AS there is no realistic scenario in which the Houthis would enforce a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, and then launch attacks on its facilities without the approval — or on the instructions — of Tehran, we need to ask why a besieged Iran has taken the risk of provoking Saudi Arabia, which has thus far avoided direct participation in the war despite massive pressure from the US. Saudi Arabia’s chequered and violent history with Yemen and its armed factions notwithstanding, this blockade is a tool used by Iran to swing outcomes in its favour.
The strategy is simple: Iran wants the clock to run down on global oil supplies while ensuring that the world feels the pain as prices rise. Saudi Arabia is not only the world’s largest crude oil producer but also the one country with enough spare capacity to stabilise energy markets. By attacking Saudi tankers trying to transit Bab-El-Mandeb, the Houthis force them to take the circuitous route through the Suez to Asian markets, easily doubling the fuel cost.
Thus far two tankers — one bound for India, the other for China — have been forced to turn back but two Chinese supertankers were allowed to pass, showing that the blockade is selective. The threat to Saudi Arabia has rung alarm bells in Pakistan. The Foreign Office warned that Pakistan will “take all necessary measures, including lawful use of force, in the exercise of self-defence to protect its maritime assets and national interests”. The bottom line is clear: Saudi Arabia is Pakistan’s red line but oil is Pakistan’s lifeline.
Saudi Arabia — barring one spat over Pakistan’s (wise) refusal in 2016 to join the Saudi-led military intervention — plays a major role in keeping Pakistan running through rollovers and oil facilities. During this war, it ensured that oil supplies reached Pakistan from its western port of Yanbu thus preventing a serious fuel crisis. However, that port is now under threat of blockade and even attack which creates an intolerable and possibly existential crisis for Pakistan.
Now, with outright Houthis attacks on Saudi facilities, there is the Pak-Saudi defence pact to consider: were Islamabad to refuse a call for action it would not only seriously damage our relations with a critical ally but also regional and, in fact, global credibility. While outright entanglement has been avoided thus far, a direct attack on Saudi soil would naturally change the calculus rapidly and the result would be in no one’s interests, certainly not Iran’s.
Saudi Arabia is Pakistan’s red line but oil is Pakistan’s lifeline.
Much has been written about America’s obvious lack of planning and foresight, and about the odious behaviour of its leadership, but this should not be taken as proof that Iran’s leadership — whoever is calling the shots at this time — is making the correct calculation. Yes, they acquitted themselves better than expected in the first round of conflict and yes, in the short term the squeeze on Riyadh will hasten the global energy crisis Iran desires, but at what cost? If Pakistan’s oil lifeline or treaty ally is threatened, what will that mean for Iran in coming months and years, with yet another neighbour not exactly looking at it favourably?
The actions against Saudi Arabia come despite a China-brokered pre-war improvement in Iran-Saudi ties over the past few years, which had raised the tempting prospect of a post-war scenario in which Riyadh and Tehran could come to terms. The current confrontation makes that scenario less likely with every passing day. Indeed, it makes a Saudi-UAE rapprochement all the more likely, which would also be to Iran’s detriment.
The irony is that the war provided a historic opportunity for Iran to drive a wedge between the US and its Gulf allies, who were clearly fuming at the US turning them into a target and then refusing to defend them. And while it is a reality that US bases in those countries serve as launching pads for American aggression, Iran’s current strategy runs the risk of (a) forcing those countries into a deeper US embrace out of necessity, and (b) working to increase their own defensive and offensive capabilities and entering into regional alliances that exclude, and are aimed at containing, Iran. Is that a desirable outcome for Tehran? Would a carrot have been preferable to the stick?
There’s a degree of selectivity when it comes to Iran’s acquiescence in the Saudi blockade and the latest attacks on Gulf states as well, given that the UAE is and has been an active partner of Israel and in favour of the war on Iran but has been spared in the latest round of hostilities. Does this mean that the reports of a UAE payoff to Iran are true? Perhaps. Either way it points to a pragmatism that belies the rhetoric emanating from Iran. And so, we must and should ask where that pragmatism is when it comes to Saudi Arabia and, by extension, Pakistan?
The writer is a journalist.
Published in Dawn, July 27th, 2026
