THE next phase in the unravelling of Pakistan’s current constitutional crisis, precipitated by the attempted dethronement of a sitting Chief Justice, is the subject of continuing speculation in the country. Much would seem to depend on the course of the judicial proceedings underway in the Supreme Court and the momentum of the protests by the lawyers’ community, which has now been boosted by the support of a wide array of political parties.

It is certain, however, that the country’s political situation will not return to that which existed before March 9. For one thing, the government’s vulnerability to attacks by the opposition, however divided and whatever the differing motivations for its attack, has been greatly increased. It cannot be taken for granted that the government’s writ, already eroded by its many disastrous misadventures, will be reinforced any time soon.

While General Musharraf and his collaborators seem to be confident that they will be re-elected, even if he is forced to give up his uniform, before the end of the year, such a happy ending is more a fantasy than a realistic prospect. There are many other versions of how the finale of General Musharraf’s saga may be scripted in the coming months.

Among the happy-ending scenarios is one envisioned by some of his admirers, including some former generals, who are optimistic that he may himself see the writing on the wall and make a graceful exit, in the hope that he will be better remembered by the legacy he leaves behind now than after a forced exit.

If he leaves now, it is argued, he will leave behind a substantial legacy of achievements. It can be argued that he has helped his country resume its interrupted journey towards modernisation and the establishment of a tolerant and progressive state. He could rightfully claim credit for rebuilding bridges with the United States that were destroyed by the emergence of the jihadi movement in the wake of the Afghan war against the Soviets and the establishment of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, with Pakistan’s tacit help. He could also claim some redemption for his earlier Kargil misadventure by achieving some improvement in relations with India.

Another acclaimed legacy of the Musharraf era is the relative freedom of the press and speech made available to the regime’s opponents to air their views. However, to what extent it is well-intentioned (i.e. to encourage debate and get policy feedback) or cosmetic or wilful (e.g., to take the steam out of public discontent) in design is debatable.

On the economic front, he could claim success in exorcising the threat of debt default and in effecting the reversal of the rapid depletion of foreign exchange reserves and in accelerating the growth rate of the economy which had drifted into the negative territory. But whether this can be sustained beyond tomorrow in view of the rising economic and political pressure from the regime’s chief benefactor is being doubted by most analysts, except those who have allied themselves closely with its policies.

Among the other achievements of his regime, the space provided to women and the reversal of some of the more archaic pro-religious policies of the Zia era are often cited as notable achievements.

Whether all this could add up to a memorable legacy exclusively attributable to him is questionable. Indeed, many of the above policies were tarnished both in their motivation and implementation by the regime’s need for acquiring legitimacy through them, and failed to achieve their stated aims because of a lack of genuine commitment and accountability.

Unfortunately, the legacy of mistakes and collateral damage, too numerous to be catalogued, that he has inflicted on the political, social and economic life of the country far outweighs the list of his overstated accomplishments. Even if the bottom-line of his rule had less red ink than is commonly perceived, it would be mere wishful thinking that he would somehow metamorphose into an officer gentleman who would gracefully lay his arms in defeat.

The fact is that he continues to remain in denial about his steeply falling popularity curve and the increasing disarray in which his regime finds itself. By exposing himself, his prime minister and the motley collection of his ministers and associates to the daily ridicule of the contradictory and false statements they make on a regular basis on TV talk shows, whatever little credibility this regime had two months ago, has been totally lost.

As the lawyers-led campaign to restore the power of the judiciary and democratic civilian rule gains momentum, the options for the Musharraf regime are getting narrower each day. Its hope is now pinned largely on the possibility of striking a ‘deal’ with Benazir Bhutto or playing the religious wild card in a manner which it finds expedient, perhaps with a view to declaring an emergency and calling off the election.

If things get out of hand, he may be forced to pass on the baton to another general, the way Ayub passed it to Yahya. This would give the military some time to rethink its political strategy as well as provide the opportunity to limit the damage that the Musharraf years have done to its image, both at home and abroad.

Both these options will have their own dynamics and may further complicate the crisis. At best, it could bail the military out of its present predicament, though not for long. The judiciary is also likely to become a major arbiter in the political process, especially if the reference against the Chief Justice proves infructuous.

Ms Bhutto’s reported deal with Gen Musharraf, details of which have been kept under wraps, seems to be more or less finalised, notwithstanding denials by both sides and the negative vibes present in the PPP and ARD circles. The main source of discontent is the acceptance of Gen Musharraf’s re-election, with or without the uniform, by the existing electoral college. This would imply giving away much of the mileage that the lawyers and political parties have painfully earned in the past two months. The battle cry of these protests has, after all, been “go Musharraf, go”.

Even if a “peaceful transition” for free and fair elections requires some negotiations with the government, these should be made with the participation of all political parties who have signed the Charter of Democracy.

Ms Bhutto’s attempt to achieve a bilateral deal with Gen Musharraf seems both opportunistic and counter-productive. In case it misfires, it runs the risk of landing her into permanent political oblivion and dragging the country into a violent civil strife. This is not even a marriage of convenience; it is a marriage of mutual mistrust, with both partners pointing a gun at each other.

The proposed Benazir-Musharraf deal is reportedly being brokered by the US and British diplomats and derives considerable support from Pakistan’s liberal circles. Its presumed rationale is that it would help to eliminate the scourge of religious fundamentalism which has been rearing its head in various parts of the country from the border areas of Afghanistan to the federal capital.

However, important as it is to combat religious extremism, one must guard against the possibility of increasing divisiveness both in politics and society at large. Much of the escalation in the activities of religious extremists (whose foundation was laid by a previous military regime) in Pakistan has occurred since Gen Musharraf’s unilateral decision to pledge Pakistan’s “unstinted support” to the US in the war on terror after 9/11. It has been fuelled by the wave of anti-Americanism that is sweeping across the Third World, especially the Muslim countries.

Gen Musharraf is increasingly perceived as an American stooge who is peddling the American agenda of “enlightened moderation” to ensure continued economic and military support from the West.

At the same time, his regime, through the intelligence agencies which manage the jihadi infrastucture, has used militant Islamist groups to leverage his bargaining power with the Americans and has deliberately given the jihadi groups a long leash. All the while, economic nationalist elements in Sindh and Balochistan have been brutally suppressed in the name of establishing the writ of the state.

Another factor contributing to the popular appeal of religious extremism, which has received less attention, is the increasing polarisation in society as a result of the Musharraf regime’s elitist economic and social policies, which many jihadi groups have capitalised on.

The burning of cassettes and CDs and the campaign against red-light areas find a responsive chord in the deprived against the profligate lifestyles of the elite, as the pious react against sinful living. While such genuine discontent of the poor, including their exclusion from privatised avenues of employment, education, health and housing, is misdirected into religious extremism, civil society and the state are unable to channel it into more socially purposeful projects.

Thus General Musharraf and his regime are likely to be of little help in eradicating the extremist Islamic ideology, which only an active civil and democratic society and a caring state can help combat. The ‘deal’ is likely to prove a very divisive strategy which could further perpetuate the military’s stranglehold on Pakistani politics, without making any significant dent on religious fundamentalism and other aberrations in society.

Unless it is just a red herring being used by both Musharraf and Benazir for their disparate, yet desperate, pursuits of clinging and climbing back to power through the backdoor, the ‘deal’ could greatly damage the prospects of democracy in Pakistan.

sm_naseem@hotmail.com