REST assured, I am not arguing against the much-delayed ‘Zarb-i-Azb’ here. I am questioning using war as the only tool in Pakistan’s other, almost forgotten, conflict: Balochistan. Pakistan presently faces broadly three types of terrorism: Taliban-affiliated, Baloch secessionist and sectarian. Pakistan’s response to the three has been varied and puzzling.

Before Zarb-e-Azb, the response to the Taliban had been infrequent major operations, frequent peace deals and endless decision-making delays. With sectarian groups, the response even today is passive tolerance, perhaps even partial protection. With Baloch groups, the main tool has been war. Have these responses been appropriate? I use the principles of the ‘just war theory’ — an international liberal theory about when war is justified — to answer this question.

Its first principle in recommending counter state violence relates to the justness of the grievances of violent groups. Terrorism is wrong, however justified grievances may be and states must counter it. But the justness of such grievances should influence the level of counter-force and whether states also initiate parallel talks.

The goals of sectarian groups are completely unjust as they kill out of bigotry alone. The Taliban claim pursuing a just system based on Islamic teachings. But their version is harsh and retrogressive, and contradicts both majority interpretations of Islam and prevalent global liberal values.

Baloch resistance, based on actual grievances, has kept resurfacing.

Finally, Baloch groups are fighting against state discrimination, which neutral sources also confirm. A 2005 development ranking of provincial districts shows that seven out of the bottom 11 but only one out of the top 10 were Balochistan districts. Balochistan also ranks lowest in the Alif Ailaan Education Rankings 2014. Thus, addressing Baloch grievances will further the principles of equality championed both by religion and liberal values.

The second principle relates to the damage inflicted by aggressors. The 2013 annual report of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies shows that Taliban groups killed 1,418 people, sectarian groups killed 658 people and Baloch and Sindhi secessionist groups killed 375 people during 2013.

The Taliban have killed nearly 40,000 people since 2004 and undertaken numerous attacks on strategic installations, eg airports. The multi-billion terrorism-related loss incurred by Pakistan since 2004 has been largely due to the Taliban insurgency.

Sectarian groups have also undertaken several spectacular attacks in Quetta and Karachi. The Taliban have repeatedly held large swathes of land and population, coming to within almost 100 kilometres of Islamabad once, and established a parallel state in parts. Baloch groups at most hold limited sway over isolated areas.

The third principle states that other means of ending violence must have failed. With the Taliban, Pakistan has entered into several peace deals to-date. All collapsed because of militant violations. There has not been a single serious peace deal attempted with Baloch groups. Formal peace deals have not been attempted with sectarian groups either. An informal accommodative ‘deal’ is in effect in Punjab according to many analysts. Yet, such groups continue to undertake terrorist attacks.

The fourth principle states that there must be serious prospects of success in using war. The success of the Swat, South Waziristan and now North Waziristan operations shows that it is possible to at least liberate land and populations captured by the Taliban. It may be even easier to eliminate the sectarian groups today if the state develops the will. However, the Syrian and Iraqi examples show that if left unchecked this may become difficult in a few years.

Finally, the Pakistani state could easily crush Baloch groups. But Baloch resistance, based on genuine grievances, has kept resurfacing repeatedly since 1947. War, then, is not a sustainable solution. The final principle states that the use of arms by the state must not produce evils graver than the targeted evil.

Here, the issue of missing persons and kill-and-dump policies in Balochistan become salient. Ironically, such tactics are used more sparingly against the more vicious Taliban and sectarian groups.

So, all five principles suggest that the use of force is more justified against Taliban and sectarian groups than Baloch groups. Unfortunately, actual state policy has been opposite. A course correction has now occurred against the Taliban. A similar correction against sectarian groups is needed.

But in Balochistan, talks must become the main tool. Force must be used selectively there, eg, to pre-empt attacks, destroy arms depots and in pursuit after actual attacks. All-out force, as now being unleashed against the Taliban, must be avoided to give talks a chance. Kill and dump and illegal abduction policies must be avoided.

The writer is a development and political economist and a senior fellow with UC Berkeley.

murtazaniaz@yahoo.com.

Published in Dawn, July 22nd , 2014