ONE has to be either a fool or in government not to fear a nuclear conflict. Fools need not worry; they live in their own paradise. Governments make provision for their safety in case sirens blow. It is we — the citizenry of nuclear states — who are unprotected, when the doomsday button is pushed.
Modern tactics have taught nations that conventional civil defence preparations such as drills, blackouts and mass evacuation would be ineffective in the event of a nuclear attack. Every nuclear state, therefore, has developed its own strategy. In essence, it mirrors the priorities defined by the USSR in the 1960s: “to protect the leadership first, the essential work force second and the remainder of the population third”. Contaminated survivors would nevertheless need to be fed, housed and medicated.
Unlike Hiroshima and Nagasaki which were city-specific, any future nuclear attack would be target-specific. No one would have time to relocate, only retaliate. Today, single bombs have been replaced by tactical nuclear weapons. These are “short-range nuclear weapons designed for more contained strikes”.
Ever since India and Pakistan joined the macabre nuclear club in the 1990s, their strategies have hung, like fluttering pennants, for all to see.
Both countries are in a state of suspended animation.
India’s nuclear doctrine was developed in the 2000s by K. Subrahmanyam, a former civil servant, regarded as “the doyen of India’s strategic affairs community”. It balances on three principles. One, no first use (NFU): India will not be the first to launch a nuclear attack. It will only retaliate. It will, however, use chemical or biological weapons, if need be. Two, credible minimum deterrence: India’s nuclear weapons are to discourage others from attacking India. Three, massive retaliation: India’s retaliation to a first-strike will be to ‘annihilate’ its enemy’s capabilities.
The decision to approve a nuclear attack (or not) can be taken only by PM Modi, as head of the political council of India’s Nuclear Command Authority. It is not (regardless of what the Indian foreign secretary was told to say) at the discretion of its DGMO.
And Pakistan’s strategy? Responsibility for “the command, control, and operational decisions regarding Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and strategic assets” is vested in its National Command Authority, a civilian-cum-military body. Pakistan’s equivalent of Subrahmanyam is retired Lt-Gen K.A. Kidwai, adviser to the NCA.
He has identified four ‘red lines’ that could trigger a deployment of Pakistan’s nuclear armoury: spatial threshold (loss of territory); military threshold (destruction of its land, sea or air forces); Economic threshold (any action that might choke Pakistan’s economy, such as water terror — for example, the Indus Waters Treaty’s suspension); and the political threshold (internal political destabilisation or disharmony, such as India’s covert terrorism in Balochistan). Deterrence remains their capstone.
According to the CSIS, “India is currently estimated to have more than 180 nuclear warheads.”] Pakistan’s arsenal is said to have over 170. These warheads have “explosive yields of up to 300 kilotons, or 20 times that of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima”. India relies on Russian, Israeli and US technological support; Pakistan looks to China. India and Pakistan have enough missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads that would leave both countries devastated, turning their citizens (as the dying Cleopatra said) into “fire and air”.
‘Disarmament’ and ‘non-proliferation’ are two words erased from the blackboard of nuclear states. Less is no longer more. While India hides behind the fig leaf of its NFU policy, Pakistan flaunts a ‘No NFU’ posture. No more Mister Nice Guy. For the moment, both are in a state of suspended animation. Their DGMOs continue to implement a withdrawal of their forces to a pre-Pahalgam situation.
The misguided missiles of Indian MPs propelled abroad to advocate India’s cause have been received with polite incredulity and unexpected responses. Dr Shashi Tharoor took umbrage when his Colombian hosts condoled the deaths of Pakistani casualties, rather than Indian victims. In the US, Tharoor riled President Trump by comparing him unfavourably with former presidents Bush senior and junior, Clinton and Obama. Tharoor, a Francophone, should have heeded the French philosopher J.J. Rousseau’s advice: “Insults are the arguments employed by those who are in the wrong.” On his return, a bruised Tharoor may find the Congress door closed to him, and the BJP one locked from the inside.
As mentioned, K. Subrahmanyam was the ideological father of India’s nuclear doctrine. Few know that S. Jaishankar, India’s militant minister for external affairs, is his son. The son seems determined to test his father’s nuclear strategy — on Pakistani soil.
The writer is an author.
Published in Dawn, June 5th, 2025
