A fair investigation?

AS the debris and smoke of the bomb attack on Benazir Bhutto settled, one thing was clear: the battle with militancy in Pakistan has been raised to a new level. This is not a PPP vs MQM battle of the 1990s where both parties simply manoeuvred for political advantage. The militants are a different matter altogether.

After the militants’ battle with the moderate forces, one of three things will emerge. A theocratic Pakistan; a Pakistan that is a moderate state which is able to be an equal partner in the technological and social advances of the rest of the world; or if no one fights this battle well, which is increasingly likely, a war-torn Somalia permanently in ruins.

In this perspective, the bomb attack on Benazir Bhutto made perfect sense from the point of view of the militants. If she had been eliminated, the ability of the people of Pakistan to reach out to the rest of the world would have been seriously impaired.

However, are the militants really worried about Benazir? Is she really threatening them yet? The answer to these questions is closely related to the question: are the militants out-of-control Frankensteins or are they merely pawns with umbilical links to a dominant Pakistani elite?

The whole reason for the West backing the return of political forces to Pakistan has been based on the growing understanding that the Cold War relationships between military generals and western military elites are not sustainable. Firstly, these relationships are opaque, and secondly, politicians, who in the West are used to challenging assumptions, are finding them increasingly useless and incompetent.

The politicians in the West have, therefore, been pressing their establishments to rethink such relationships. If Benazir and the PPP leadership would have been knocked out in the bomb attack any hopes of the international community’s effort to change the structure of its alliances from one with the military to one with the people of Pakistan would have been shattered.

In other words, leaving aside the militants who might have felt threatened by Benazir Bhutto’s return, the elite that has dominated Pakistan’s power structure since Zia assassinated Benazir Bhutto’s father in 1979, has the most to lose by any radical restructuring of Pakistan’s relationship with the West.Given this historical background, any investigation by this very elite is not going to be acceptable to the PPP. Any such investigation will also at best be regarded sceptically by the international political and intelligence communities who are watching this matter closely. Members of this elite are very much suspects in this investigation.

An eminent intelligence expert, who requested not to be named but whose influence in the change of western political orientation towards Pakistan’s military was marked, said: ‘Whether this attack is properly investigated or consigned to history with an epitaph (of the unknown suicide bomber) will be a major indicator of how Pakistan’s intelligence elites are orientated in this battle between the militants and the progressive political forces.’

Clearly, a fair investigation may lead to sacrosanct spaces and figures. The burning question is: will Musharraf permit such an investigation? If he does not, he runs the risk of arousing suspicions regarding his own commitment amongst his allies in enlightened moderation. If he does, his own power base may be under threat.

Assuming he agrees to a wide-ranging and fair investigation, the next question would be who in the present scenario could be trusted with such an investigation. The answer surely cannot be the police department of Sindh which like all civilian structures in Pakistan now takes direct orders from these agencies.

As a matter of fact, to be successful such a complex investigation can only be undertaken after large-scale purges of the officers, middle-level contractors and bureaucrats who have populated the offices of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and law enforcement for the last 30 years.

The arguments for such a purge go beyond the investigation itself. The process and results of such a broad investigation would probably also convey to Musharraf some of the key reasons behind the abysmal performance of his intelligence agencies against the actual sources from where this terrorism emerges.

Arguably, such a process is long overdue anyway. Accountability for the analysis that resulted in all the failed intelligence doctrines of strategic depth, insurrections in India and domestic ethnic and sectarian strife may perhaps follow through this path. As a matter of fact, one does not want to add nuclear proliferation but this is surely someone’s baby as well.

The continued self-serving argument of these agencies that they need links with certain leaderships that might be involved in militant activities because of their support among the people of Pakistan is a suspicious one. It does not wash. After the crowds that greeted Benazir Bhutto (despite a heavily funded scheme of disinformation questioning her democratic credentials) one thing is clear; the people of Pakistan do not agree with the glorious strategic adventures cooked up in safe houses in Margalla and unmarked rest houses in Abbottabad and Peshawar.

For a long time, no one has challenged either the strategic objectives of the intelligence agencies or the diversion of the funds of the people of Pakistan. The only thing that we know about such funds is (if the statements including Naseerullah Babar’s affidavit in the Supreme Court in Air Marshal Asghar Khan’s petition are any indicator) that they are apportioned royally between the spymasters and their top civilian lieutenants including contractors, unsuccessful politicians and their lackey bureaucrats — the so-called elite.We need to know more: any investigation has to track funds forensically to pick up the strands of any conspiracy or dismiss it. This cannot be done when people responsible for these fund flows are permitted to influence the investigation.

If there is no purge, no forensic tracing of the flow of funds and no replacement of people handling militancy then the Pakistan People’s Party should reconsider the framework within which it has decided to become a partner in this process. If that happens, the United States and the West also need to consider how they should interact with this Pakistani elite that would then appear to be holding them, the people of Pakistan, and the militants hostage to a conflict.

Intelligent questions could well lead to interesting answers regarding the attempted assassination of Benazir Bhutto. A number of operatives in the current establishment and the intelligence services look towards people in this elite for guidance, financial largesse and political sponsorship. Some interesting leads would definitely arise if a proper investigation net is thrown for funds and personalities.

Perhaps the starting point of the investigation should not be the usual bloodied head exhibited on television.

If a thorough investigation reveals more than that a militant from the northwest was responsible, very few in Pakistan will be surprised. If, as I hope, this is not the case, then purges in this elite would in any event do no harm. Pakistan cannot be the loser if this elite as a whole is economically and politically cut to size. Its main legacy is in any case incompetence and human rights violations.

The future for Pakistan will be bright in the fight against militants if these intelligence elites are replaced with possibly naïve but educated, analytical young people under new charters. Similarly, complete incorporation of the tribal areas in Pakistan’s political system and an overhaul of the religious system of education need to be high on the political agenda.

More intriguing than interesting

WHEN a delegation of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement arrived at Bilawal House earlier this week to condole with the provincial leadership of the Pakistan People’s Party over the tragic incidents of Oct 18, it was a major step forward on the rather tricky road of mutual coexistence that the two sides seem to be building over the last month or so. The nascent love affair, for sure, is making heads turn.

In the lead-up to the long-awaited return of Benazir Bhutto, the MQM has clearly had a major role to play. So delicately poised is the situation in the PPP’s home province that Ms Bhutto had to first land in Karachi to make her statement of political intent. This was unlike her previous choice of Lahore in 1986; a choice that she never regretted, and a choice that immediately turned into a significant milestone in the context of homecoming receptions and political processions in the country.

So anxious was Ms Bhutto about her political base that she actually played the so-called Sindh card on the eve of her return. She could have easily avoided being so unnecessarily blunt while taking on the Supreme Court, accusing it of a certain provincial bias in its verdicts. It was quite an uncharacteristic outburst on the part of Ms Bhutto who is otherwise known to be shrewd and astute in her public postures. But it also betrayed her anxiety about reclaiming her political base.The big question here is, whether or not she could have laid this fresh and potent claim without an understanding with the MQM. With the backing of the West, she could have a ‘deal’ with President Gen Pervez Musharraf. In turn, she could have the protection of the National Reconciliation Ordinance, and, under that protection, she could have landed in Pakistan. So far, so good. But Karachi? That was one decision she could not have made on her own — or even in consultation with her newfound uniformed ally — without the MQM being on board.

Behind the façade of facilitating the ‘forces of enlightenment and moderation’, there have been a string of soft vibes coming out of the MQM camp towards the PPP, and it surprised no one when Ms Bhutto publicly thanked Altaf Hussain and Karachi Nazim Mustafa Kamal in the same press conference where she committed the folly of going hyper about the Sindhi-Punjabi divide. Whatever be the reason, the effort to begin afresh is visibly mutual at this point in time.

It is more than a decade now since the two entities interacted on the political scene; first as coalition partners and then as fierce rivals. Public memory, as is often said, happens to be short, but it is certainly not short enough to forget history in a hurry. For the two parties it was bitter, discordant and acrimonious, especially in the mid-1990s when the PPP-led state machinery was hell-bent on breaking the back of the MQM.

Interestingly, Naseerullah Babar, the man who was leading the charge in his capacity as the interior minister, resigned from the party as soon as Ms Bhutto struck her ‘deal’ with the general. This he apparently did in protest against the NRO, but as far as the public perception is concerned, he has been discreetly sidelined by the party as a symbolic gesture to the MQM, a gesture that seems to have been well received.

If distant history is that of hostility, recent history has not been any better. The infamous May 12 bloodbath is no more than five months old. The atrocities had the two parties on either side of the divide and it was as bloody as it has ever been in the city and even more. Today the two parties are rivals in judicial proceedings as a result of suo motu action by the courts. That makes the current honeymoon even more interesting.

It may be reflective of some newfound wisdom on the part of the two parties, but, more than that, it is reflective of the power of the Pakistani establishment to create the strangest of bedfellows. There is hardly any other way of rationalising such a seminal change of heart in such a short span of time.

In the context of provincial politics, the PPP and the MQM happen to be simultaneously the most natural and the most unnatural allies. Both draw their strengths from the same province; one does it from rural Sindh which is bigger in mass and the number of constituencies, while the other does it from urban Sindh which may not have the mass, but certainly has more say in both provincial and national politics.

The MQM will always find it easier to form governments in Sindh with the Muslim League, be it ‘Q’, ‘N’, ‘F’ or any other variety, as they have no concerns in respect of appeasing their supporters because there are practically none. With the PPP, it is an entirely different story. With the two partners trying to dominate each other in terms of power, resources, jobs and everything else, the coalition is doomed even before it is formed on paper.

It did not work in the past. Will it work now? Will the constant pressure of appeasing their supporters allow them to work? There is little on the ground to suggest that it will, and yet the two are going soft on each other. Perhaps the only big difference from the past is the strong guiding hand of the power that is seeking a coalition of ‘moderate’ forces in Pakistan. This makes it more intriguing than interesting.

Growing Russia, Iran ties

MOST summit meetings these days are uneventful, because of the primacy given to protocol and publicity rather than to substance. But last week’s meeting between the leaders of Iran and Russia, on the sidelines of the Caspian Sea summit in Tehran, was a qualitatively different affair.

The timing of Iran’s initiative for a summit of the five Caspian Sea littoral states that brought President Putin to Tehran — the first visit by a Russian leader in 60 years — represented a major success for its efforts to break out of the isolation that the US has tried to impose on it.

Moreover, the Iranians chose wisely to relegate to the background such thorny issues as Caspian Sea ownership and ‘legal regime’, focusing their energies on shared interests, trans-boundary issues and trade. This was to the advantage of Iran, given its relatively minor energy interests in its sector of the Caspian Sea.

If Iran was the beneficiary of the summit, President Putin was its star. Betraying no evidence of being a ‘lame-duck’ president, Putin warned against military action against Iran, while declaring that it was wrong to ‘think about the possibility of using force’. More importantly, he emphasised that it would be irresponsible to ‘talk about the possibility of using our territory for other countries to carry out aggression or military action against other Caspian littoral states’.

No less significant was his support for Iran’s right to nuclear energy, adding that Russia supported the right of all NPT members to ‘research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful ends, without discrimination, within the framework of this treaty and the mechanisms of the UN nuclear watchdog’. For good measure, Putin also reminded the world that ‘Russia is the only country helping Iran to construct a nuclear power station for peaceful ends’ and reiterated that Russia would honour its commitment to complete it.

Putin’s unequivocal support for Iran caught Washington by surprise. In response, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice accused Iranian leaders of ‘lying’ about their nuclear programme while the Pentagon reiterated that Iran was providing weapons to terrorists in Iran and Afghanistan.

This was followed by President Bush warning that Iran must be barred from acquiring nuclear weapons to avoid the prospects of a third world war. Vice President Cheney, long recognised as a ‘hawk’ on Iran, stepped in with the declaration that the US ‘will not allow Iran to have nuclear weapons’, emphasising that the ‘international community cannot stand by as a terror-supporting state fulfils its grandest ambitions’.

What upset the Bush administration even more was that Putin’s visit to Tehran took place only days after Ms Rice and Secretary of Defence Robert Gates had held a comprehensive dialogue with their Russian counterparts in Moscow. Both sides claimed that they wished to defuse the mounting tensions between them, but the Moscow meeting failed to bridge their differences, with the US anti-missile defence shield proposal and the Russian threat to abandon the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, resulting in a public spat between them.

Putin’s statements in Tehran are significant for they represent a departure from Russia’s oft stated policy of working with the US and the other P-5 states to maintain diplomatic pressure on Iran. Washington’s harsh reaction confirms the impression that this development represents a failure of its policy towards Russia, as much as it demonstrates the skill and resolve with which Putin has advanced his country’s interests, even when playing with a weak hand.

Putin’s assertive foreign policy may have upset many in the West but it has endeared him to his people, for it is taken ‘as a sign of the strengthening of Russia’s role and authority on the world stage’. But it is not only in Europe that Putin wants to demonstrate Russia’s influence. Central Asia and the Middle East have not escaped his attention either.

Relations with China in particular occupy centre-stage in Putin’s strategic plans for the region, both bilaterally and in the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In fact, Sino-Russian collaboration confronts the West with a formidable challenge.

As Putin ends his second four-year term, the Russians are deeply appreciative of the peace and order imposed by him. But what has endeared Putin to most Russians is the element of ‘pride’ that he has restored to the country. What the US sees as ‘aggressive’ or ‘nationalist’ policies are viewed by Russians as ‘independent’ and ‘sovereign’ policies.

The US must learn to strike a balance in its relations with Russia and treat it as a responsible major global power, just as it treats China as an economic giant and a major political player. The US must also recognise that the Russians will no longer brook ‘guidance’, and certainly not any ‘interference’ in their internal affairs. That era is over now.

Meanwhile, Iran has become an obsession with the Bush administration. It has also emerged as a major issue in the foreign policy debate for the US presidential candidates. While some Democrats are accusing Bush of raising the spectre of a global war, Hillary Clinton has opted to give the president ‘a virtual blank check’. Republican candidates, on the other hand, are vying over who would be toughest on Iran, with each vowing to take military action, if necessary.

Nevertheless, many Americans remain sceptical of US allegations against Iran’s nuclear programme. In an op-ed piece, Scott Ritter, a former UN arms inspector, asserted that ‘a careful fact-based assessment of Iran demonstrates that it poses no threat to the legitimate national security interests of the US’. Similar views were expressed by Fareed Zakaria, a well-known foreign policy analyst, who wrote that ‘the American discussion about Iran has lost all connection to reality’ and warned that the US was ‘on a path to irreversible confrontation with a country we know almost nothing about’.

Putin’s comments highlighted the growing differences between Russia and the West, especially the United States. While the latter seeks more unilateral and multilateral sanctions to punish Iran for its nuclear programme, the former believes that diplomacy is the only way to solve the stand-off; especially as it remains sceptical about western claims that Iran’s nuclear programme is military in nature.

In fact, it is US interventionist policies and Washington’s proclivity to unilateral action that has propelled Russia and Iran to come closer. With both under pressure from the Bush administration, the Tehran summit’s results represent a major success for them. Iran, described by Putin as an ‘important regional and global power’, has been provided with some much-needed breathing space that it will be able to put to good use, thanks to the skill with which it pursues its multi-faceted diplomacy.

It will also try to use the summit declaration as a stepping stone to full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, seen increasingly as a security counterweight to Nato and US ‘hegemony’.

On the other hand, it is clear that Moscow is now prepared to enter into a new strategic relationship with Iran that is likely to have a profound impact on the region. This is one development that needs to be monitored closely by us as well.