PAKISTAN is once again in the midst of a grave multiple national crisis. On one side is the standoff between the establishment and the legal fraternity that has created a powerful surge across the nation, creating a new political dynamic –pitching those standing for the rule of law against those who still maintain that the rule of the military as the dominant player and Musharraf as its head should continue.

At the same time, another crisis has erupted in the heart of the capital Islamabad where Islamic zealot students, both male and female, rallying round the fiery radical cleric Maulana Aziz is setting up a parallel administrative and judicial authority challenging the writ of the state. Similarly, fanatic Islamisation, Taliban-style, has virtually ruptured the tribal belt’s old order and is spilling over into settled areas of the NWFP.

The government is struggling hard to reestablish a modicum of its writ there. Sectarian conflict is once again raging in Khurram Agency and creating deep divisions in many parts of the country. No less serious is a low-intensity insurgency being carried on in Baluchistan by nationalist forces seeking greater autonomy and a say in the affairs of the province and the state.

Let there be no illusion about the dangers facing Pakistan from each one of these issues and many others that bedevil it. Taken collectively, they pose a formidable challenge to the state. These are not isolated occurrences but are a part of a broader malaise which afflicts the nation. To these our current and former rulers have for long remained indifferent. For instance, when the government stumbled into the current judicial crisis several ministers dismissed it as a flash in the pan or a media-hyped phenomenon, overlooking the reality that it is a profound development one that has shaken deeply entrenched assumptions of the establishment that the people can continue to be manipulated at will.

In situation that is fast emerging from the clash of new forces demands a wholly new approach by all our leaders, especially President Musharraf, who stands considerably weakened from these events. The foremost requirement is for him to revise his plan of retaining his hold on power by keeping his uniform. By using the office of the COAS and the military as the dominant institution.

President Musharraf has exercised extra-constitutional powers and operated beyond normal democratic norms and limits. He may have meant well and people were prepared to give him a chance for a variety of reasons. But seven and half years of the current military-dominated rule has once again clearly demonstrated that a federal state with 150 million people cannot be run except under a normal democratic system in which judiciary, parliament and other institutions are genuinely not effective. It is only logical that the old order should give in to face the great challenge stemming from the policies pursued over these years.

This does not mean that the army is no longer the strongest, most organised and modern institution in the country. But these attributes of the military now have to be utilised differently if the state has to be preserved and strengthened. Paradoxically, these very unsettling conditions of today also open up new potentials provided all major stakeholders have the prudence and political will to exploit this opportunity and turnover a new leaf.

The fundamental question, however, is whether the military recognizes that its professional and corporate interests are inextricably linked to democracy and a just socio-economic order and that events have now reached a stage where it is in its interest to relinquish political power. What is more crucial, does President Musharraf think that time has come to place the long-term and larger interests of the country above matters of personal ego and prestige?

Similarly, are our political leaders in a position to rise to the challenge of facing the dark forces that are engulfing us and develop a broad consensus among themselves and with the military to rein them in? They must also realise that war-like situations prevail in many parts of the country. If a political government comes to power, it may not be able to function without the full support and backing of the military.

Equally significant, will the army adjust to sticking to its normal constitutional role of defending the country and assisting the government in aid of civil power, or seek formal or informal sharing of political power as in the past.

Indeed, President Musharraf’s perception that political parties are in disarray and are undemocratic in character and the last eleven years of their rule was marked by poor governance and corruption is shared by many. Yet it would be imprudent to make that as a basis for denying the people of Pakistan a normal democratic order. While conceding that the basic failure of past civilian governments was due to major omissions on their part, frequent interference from the military hierarchy was also an impediment and should not be overlooked for reasons of expediency.

Moreover, failure of civil governments was not a consequence of any systemic failure but a result of poor governance, corruption and a lack of democratic culture. The PPP and the PML (N) have done serious introspection and admitted their shortcomings of which the “Charter of Democracy” does make a mention. Moreover, national interest dictates that political parties be strengthened and not incapacitated by marginalising them.

President Musharraf was also hoping that the current political dispensation would throw up a breed of young political leaders, but it has not done so because a manipulated system does not promote meritocracy in any field of activity, more so in politics. Experience of these eight years also shows that drawing legitimacy on the basis of performance does not work as it is not possible to achieve good governance without adequate checks and balances and proper accountability at all levels, especially of those at the helm of affairs.

Besides, without genuine public participation economic projects, however useful, fail to obtain the right response from the masses. Similarly, decision-making and by, implication, national policy-making remains skewed in a political vacuum.

Regrettably, evidence indicates that President Musharraf, driven by his desire to retain center stage surrounded by only a few who could honestly differ with him, may find that he is detached from reality. This is apparent from the way he has intensified his political activity which is reminiscent of an election campaign. Foreseeing that the current events have curtailed his power and lowered his standing, he may find it even more difficult to shed his uniform. What then could be his options? Will he try to align with the PPP as is broadly speculated, or continue to rely on the present political set-up or declare an emergency and revert to full authoritarianism?

None of these is likely to succeed. Why should Benazir Bhutto associate with a weakened President and play a second fiddle to him? Also earn the wrath of many be faced for compromising on principles? PPP support for President Musharraf, even without uniform, may not be that easily forthcoming. Mr. Nawaz Sharif has categorically stated that entering into any “deal” with President Musharraf is out of the question. This is understandable, because for him General Musharraf is his nemesis as General Zia was for Benazir Bhutto, and to have expected her to negotiate with him was unthinkable.

In view of the strained relationship between Qazi Hussain Ahmed and President Musharraf, any support from the MMA on the uniform issue may not be easy. Besides, there is a wide gulf between them on the “war on terror” and tackling religious fundamentalism.

In these circumstances, the likely route that President Musharraf may take is to accept cosmetic changes in the PML (Q) and continue with the status quo. But this arrangement has failed in the past and to expect that it will deliver better in the future and be able to extricate him from the gathering storm would be unrealistic. This partnership was useful in giving the government a semblance of democracy, but has turned into a liability as people watch with anxiety the moral and intellectual slide of the present system.

President Musharraf cannot even buy time by declaring an emergency as the Constitution does not permit postponement of provincial elections, although national elections can be postponed for one year. In any case, delaying elections will further polarise Pakistani politics.

The attitude of the international community, especially the United States, will also be an important factor in the emerging scenario. Bush administration so far remains steadfast in its support for Gen Musharraf, but with Democrats now in a majority in both houses of Congress and the fast changing scenario in Pakistan could compel the United States to adopt a more supportive policy for a return to democracy. Nonetheless, Washington would like the present situation to calm down as societal turbulence is a huge distraction in the “war on terror”.

Clearly, President Musharraf faces a formidable strategic dilemma, which perhaps is the worst since he took over the reins of power. He could think of many options to overcome this political quagmire, but there is only one honourable solution and that is to have a free and fair election, to which he is also publicly committed. After that he could seek reelection for president without his uniform. In this way he will demonstrate good intent and leave a good tradition and legacy behind.

The writer is a retired lt-general.