IF 2011 was the year in which the US and Pakistan got involved in a series of public squabbles and high-stake run-ins, 2012 was a year they spent first in a stubborn standoff and then in stealth recovery mode, which was perhaps not the worst possible outcome, given how inauspicious the backdrop was.

The Raymond Davis incident, the Osama bin Laden raid, suspicions of Pakistani involvement in attacks on Americans in Afghanistan, a near-total breakdown of militaries and intelligence ties, and Pakistan’s reluctance to meaningfully facilitate talks with the Afghan Taliban were all that marked 2011; capped off by the infamous Salala incident that cemented the antagonism which dominated the first half of 2012, with both sides digging in their heels and changing from boys in a schoolyard brawl to petulant teenagers refusing to engage constructively.

The American president wouldn’t apologise in an election year for what the US maintained was a mistake and Pakistan claimed was a deliberate targeting of its soldiers. In Islamabad, parliament took its time devising the new rules of engagement for the country’s rockiest bilateral relationship, while Nato supply routes through Pakistan remained closed and the activities of American personnel on the ground were curtailed.

Not much eventually came of all this sound and fury. The apology that was issued when routes were finally re-opened was not from the American president and not quite as clearly worded as some wanted. Transit rates paid by the US weren’t raised. Drone attacks, halting which at one point Pakistani lawmakers insisted should be a precondition of resuming supplies, have continued.

So the real benefit of the agreement was not that any specific conditions were met. Instead, it lies in the lessons the two sides learned from the crisis of the first half of 2012. Since the re-opening of supply routes, the media leaks and public blaming and shaming that had hit a peak last year and continued into 2012 have faded away, while negotiations on working together seem to have picked up behind closed doors.

The other positive change was on the regional stage. By releasing several Afghan Taliban prisoners in November and December, Pakistan finally began to publicly demonstrate a willingness to facilitate an Afghan peace process. Did negotiations with the US nudge the Pakistani establishment into cooperation on that front? Or was it a more independent decision, a reflection of changing calculations about what kind of future Afghanistan will be to Pakistan’s advantage? Either way, that move and the December meeting between Taliban leaders and Afghan officials near Paris signalled that reconciliation may have a chance despite the failure of the US-led Qatar process.

But a series of major sticking points persist, including the Afghan Taliban’s reluctance to talk to the Karzai government, their refusal to accept even a residual American troop presence after 2014 and their latest call for a new and more Islamic constitution for the country. And the near-term outcome in Afghanistan – the big and unanswerable question looming over the region – still seems painfully dim, with persistent security problems, ineffective and corrupt politicians and an economy significantly dependent on the war. With a West that can no longer bear the costs of the conflict, some countries have withdrawn already and the rest will over the next two years. What will happen once they leave, and how that will affect Pakistan’s security, is anyone’s guess.

But one other bright spot, besides glimmers of hope for a peace process, is the December nomination for secretary of state of Senator John Kerry, who arguably knows the region better and sympathises with it more than any other American politician. Ultimately, though, the American approach to Pakistan and Afghanistan will be decided through what is reportedly a foreign policy decision-making process that is highly centralised at the White House. And that process will end up shaping the answers to a slew of lingering questions; drone attacks, Pakistan’s alleged support for the Afghan Taliban, the Afghan peace process and how to handle the American withdrawal are only some of these. The only certainty is that, low as the bar may be, things look a little less grim today than they did when 2012 began.

The writer is a member of staff.