Our flawed Afghan policy

I WAS in the midst of writing about Pakistan’s tortured relations with Afghanistan, when the shocking news of the October 30 air strike on a seminary in the troubled area of Bajaur, gave fresh evidence of how closely entwined the paths of the two neighbours have always been. Not only did the air strike result in the death of around 80 people, it unleashed widespread anger, leading to countrywide rallies and protest demonstrations.

The government spokesmen put up a stout defence, but what took observers by surprise was the nonchalant manner in which President Musharraf dismissed these expressions of concern, describing the Bajaur action as a “physical manifestation” of the government’s resolve to deal with militants. Apparently, the seminary had been under surveillance for several days prior to the attack. But no effort seems to have been made to apprehend the alleged militants, whose capture could have saved many innocent lives and also provided valuable information to the security agencies.

An added cause for concern was that the seminary attack came only hours before a second agreement was to be formalised, similar to the one signed in North Waziristan. Does this mean that the government has abandoned the policy of dialogue and conciliation with the tribal elders that had been so forcefully defended by the president during his recent visit to the US? Are we going back to a policy of open war in the tribal areas? If so, what factors may have compelled us to do so? More importantly, have we undertaken this policy shift on our own, or have we become willing tools of the US? These are legitimate questions, given the scale and ferocity of the Bajaur operations.

There have been other disquieting developments that would indicate that the situation is not as clear as one would expect. For those who closely monitor developments in Washington, news from there has been both confusing and worrying. The release of a paper by Lisa Curtis of the conservative think-tank, The Heritage Foundation, around the time the president was in Washington, revealed that all was not well, especially as regards the US perception of Pakistan’s anti-Taliban actions.

In a paper titled ‘Fine-tuning US relations with Pakistan’, the author called upon President Bush “not to shy away from straight talk on terrorism issues and to coax further cooperation from Islamabad in denying safe haven to individuals and groups that threaten both Pakistan and the international community.” On Pakistan’s domestic politics, the paper characterised the 2007 elections as “providing a crucial test for future stability in the country” and called upon Washington to “take the lead in calling for transparent, open and fully participatory elections”. In deference to Musharraf’s presence in the American capital, the paper did, however, acknowledge his “leadership role within the Islamic world in calling for the promotion of a moderate, progressive society.”

Wisely, the government ignored this paper and sought to bask in the self-proclaimed success of the president’s visit to the US. But soon Heritage threw a spanner in the works when, in another policy paper that came out in late October, it called upon Islamabad not only to enforce the Waziristan deal, but claimed that this may “require Musharraf to punish lower level individuals within his own intelligence and security services who have helped Taliban leaders evade capture by US forces in the past.” It also pointed to the need to “focus all of the tools and resources at its disposal on dealing effectively with this tribal region.”

The passage alleging our involvement in terror against India should, however, have set alarm bells ringing in Islamabad: “Washington should privately acknowledge the links between the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Pakistan-based groups that target India and should convey US expectations that Islamabad develop an equally uncompromising policy towards all three groups. This means that Pakistan must shut down training facilities associated with international terrorist incidents.” This coupled with the reminder that “US laws require sanctions against states that support terrorist groups”, will certainly encourage the Indian Foreign Office to focus with greater vigour on the issue of terrorism during the forthcoming foreign secretary-level talks.

But there was an even more provocative observation on Pakistan’s domestic situation, something that may give the opposition some comfort. This was the recommendation that the administration should remind Pakistani officials that US sanctions against Pakistan on the issue of democracy has not been dropped from the statute books. They have only been waived and that too on a yearly basis. Heritage recommends to the administration that “the annual re-certification of this waiver should be tied to free and fair elections in 2007 and a return to civilian rule.”

Of course, it does not mean that Heritage’s views will be accepted by the US administration as gospel truth. But it certainly reveals the thinking in neo-con circles, whose influence on the administration remains as powerful as ever. Moreover, Heritage and the administration are usually on the same wavelength and, therefore, its observations will certainly echo in the corridors of power. That there should be a growing “credibility gap” between Washington and Islamabad, on an issue as critical as the war on terror, which both sides affirm is the litmus test of their mutual trust and confidence, should be of concern to Pakistan.

In such a situation, it goes without saying that what happens in Afghanistan is of abiding interest to Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan has always accorded special importance to its relations with Afghanistan and not only because of historic linkages with that country. Given India’s long-standing animosity towards Pakistan, it was only natural for the latter to monitor closely developments in Afghanistan, which the leadership viewed as essential for its “strategic depth”. This goal was, however, expanded by General Zia’s regime, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, into an unbridled ambition to transform Afghanistan into a country that would provide not only strategic depth to Pakistan, but also be a launching pad for extending its influence into Central Asia.

The symbiotic relationship between extremist religious organisations and state agencies forged during the 10-year jihad created vested interests in Pakistan, which have proven much too powerful to permit a clean break with them. True, some of those prominently associated with the policy of aiding the Taliban to capture power in Kabul, have been eased out, but there are still many who are reluctant to accept that Pakistan should disengage itself totally from Afghanistan. There is, therefore, a constant struggle between those who want to look at Afghanistan as a genuine foreign policy issue and those who are convinced that it is in Pakistan’s long-term interest to maintain strong influence in that country. This is evident even from the president’s admission during his recent visit to London that retired intelligence officers may still be involved in assisting the Taliban.

The political deal entered into with the tribal elders in Waziristan was timely and appropriate. Carrying out military operations against the citizens of one’s own country and that too in a sensitive, border area was politically wrong, militarily unwise and morally indefensible. Placing Al Qaeda and Taliban in the same basket is also a mistake. One is a foreign element, while the other is an indigenous, homegrown phenomenon that cannot be hounded out of the country. While tough measures against the former would be understood by the people of Pakistan, military operations against those who are merely suspected of pro-Taliban sentiments is dangerous and counter-productive. The solution has to be found in dialogue and engagement. This is why the Waziristan deal was welcomed by large sections of the people. But along with this, there should be genuine political enfranchisement and meaningful economic activity that generates employment and ensures the well-being of the people. As regards Afghanistan, there are no easy answers to the current turmoil in that country. Admittedly the Karzai government is weak, ineffective and corrupt. It has failed to fulfil Afghan expectations and has, therefore, been unsuccessful in expanding its writ beyond Kabul. It also suffers from the stigma of being perceived as a foreign-installed regime and is dependent on the support of powerful warlords.

It is also true that though Afghanistan may not fragmenting in the same manner as Iraq, the security situation in the country is deteriorating rapidly, as described by Secretary General Kofi Annan, when he remarked that one-third of Afghanistan is “racked by violent insurgency”. Senior British military officers, who have been involved in operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, have also pointed out that fighting in Afghanistan has been more ferocious than what they saw in Iraq.

This assessment is shared by mainstream newspapers in the US and the UK as well. The LA Times in its editorial earlier this week warned that “we are on the brink of losing Afghanistan to the resurgent Taliban”, while the Financial Times in its editorial of October 30 called upon Nato to rethink its strategy, pointing out that “insurgencies are overcome by winning hearts and minds, not stacking up corpses.”

Surely, there is merit in the argument that Pakistan has a vital stake in a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. But this objective can be far better served by treating Afghanistan as a genuine foreign policy issue, rather than as an extension of Pakistan’s domestic politics. There is a need for maintaining a delicate and sensitive balance between our strategic interests in a peaceful Afghanistan and our desire to influence that country. In any case, the current confusion and uncertainty regarding our strategic priorities has damaged our credibility in foreign capitals and created serious problems at home. We, therefore, need to define our policy in terms of what is good for us, not what pleases our distant patrons.

The writer is a former ambassador

Racism enters the race

IT’S that time of year. A nip is in the air, the football season is nearly halfway over, the holidays are almost upon us and right on schedule — just before the Nov. 7 elections — the airwaves are full of racially tinged politicking. Republicans and Democrats, Northerners and Southerners alike, are attempting to tap a vein of voter fear and bigotry.

Commercials clearly pandering to prejudice, such as the infamous 1988 Willie Horton spot that painted Gov. Michael S. Dukakis as soft on crime and Sen. Jesse Helms’ 1990 ad blaming affirmative action for taking jobs from white men, are yesterday’s style. Today’s is all about suggestion.

In Massachusetts, white Republican Kerry Healey, in a contest for governor with black Democrat Patrick Deval, is running a commercial that shows a nervous white woman being stalked. It ends with:

“Deval Patrick, he should be ashamed — not governor,” alluding to Deval’s support for a rapist he believed was not guilty until a DNA test proved him wrong.

The spot is filmed from the perspective of the would-be attacker, and viewers are divided on what they see. Is the camera a stand-in for Deval? For black men in general? For attackers regardless of race?

Then there is the appalling flier recently put out by Democrats attacking Georgia Gov. George Ervin “Sonny” Perdue. It shows a photograph of a civil rights marcher being beaten to the ground by a white officer with the caption: “Remember this? Their last attempt to stop us from voting.” Beneath is a photo of Perdue, the state’s white governor, signing a voter identification bill into law, and the words: “Their current attempt to stop us from voting. Don’t let the Bush/Perdue Republican Mafia take away our vote!”

Requiring an ID to vote is hardly the equivalent of racial disenfranchisement, but the ad taps into the anguish of the civil rights period and smears it all over the Republican leadership — without, of course, actually calling them baton-wielding racists.

The most masterful of the genre is the television spot in Tennessee targeting Harold Ford Jr. Ford is a black Democrat running for the Senate against Republican Bob Corker, and the commercial ends with a bare-shouldered blond urging Ford, a bachelor, to call her.

— Los Angeles Times

How to allay India’s fears

I HAVE known the views of the youthful Kashmiri leaders Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Yasin Malik and Shabir Shah for years. They may have changed their strategy but they have never wavered from their stand: Kashmir’s autonomous identity. I do not agree with them because the undoing of what was done nearly 60 years ago would spell ruin for India’s integrity and pluralistic society.

Yet, I have respected their views since they have stood by them from the day they have come into politics. They have talked to the establishment but they have never been part of it. I feel that they can be brought round to accepting a settlement that faces the realities and also meets the essentials of their demand.

In contrast, the stance by the elderly Farooq Abdullah and Mufti Mohammad Sayeed is like quicksand. They stand for one thing today and another tomorrow. They are critical of New Delhi when they are the greatest beneficiaries.

They have been part and parcel of the establishment even though they have been out of government. Abdullah’s son, Omar Abdullah, was a minister in the Union government, while Mufti has been the central home minister.

Lately, both Abdullah and Mufti have been bizarre in their pronouncements as if they are trying to gain ground they had lost to their opponents. Their statements are whimsical. They do not seem to realise that they lose their credibility still further when they attack India.

For example, Abdullah has criticised New Delhi for the death penalty to Mohammed Afzal Guru that the Supreme Court of India has endorsed. He has warned that India would “go up in flames” and that the terrorists would destroy relations between the Hindus and the Muslims.

I am aware that Abdullah’s rhetoric gets the better of him. Many years ago, I complained to Sheikh Abdullah about his son’s speech at Aligarh. The Sheikh himself was worried because he had decided to nominate him as his successor. True, Abdullah has matured a lot since then.

But he still gets carried away by sudden spurts of emotion, as happened on a TV network the other day.

I do not know whether he pleased the Kashmiris but he disappointed his admirers in Delhi and elsewhere. It is difficult to say what the fate of Afzal Guru will be. I, for one, have argued that capital punishment should be abolished.

But so long as India does not do that the fate of Afzal will depend on the president of India. Yet, for Abdullah to say that India would go up in flames if Afzal Guru was hanged, shows that he does not appreciate the inherent strength of his own country.

Similarly, the pluralistic society of ours, however wanting, is not so weak that its fate is dependent on Afzal Guru.

I wish the leaders would not bring in relations between Hindus and Muslims in every discussion.

Abdullah’s outburst has led to his son’s decision to have his party withdraw from all the sub-groups and the committee discussing the future of Kashmir following Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Srinagar.

How does this help the situation? Abdullah’s future is intertwined with the outcome of the deliberations at these committees. Take Mufti Muhammad Sayeed. He is going to the UN to present a case for Kashmir’s self-rule.

He should know by this time that the fate of Kashmir cannot be decided at the UN.

Even Pakistan realises this. It is India’s parliament which has to vote on any settlement. Mufti should have begun with the Indian parliament which he has served for many years as a member.

His speech at the UN, if at all delivered, may get a mention in a few newspapers. But how does that make a difference? Mufti’s party is sharing power in Srinagar.

If he believes so strongly about his proposition of self-rule, he should threaten to walk out of the coalition if it is not accepted.

But it is more than a coincidence that he should begin talking about self-rule as soon as his two-and-a-half-year term ends and the Congress chief minister steps in.

The problem with both Abdullah and Mufti is that they have no hard and fast view on Kashmir. They are trying their best to come back into the reckoning in the state.

But they cannot easily rub off their pro-establishment image. Even after spending 12 years in Indian jails, the Sheikh could not regain the old affection of the Kashmiris. Abdullah and Mufti have not spent even a day in jail.

Although they have expressed disappointment over the pace of agreement on Kashmir, they are essentially pro-establishment men who even when angry are not taken seriously. Now that the talks between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan are to begin, Abdullah and Mufti can play a role, not by criticising New Delhi but making it understand that the valley remains alienated to the last person owing to human rights violations.

They can never take the place of Yasin, Shabir or Mirwaiz Umar Farooq. But they can say that Jammu and Kashmir joined the Indian Union on the understanding that the state would be supreme in all matters, except foreign affairs, defence and communications and that New Delhi has usurped other subjects.

The decision to give more subjects to New Delhi depends on the state which joined the Union, not the other way round. Islamabad has a long way to cover. It must give to its part of Kashmir plus the Northern Areas the same powers and the status which Kashmir on the Indian side enjoys. They too should have all subjects except foreign affairs, defence and communications.

The LoC can be converted into a soft border to make it irrelevant for the people of Jammu and Kashmir and those in Kashmir and the northern parts under Pakistan. Why should President General Pervez Musharraf put emphasis on the joint control of certain subjects? It is for the people living in the two Kashmirs to decide.

Islamabad should first remove the military brass from Kashmir on its side and transfer to it the same powers that New Delhi has done. Any other arrangement between New Delhi and Islamabad will amount to putting the cart before the horse.

In the same way, any talk of the settlement of Kashmir will be putting the cart before the horse if Islamabad does not allay fears in India that the ISI has plans for the disintegration of the country. Probably, the authorities are exaggerating the ISI reach for covering up their shoddy performance against terrorists.

Yet, the gunmen in Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu with Pakistani passports cannot be all made up. Islamabad should welcome any proof instead of holding on to the phrase used by India’s national security adviser that the evidence was weighty but not clinching.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi