explicit at the launch, calling for multilateral cooperation on AI, and rejecting AI dominance by one country (this appeared to be a barb at the US; recall comments last year by the White House AI policy adviser at the India AI Summit, prioritising US ‘dominance’ of AI through the global use of the American AI stack).

Xi’s attendance at the moot highlights how central AI now is to China’s diplomatic and industrial strategies. Seeing a gap created by US isolationism and heavy-handed protectionism, China has stepped in. It is advocating for countries to share technologies, amplify capacity building efforts and, most importantly, coalesce around shared demands for global AI governance.

The rallying cry is particularly targeted towards emerging economies in the Global South. With WAICO’s launch, Beijing has positioned itself as an AI ‘godfather’, happy to dole out gifts and advice to smooth the AI journeys of its less technologically advanced or poorly resourced partners. Pakistan on Friday joined 29 other countries as founding members of the organisation.

Why is Beijing seeking to hold the pen on AI?

Why is Beijing, which has for so long shied away from global leadership, seeking to hold the pen on AI? For one, the winner of the AI race will reap both economic and political benefits. Beijing has seen this with the Digital Silk Road Initiative, under which China has exported 5G networks and surveillance tech around the world, creating reliance on Chinese companies’ know-how and influence over user governments.

China now wants to step up investment in AI infrastructure — including semi-conductor chips and the critical minerals supply chain that underpins them — and build Global South dependence on Chinese AI infrastructure and technologies, ensuring its economic prospects for the decades ahead. While it has some catching up with the US to do in the chip space, it is well-positioned, due to its outsized energy infrastructure, to fuel AI dominance.

The other reason is ideological. China recalls when it alone stood behind the Great Firewall, while the world celebrated the idea of a democratic, open internet. Those days are gone, as nations ranging from large democracies such as the US and India to tin-pot dictatorships all clamp down on net freedoms, frequently impose internet shutdowns and install surveillance systems. With AI, Beijing is pushing for state-dominated, highly regulated AI systems.

WAICO is expected to build consensus on AI standards and governance in line with China’s vision for state-centric AI, and use the group’s influence to sway global AI governance and policies ultimately established through UN frameworks.

Before Pakistan is fully swept away by the Chinese AI wave, it should clarify its own AI priorities and demands of global AI governance. The National Artificial Intelligence Policy, 2025, recognises the importance of AI for the country’s digital — and so economic — transformation. Parts of the policy, such as investment in AI infrastructure funded by dedicated funds and capacity building through the AI Seekho programme, aimed at training a million people, align with WAICO’s collaborative approach.

Both Pakistan and China are also aligned in demands for strong regulation regarding the securitisation of AI, and the responsible management of dual-use risks. Through WAICO, the countries’ level of alignment or departure on this topic will be clarified. China will likely focus its attention on potential for the US to deploy AI in a military context, with little heed for global norms or rules. Meanwhile, Pakistan will remain preoccupied with scenarios in which non-state actors such as militant groups increasingly adopt AI, whether for propaganda purposes, or to deploy AI-enabled drones in attacks against state security targets.

But Pakistan’s policy also calls for domestic AI infrastructure, strong cybersecurity and data sovereignty, aspirations that may not sit comfortably with China’s plan to export its AI tools and technologies, creating dependencies. More importantly, Pakistan’s policy acknowledges the importance of data privacy, ethical and inclusive AI, and human rights in AI applications. Will growing alignment with China’s AI vision mean forgoing the emphasis on digital rights? In this scenario, irrespective of who wins the AI race, we all lose.

The writer is a political and integrity risk analyst.

X: @humayusuf

Published in Dawn, July 20th, 2026