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When in 2009 the Taliban had taken over the districts of Buner, Shangla and Lower Dir, they had been some 60 miles away from Islamabad. But that had been reason enough for the world to take notice and pressure the army to conduct an operation in the Swat valley because the Taliban were too close to the capital.
Fast forward three years, on March 27, unruly religious elements roamed freely in the capital city, vandalising public property and challenging the police with little care or concern about the consequences. More shameful was the fact that the city administration and the police were not caught unawares.
The events of the day went on to highlight the sheer incompetence and lack of coordination at all levels in preventing banned outfit Ahl-i-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) leader Maulana Mohammad Ahmed Ludhianvi from entering the capital and then arresting him. Some police officers opine that the mismanagement on the part of the senior police officers and local administration put the lives of dozens of subordinate officials at risk as members of the banned outfit rioted.
To begin with Maulana Ludhianvi should not have been able to leave Kamalia escorted by Punjab police commandoes. Police officials told Dawn: “Every time Maulana Ludhianvi leaves his native town of Kamalia, he has to inform the district administration.”
However, the Maulana clearly doesn’t believe in the rule of law and the police administration doesn’t believe in doing its job well, and so between February 3 and March 27 this was the third time that he had managed to make his way to the twin cities.
On March 27, the administration of Kamalia failed to alert its counterpart in Islamabad about Maulana Ludhianvi leaving the town escorted by police commandoes (worth mentioning here is that they’d brazenly point their weapons at the capital police at the Ninth Avenue).
Technically, the moment the Maulana put his foot in the capital he was bound to have been arrested as he had been nominated in an FIR registered on February 5 with the Margalla police. However, despite being intercepted by the police thrice – at Parade Ground, Ninth Avenue and I J Principal Road – he got away each time.
Police officers told Dawn that this was because there was no semblance of organisation for the March 27. “There were obvious differences in the approaches to counter the entry of banned leaders during Difaa-i-Pakistan Council’s (DPC) protest on February 20 and March 27,” commented one official.
“In February, even though the superintendent police was on leave, the in-charge police officer had called a meeting with all the station house officers, subdivisional police officers and superintendents of police. Pictures of the banned leaders were circulated among all patrolling teams to stop them from entering the city,” confided on official.
“In March, there was no such meeting and no contingency plans drawn. Only a station house officer and assistant commissioner were present at the Parade Ground,” he added.
He went out to point further loopholes: “In February, the police had managed to secure an undertaking from the organisers of the DPC that banned leaders would not appear in the gathering to be held at Aabpara and would stay in their native towns. However, for the March 27 event, neither the police nor the administration met the local organisers to get the same assurance.”
He added that in February the capital administration had also imposed Section 144 on the entry of banned leaders and publicised the same in the media.
Given the lack of initiative, one can only wonder about its effects on emboldening the banned leaders. Another police officer told Dawn that when the police attempted to arrest Maulana Ludhianvi at Parade Ground with regard to the February 5 FIR, he instead asked them to show the warrant.
“The police instead turned to an official of the city administration for the arrest warrant. Now he could issue either written or verbal warrant on the spot, but for reasons unknown, he said the police should’ve acquired an arrest warrant before. The point is that no arrest warrant was needed even if the FIR was sealed,” explained the officer.
It was only when the Maulana managed to leave Parade Ground that the senior police officers were moved to action.
“We were ordered to seal the city, including the main arteries,” he said, “eleven reserves of police each comprising 30 officials, contingent of Anti-Terrorism Squad, Anti-Riot Unit, and all the senior officers, except for the inspector general of police reached the Ninth Avenue to arrest him. But even this attempt remained unsuccessful.”
By this point in time, a rowdy crowd had gathered and removed all blockades and vehicles, including the official car of senior superintendent of police, from the avenue and made way with their hands for Maulana Ludhianvi.
He managed to cross another kilometre to reach the I J Principal Road, where his car was intercepted a third time by the car of the superintendent of police city circle. A standoff ensued in the middle of the road from 6:20pm to 10:30pm, after which Maulana Ludhianvi was taken to the police station. There it was decided that a case will be registered on the charge of section PPC 188 – for violation of section PPC 144 for entered the city despite ban – in Industrial Area police station.
Meanwhile, activists of ASWJ created a massive law and order situation on I J Principal Road, setting tyres on fire, and made their way to the police station.
A heavy contingent of police succeeded to intercept them a kilometre away from the police station and told the seniors about a possible attack on the building. After much back and forth, and a tussle with the interior ministry, Maulana Ludhianvi was given bail against two surety bounds, each worth Rs50,000, and was released in the wee hours.
The police morale that day was already low after the Supreme Court chided them for baton-charging unarmed nurses and paramedical staff, however, that does not mean that they lay their weapons altogether. Such events do not only bring bad name to the police, they also set a bad precedent for the future. It’s obvious that the police could’ve prevented things from coming to a still by taking preemptive measures, but for reasons best known to them they did not.
