Coalition on trial

WHILE in Pakistan I talked on the phone to Nawaz Sharif, chief of the Muslim League-N, at Islamabad a day before he extended his support to the Pakistan People’s Party. His demands for a coalition were two: one, reinstatement of the 60 sacked judges and, two, the renunciation of military rule in Pakistan to bring the forces at par with India’s.

He assured me that he would make no compromise on what he defined as the “basics”. I found Nawaz Sharif sounding quite confident.

Nawaz Sharif’s joint press conference with Asif Ali Zardari, co-chairman of the PPP, was categorical on the restoration of judges. They will be reinstated within a month of the National Assembly’s first session.

Probably an executive order can give back the sacked judges their jobs. However, there was no mention of the military’s role at the briefing. I do not see any difficulty in the judges getting back their jobs.

But there may be a problem about the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry because a new CJ is already in the chair. He may step down voluntarily to accommodate Chaudhry. Otherwise, it would be a tough question to sort out.

The bigger complication lies in effecting a reconciliation between Justice Chaudhry and President Pervez Musharraf who is to administer the oath of office to the Chief Justice. Chaudhry and his family have been treated as criminals, confined to their home for nearly six months. On the other hand, Musharraf has not stopped running down Chaudhry. How can there be a meeting point?

With Musharraf’s resolve to humiliate Chaudhry, things do not appear to be working between the state’s head and the judiciary’s chief. Musharraf is taking revenge from the judiciary and the bar which have facilitated the re-emergence of political parties. But he should realise that if the restoration of democracy was his ultimate goal, the lawyers’ agitation has brought it nearer.

Nawaz Sharif’s second observation on the military is not even under discussion. True, Zardari’s stand is different. He can live with the military as he can with Musharraf. My feeling is that the martyred Benazir Bhutto would not have agreed to this position. Since Zardari heads the party at present, his word would count.

Nawaz Sharif’s views are different but, maybe, Zardari has assured him that the military’s role will be attended to in the National Assembly. He should realise that downgrading the military is so important for democracy that the change should be seen and felt by the people. The National Assembly is a good forum but the military would not like its dirty linen to be washed in public.

It is difficult to visualise a Pakistani army chief giving up the authority and power his office has wielded for more than four decades. It also means losing 70 per cent control over commerce, business and industry, the vast empire that the military has built.

What happens to defence colonies, built on land given free of cost to the top brass? The whole of Pakistan and its thinking would have to undergo a complete change if the military is to be reduced only to the role of defending the country as is the case in India.

No doubt, Pakistan’s army chief Parvez Kayani has withdrawn many officers from top civil positions. He has also promised to keep his force away from politics. But he has also said that he has not distanced himself from President Musharraf.

The day he distances himself from the president will be the day when the process of transferring power to the political set-up will begin.

This tangles the situation because Musharraf is going to face the charge of ousting an elected prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, through a coup. Presidential spokesman Maj Rashid Qureshi has said that Musharraf intends continuing “serving” the nation. How can he legalise his rule which was palpably illegal?

The use of the word ‘serving’ is irritating because if ever history records the role of Musharraf, it will be in unpardonable terms. Nawaz Sharif has made no secret of his endeavour to put Musharraf on trial. This may not be to the liking of Zardari.

The fragile coalition may come under more pressure and one does not know the outcome if there is no amicable settlement. At least, Gen Kayani should distance himself from Musharraf because if he doesn’t it may create a piquant situation, not to the benefit of either the military or civil society.

I can see a legal and political battle building up. When Musharraf got elected as president by the last assemblies, he was still in uniform. A candidate for the office of president cannot be in uniform, says the Constitution. The matter is still pending before the Supreme Court which may again be presided over by Chaudhry.

He had given a landmark judgment against emergency rule before he was sacked and placed under house arrest. What will be his verdict on Musharraf’s election is not known but it is bound to create an uneasy situation.

It is also difficult to predict how the army would react to parliament’s move to reinstate the sacked judges, including Chaudhry, and how Gen Kayani might respond to measures parliament will initiate to undo the constitutional decisions Musharraf took. Parliament will need to restore its prestige. So will the judiciary. Both will tell on the position which Musharraf and the military enjoy at present.

In a democratic structure, there cannot be two parallel lines of control. People’s representatives have to be at the helm of affairs, answerable to those who elect them. So long as the military has a say in formulating policies, domestic or foreign, Pakistan may not be considered a democracy.

True, there is a National Security Council which has the executive and the three wings of the armed forces as its members. But the power the Council has enjoyed so far is far more than is allowed in a democratic set-up. Parliament has to be supreme, not the National Security Council.

Both Nawaz Sharif and Asif Zardari have an opportunity to take the country on the road to people’s raj. That the two have been able to persuade Fazlur Rehman of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam and a dynamic democrat like Asfandyar Wali Khan, leader of the NWFP-based Awami National Party, augurs well for Pakistan.

Together they can put the country back on the rails. They have a lot to do and that requires unity of purpose and action. If any of them tries to monopolise power to the exclusion of others — the bane of Pakistan — the country may go back to square one. Then even its ardent supporters may lose heart. The coalition of different parties is on trial at the moment. They must not fail Pakistan.

The writer is a leading journalist based in Delhi.

Re-imagining the state

The PPP, in particular, will have to deal with the problem of forming a government in Sindh without the MQM in whose absence one cannot conceive of any stability in the urban areas of the province. Unfortunately, the PPP’s gesture of extending a hand to the MQM was rejected and the latter opted to sit with the opposition instead. Despite this, the new leadership would benefit a lot if it looked carefully at its relationship with the ethnic party and find a long-term solution to the larger problem of ethnic politics in the country.

At this juncture, what is needed is the re-imagination of the state based on carving out administrative divisions on a linguistic basis. The ethnic tension in urban Sindh can only be solved once the internal boundaries of the state are re-imagined. The conflict in Sindh, which has marred light and life in major urban centres like Karachi, needs deep political solutions.

The ethnic issue in Sindh emanates from the divergent development of different ethnic communities and the insecurities arising from an institutionalised method of balancing representation between different groups in the socio-politics of the province.

In 1947, Pakistan received 7.22 million migrants out of which 73 per cent settled in Punjab and about 16.13 per cent came to Sindh (including Karachi). While the Punjabis assimilated with the rest of the population, it was harder for the mohajirs to integrate because of four factors.

First, their linguistic and cultural identity was different from the rest of the population. Second, they were conscious of their social skills such as education. The literacy rate amongst these migrants was 70 per cent as compared to 10 per cent in the indigenous population.

Third, the lack of development widened the gap between different ethnic groups which the political parties tried to redress through the quota system. But this did not necessarily narrow the gap amongst these communities. The Urdu-speaking migrant community, especially in the initial years, dominated the state apparatus.

For example, by 1973 these migrants held 33.5 per cent of gazetted posts and half of the positions in public-sector enterprises as compared to the indigenous Sindhis who had a 2.7 per cent share in gazetted posts and 3.6 per cent in public sector enterprises. In 1968, the Urdu-speaking migrants held 11 out of the 48 top positions in the military. Even now, urban Sindh seems to be disproportionately represented in the officer cadre of the armed forces. Such disparity encouraged a false sense of superiority amongst the mohajirs and angered others who were not represented.

Fourth, as the state and society evolved other ethnic groups used their political base to create greater space for themselves which meant that the mohajirs were marginalised. The Sindhi-mohajir riots of 1972 were the beginning of tension in Sindh. In later years, the mohajirs were confronted with the problems emanating from greater urbanisation of Pakistan which resulted in Punjabis and Pathans moving to Karachi. The fear of displacement led to the violent movement propagated by the MQM during the 1980s to oust other communities.

In any case, the winds of change had begun to blow under Bhutto’s rule which shifted the emphasis to the poor, especially in Sindh, who were under-represented in the state’s power structure. The introduction of the quota system was to redress the problem of unequal development but it made the migrants insecure. In the Zia years, the decision to give a 10 per cent quota to military personnel in the civil bureaucracy resulted in further reducing the influence of this community in the civil service. Similar changes under General Ayub had also affected the influence of the mohajirs.

Faced with demographic changes in Sindh’s urban centres and the country at large, the MQM adopted a dual approach to protecting its interests: political and military. The party became the voice of the community. Many from the community’s upper middle class contributed generously to it despite their unease with the military-style tactics. The violence was a means of expression for the lower-middle-class mohajir youth for whom, as the author Oskar Verkaaik says, violence filled the void left by a lack of opportunity for fun and employment in their lives.

The violent methods brought the MQM in direct confrontation with the army as well which was forced to launch ‘Operation Clean-up’ in Karachi during the 1990s. The operation did not result in the party abandoning its military option. In fact, the MQM adopted a three-pronged strategy.

First, build links with the establishment, especially those members who were ethnically aligned to it. The May 12 crisis reflects its willingness to serve the establishment in return for a share in power. It continues to be manipulated by the establishment which is seen as an essential security valve. In any case, people in key positions and ethnically aligned to the party were seen as beneficial contacts.

For instance, it was during General Aslam Beg’s tenure that the issue of the repatriation of Biharis from Bangladesh was brought up again. Similarly, Pervez Musharraf seems to have offered a partnership to the MQM leadership. Links with the establishment are also strengthened through giving economic space to the former. The MQM government of 2002 awarded several contracts to military foundations.

In any case, from the MQM’s perspective it is better to enter into a partnership with the establishment than become its target as had happened during the 1980s. Besides, the establishment also has the power to bring in other forces such as the Islamic groups to forcibly displace the MQM. The recent reactivation of the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) after eight years in Karachi, for instance, was meant to signal the government’s annoyance to the party after it talked of partnering the PPP.

Second, establish political control of the urban centres and partner political parties whenever they are in power. Third, use violence as a means to make others realise the presence of this particular ethnic community and maintain political control over an area. Probably, the fear is that the political process will marginalise the migrant community, especially when the constant demographic shifts could threaten its influence. Thus Altaf Hussain continues to pose as a mix of Tamil leader Villupillai Prabhakaran and Sheikh Rasheed.

Some argue that the MQM wants to carve an independent political space for itself where it can pursue its development unhampered without having to wait for others who are less developed. However, such a view is as extreme as the other according to which the mohajir community and the MQM must remain permanently marginalised. A solution will have to be sought through the formula of re-imagining the state. The political forces have to create spaces for people to give up guns and pursue saner politics.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

ayesha.ibd@gmail.com

Post-electoral musings

TO everyone’s shock the February elections were conducted more or less fairly. Compared to 2002, this year’s polls were practically a civics textbook exercise. But now what?

The formal process of the restoration of democracy was sealed last year when the late Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf reached an agreement, engineered by the deeply concerned Americans and the British.

Musharraf was to stay as the president as a quid pro quo for reinstituting civilian rule. Hence, even after Benazir’s assassination, Musharraf had little need to interfere with the election as western powers would be there to ensure that no disagreeable policy shifts occurred.

The press storyline played up the dictator-clinging-to-power angle but Musharraf, whatever else he is, is no Robert Mugabe. It was the first election since 1970 that was not rigged on polling day. In the 1970 heady exercise, citizens voted overwhelmingly for secular parties with progressive agendas, and so the Awami League in East Pakistan was fully entitled to assume office. Instead, Zulfikar Bhutto and Yahya Khan concocted a scheme to quash the result, which soon plunged Pakistanis into the devastating Bangladesh war and its gloomy aftermath.

The mullahs were again found wanting as political leaders in the latest exercise. The Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), feared to be in aggressive ascent, lost heavily. The PPP sensibly has since called for talks with NWFP rebels and also with armed nationalists in Balochistan. Such shrewd moves will upset Washington which, if a grand coalition ever occurs, distrusts Nawaz Sharif because of his blatant flirtations with useful religious militants. Yet, hearteningly, the Pushtoons bypassed the mullahs to opt for the secular Awami National Party that promises help in the here and now, and which can acquire the PPP as a ready ally in the NWFP government.

Even before Pakistan’s independence, the forbears of the Awami National Party cooperated with the Deoband Ulemas’ Party (JUI) but the ulema in those days were more nationalist and anti-imperialist than their present-day successors. In Balochistan the Pakistan Muslim League-Q has emerged as a major party. It is a pity, though, that the coalition of nationalist forces operating in Balochistan in 1970 is not still around. With the PPP apologising to the Baloch for Zulfikar Bhutto’s high-handed behaviour toward them back in the seventies, the PPP leaders are now in a competitive position to start with a new slate. The Frontier province was the only part of present-day Pakistan where a significant anti-imperialist movement emerged in the pre-independence years to struggle for the freedom of the country. The movement was remarkably non-violent and the credit for that achievement goes mainly to Ghaffar Khan who coaxed the Pathans to adopt peaceful means.

One can even claim confidently that Ghaffar Khan even surpassed Gandhi when he convinced his tough followers to adopt non-violent resistance, as they prided themselves on a robust tradition of resorting to all means necessary when struggling for their rights. The results of the 1970 election and the present one owe a great deal to those combined creeds of non-violence and secularism. Ghaffar Khan was not at all the traitor as successive governments have tried to portray him but an admirable far-sighted leader of the multi-ethnic independence movement. His family and old red-shirt workers have kept his tradition alive and they still propagate his message.

He was friendly to Afghanistan and his party, led today by his grandson Asfandyar Wali, is again in a position to form a government in the NWFP. The People’s Party — and the shadowy establishment behind each regime — would be well advised to avail of his diplomatic talents to reach a genuine, solid accord with Kabul. The people of the NWFP may have rejected armed struggle but not their scruples, hard experience and common sense. They don’t approve of the careless and arrogant manner in which America is combating terrorism in their territory. An anti-terrorist policy that drives young people into the arms of designated terrorists is not such a wise policy.

Any new governing arrangement for the province has to be handled delicately, and the Awami National Party is in a position to work it out as needed. To do so, it may need its old partner in the freedom struggle, the JUI, who lost the elections but still controls the seminaries. Maulana Fazlur Rahman of the MMA can still play a very positive role in persuading overwrought religious groups that violence does not pay. Recently, a gathering of ulema in Deoband in India encouragingly pronounced that suicide bombing is un-Islamic.

As for the whole of Pakistan after the elections, many urgent questions need answering. Do all those valiant lawyers who demonstrated in the streets actually care about anyone who cannot afford their services, which is the majority of the population? Some doubtless do. It remains to be seen how many. Is the restoration of the trappings of democracy only going to continue to provide a self-enriching ‘club’ game only played by the affluent? Will a nominally democratic government really act to improve literacy, health, shelter and employment for the hard-pressed masses?

Will the judiciary — spoiled by all the publicity it has received lately — behave in a truly just and incorruptible manner, as it too rarely has done in the past? Will unions be able to organise without legal and physical harassment? Will women — we mean women of all classes, not just the privileged — be helped to achieve the voice and power they need to fight their way out of the mediaeval horrors that backward communities still try to impose on them? Will a new government act to defend and extend freedom of expression, association and assembly?

Apart from tackling serious civil disturbances in the northern part of the country, which is all that the foreign press can fret about, the most pressing need is to improve the paltry living conditions of the poorest two-thirds of the population. Every political party routinely prattles on about devising social remedies but none ever bothers to deliver. Meanwhile, the investor class celebrates a rising stock market but, as Americans are learning the hard way about their own market, nothing trickles down.

About a third of Pakistani children of five years of age are underweight, that is malnourished. The percentage of Pakistanis in dire poverty doubled over the last two decades. Musharraf, for whom the military obviously came first, was no better at improving the average family’s lot than the sly politicians of whom, with some justice, he has written scornfully.

During the last three decades especially, Pakistan’s reckless Afghan policy and its involvement in anti-terrorist operations have cost the country very dearly. It is once again the turn of parliamentary politicians to attempt to show that they can do something other than pour money self-defeatingly into the military, and dish out favours for themselves and for their cronies. The last thing that familiar course — business as usual — will yield is security, for anyone.

National priorities of another kind

AS March madness descends upon Pakistan, our nation watches our politicians (and a prominent gatecrasher) occupied with a round of Mad Hatter tea parties. Somehow the moment of sanity and national pride that Feb 18 had brought along seems just that — a fleeting moment. What is tragic is that as our politicians dither, the crisis that has engulfed our country continues to spiral beyond control.

Our previous regimes had distorted the classic ‘guns versus butter’ equation that forms a part of a responsible economics of defence. Sadly, even their emphasis on the gun at the expense of our bread and butter did nothing to secure external or domestic security. For today we are living in a time when our land seems to produce more suicide bombers than the grain that feeds us. The prime minister who takes charge next will be required to have as his first priority the matter of food and water security.

Pakistan, like the rest of South Asia, is reeling from global and national forces that have not only influenced our agricultural sector’s productivity but also left us with few policy options to cope with the impact of food pricing. So as a matter of urgency the government has to bring on board researchers and members of civil society to review specific aid and policy initiatives that can redress the current situation, identify a policy that can assure rural livelihoods, reduce the impact of food insecurity on Pakistan’s poor and vulnerable, and analyse the dynamics of the country’s trade in essential food commodities.

When it comes to the matter of ensuring that our taps do not run dry, I have to confess it is dependent not only on responsible government policies but also water-efficient practices amongst us ‘mere mortals’. Water scarcity is a way of life for South Asia today and households all over the world have to watch how they consume their water. When it comes to Pakistan, sensible water consumption has to be in place irrespective of whether dam levels are high or low.

One fails to understand why there is no advocacy programme in place to explain to our populace what should be their ‘rational’ water consumption per day. According to the Sphere Project guidelines that identify minimum living standards, an individual needs 15 litres of water to fulfil essential requirements of daily life. Anything over that amount is just frivolous use of a vital resource in today’s precarious water situation. This is where the real crunch is, to instil good water-saving habits in our nation.

With summer on the horizon, what this plan needs to succeed is public trust, a feeling of community. However, what is more important is a change in perspective towards Pakistan’s shared natural resources and the country’s sustainable future. It is very difficult to do that when we still believe in the unit as in our chardevari and what lies beyond our four walls as definitely not our problem — the average Pakistani would rather expect of the family next door to conserve water for Pakistan if that is what they want.

It is also very difficult to expect the larger public to save those three buckets of water every day when they see other sections of society maintaining their ‘spendthrift’ lifestyles. So unless GHQ and the Prime Minister’s Secretariat decide to forego washing their fleets of cars every day, one shouldn’t be expecting the average Malik sahib to keep a watchful eye over his water tap.

Last year we had shuddered at the possibility of being regarded as the most dangerous place in the world and discredited all reports that suggested that we were living in a failed state. But as a populace that sees angry queues breaking into daily violence for their daily handful of grain, how long can we ignore the ominous clouds on the horizon? Add to that the grim probability that the next round of violent conflicts would not be over oil resources but rather water.

Are the honourable members of parliament that will be sworn in on March 17 prepared for these very real challenges ahead? Any bright spark who suggests building more dams has to be cautioned about the number one criterion for a failed state, namely ‘demographic pressures on urban centres and the massive movement of refugees and internally displaced people’. Any government should think twice before displacing more villagers from their lands or stirring up new inter-provincial tensions and ‘group grievances’ in the country. As it is our track record in compensating for lands and livelihoods lost due to development projects is not brilliant.

There has to be some personal responsibility on our part as well. Denise Leith, editor of Bearing Witness, comments: “Through our actions and inaction — even inaction has moral and political consequences — we make statements every day about who we are, what we stand for, and for what sort of world we wish to live in. Our silence, our indifference, and our apathy become the slow poisons we feed our beloved democracy daily”.

These are words which should strike at the heart of many in Pakistan who have developed apathy when it comes to civil society. It is up to a responsible civil society to think of more efficient ways to live within our ecosystem to ensure a secure future.