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PERHAPS the most significant implication of atheism — at least of the naturalist variety — is the foregoing of objective morality. If all that exists in the naturalist worldview is physical matter, then only that physical matter can be real. Moral values and beliefs are mere constructions of the human mind.
To say that anything is merely a product of the mind’s activity, with no independent existence beyond that, is to deny the objective reality of that thing. The atheist, therefore, cannot help but conclude that morality deals with subjective opinions, not objective facts.
This view, that moral frameworks are merely agreements between human beings and nothing more, is widely popular today. However, this subjective conception of morality poses a serious challenge to our ordinary use of moral language and our innate understanding of the nature of moral beliefs.
Let me explain. When we condemn the slaughter of innocent women and children in Gaza, we don’t say: this is wrong because, and only insofar as, I believe it to be wrong. No. We seem to say much more than that. What we really mean to say is: this is wrong, period.
The religious man is justified in making moral claims.
Something about our moral claim feels so true to us that we make a claim to its objective truth. In that moment, morality is not something we have constructed through our interaction with each other. When we make moral claims, we reach out to a realm of being that is independent of human minds and their agreement.
Look at it another way. Some moral claims are so obviously true that it is entirely conceivable for us that even if the entire world were to come together to say that those claims were wrong, it would do nothing to move us from our position.
Thus, we treat morality as a matter of objective reality. Take the example of an elderly lady walking with the help of her walking stick. A gang of youthful men decide to kick the stick away. As she falls down, they proceed to laugh at her. It doesn’t take a book on ethics to tell us that what we have witnessed is plainly wrong. Something deep inside us bears witness to the reprehensibility of what we have seen. This is moral intuition.
Guided by our innate moral intuition, we are compelled to treat morality as a matter of objective truths, and not as a matter of socially constructed values. When we ordinarily employ moral language, we call it forth with all its objective import.
The problem is this: the atheist has no justification for treating morality thusly. Since moral values are not physical, to deny the objective reality of all that is non-physical is to deny the objective reality of moral values as well. Of course, an atheist may continue making objective moral claims. But the point is this: he wouldn’t be justified in making them. For how could he say anything more than this: ‘the slaughter of innocent women and children in Gaza is wrong, but only according to my subjective moral framework?’
The genocidal Zionist may turn around to him and say, ‘So what? I have a different moral framework.’ And that is where the matter must end. When morality is entirely subjective, there is no common standard, independent of two moral frameworks, that can help adjudicate between them.
There is no open field of objective morality to which the Zionist may be invited and in which the atheist’s claim may be grounded. If the atheist is coherent and honest, he will pay the price of his atheism and will forgo objective morality, which is easier said than done.
The religious man, on the other hand, is perfectly justified in making moral claims with the force of objective truth. He may continue saying to the genocidal Zionist: you are wrong, period!
In the religious picture, there is no chasm between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. Everything that is necessarily has associated oughts. These duties are determined by the Creator who bestows things with their existence and maintains them in that state.
If nothing else, each created being stands in a moral relationship with its Creator, in whose mercy it is enveloped long before it becomes capable of doing anything to deserve it, for the act of creation is itself an act of mercy. Each existent being thus finds itself in a state of debt, which it can only repay in the currency of its own self.
Even the atoms, stones, and trees of the natural world are conscious beings preoccupied in glorifying their Lord. There is no such thing as inert matter devoid of duties. If the basis of our moral duties is determined from the moment of our inception, we don’t get to construct moral frameworks on our own. A theistic worldview can justify our ordinary use of moral language and can explain our innate sense that morality deals with an objective realm of values.
The writer studies law at Oxford.
Published in Dawn, February 13th, 2026
