AROUND this time last year, when the elegies for 2022 were being written, pervasive ‘uncertainty’, to most observers, had been the single most important challenge for those making decisions at the top. Uncertainty about where the country was headed had already wreaked much havoc in the political, social and economic domains as the nation stepped into 2023.

Addressing it, therefore, should have been the number one item on the state’s agenda as it attempted to steer Pakistan through one of its worst periods of crisis. However, as the dates on the 2023 calendar ran out, it was clear that any order or stability would still be a long time coming.

An explosive demise

On the political front, there was little to celebrate in 2023, with national leaders plumbing new depths of cynicism and self-interest.

The ‘great unravelling’ of the political order, triggered a year earlier by the fall of Imran Khan’s government, reached an ugly denouement in the summer with the PTI’s falling out with its once benefactors culminating in the shocking violence of May 9.

On the day, protests triggered by the unseemly manner of Imran Khan’s arrest from court premises — an action that was later declared unlawful — saw angry men and women take to the streets, clash with security forces, and unleash their rage on some of the most visible symbols of state power.

The tide would turn rapidly over the next few days, as the state responded by unleashing its full wrath on the citizenry, rounding up thousands and incarcerating anyone believed to have been involved.

Yet May 9 was no surprise. One could have sensed it coming. The outbreak of violence had been preceded by months of legal wrangling between various petitioners, the Supreme Court (SC), and the PDM-led government, triggered by the Election Commission of Pakistan’s (ECP) failure to follow the constitutional scheme and hold due elections to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab assemblies within a 90-day window. The two assemblies had been dissolved on Imran Khan’s insistence around mid-January as a ploy to force the government to call nationwide polls months before they were due to take place.

However, Mr Khan miscalculated, likely believing that the PDM government would not be able to accomplish what his own government had failed at a year ago: short-circuiting the Constitution to avoid an untimely demise. But the PDM, unlike the PTI, had the state behind it. It not only managed to deny the PTI early elections by deflecting the ECP’s half-hearted demands for resources and assistance, but it also neutralised the threat from the superior judiciary by exploiting its internal divisions.

The prolonged stalemate over the delayed elections and the SC’s seeming incapacity to enforce the law while the Constitution was so casually violated resulted in months of frustration for the PTI’s already agitated support base. Its anger was fanned by the party’s leadership, which continued to point a finger at the establishment. By May, the party was a powder keg: the widely shared visuals of Rangers personnel smashing through windows and then dragging former prime minister Imran Khan by his clothes to his arrest provided the spark that blew it.

The new ‘selected’

Following the May 9 violence, the state made an all-out effort to put the PTI out of commission. Other hopefuls jumped at the opportunity. Two new splinter parties emerged from the PTI: sugar baron Jahangir Tareen’s Istehkam-i-Pakistan Party, and former PTI stalwart Pervez Khattak’s PTI-Parliamentarians.

Under pressure from the state, Imran Khan’s lieutenants began to jump ship. The deserters were encouraged to join one of the two new parties as part of their ‘plea bargains’ with the powers that be. Some opted for a slightly less humiliating route by quitting politics altogether. Meanwhile, preparations got underway for the long-awaited return of the PML-N ‘quaid’, Mian Nawaz Sharif, to Pakistan.

Though Mr Sharif had absconded to London in 2019, his return to this much-changed Pakistan was a triumphant one. His party — which led the PDM government — had prepared for his homecoming by introducing a slew of legislation tailored to neutralise his legal troubles.

The state, too, seemed eager to forgive and forget. Upon his return, the cases against Mr Sharif collapsed thanks to the more accommodative mood at the National Accountability Bureau, and he won acquittal after acquittal in cases in which he had been convicted in the past. Sensing which way the winds were blowing, the other political parties began crying foul, complaining that they were being denied a level playing field.

Great expectations

Over the course of the year, the ECP repeatedly failed to deliver. It was unable to hold elections according to the constitutional timeline and found excuses aplenty as it continued to dodge its responsibilities without visible remorse.

Its failure to hold due elections to the KP and Punjab assemblies had devastating consequences; it then thought nothing of delaying the general elections as well. The commission was backed enthusiastically by the PDM government, which passed several laws to endorse its transgressive actions.

Despite the ECP’s insistence that the extra time it was taking would be used to ensure that the elections would be free and fair, the consensus towards the end of the year was that they would be anything but. In fact, so complete was the lack of faith in the ECP that the fate of the elections remained in doubt well after the commission assured the SC it would hold them on Feb 8. It was only after the apex court called an emergency session to compel the ECP to issue the election schedule that some clarity was restored.

Separately, the SC underwent an important transition in September, with the incumbent Chief Justice Qazi Faez Isa taking over after prolonged internal turbulence within the institution. With the court neatly divided on a host of key issues, the preceding chief justice, Umar Ata Bandial, faced unprecedented trouble in his last months as some of his senior-most colleagues publicly challenged his insistence on doing things ‘the old way’.

Justice Isa announced himself by ushering in reforms foisted upon the SC by the PDM-led legislature earlier in the year, most significant among which was the concession to share the powers vested in his office with the two next senior-most judges and bring about greater transparency in the process of bench formation.

In line with the image Justice Isa had cultivated before his ascension, he avoided the limelight as chief justice and resisted getting involved in the political chaos gripping the country. Instead, he turned his attention to several ‘cold cases’ — such as former dictator Pervez Musharraf’s treason trial, his own verdict in the Faizabad dharna case, and an appeal against the conviction of former prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The most important ‘current’ case that was heard, pertaining to the military trials of civilians, was left to junior judges, who promptly made history by ruling unanimously against them.

However, this momentous judgement would later be suspended in a controversial move by a larger bench apparently formed in violation of the very same rules that had been freshly enforced by the chief justice.

Missing the beat

Elsewhere, the military, under its new chief, began the year on an unsure footing, facing pressures from both within and without over the new leadership’s decision to continue backing the PDM coalition while Imran Khan grew increasingly aggressive. It only gained the upper hand following the May 9 violence.

However, the military consistently failed to find the right pitch for its responses: at first, it responded too defensively, allowing Imran Khan to run away with the narrative. It then dialled up the aggression to extreme levels post-May 9. This approach greatly weakened its narrative and made it impossible for it to maintain consistency in its public posturing.

While the new military leadership largely shunned the spotlight, the overwhelming perception by the end of the year was that it was firmly in the driving seat: everywhere and in control of everything.

Speaking of the media, 2023 was a year of shame. There seemed to be very little of the independent-mindedness of yesteryear on offer, with broad sections of the media seemingly content with unquestioningly reproducing official talking points instead of offering any critical assessments of Pakistan’s lived realities. A large part of this may be blamed on the environment of obsessive control fostered by powerful quarters, but still, it was most disappointing to see the media lose its voice and will to fight at a time when the country faced some of its most pressing existential challenges.

Old nemeses

Though politics dominated headlines, terrorism and militancy also made a strong resurgence in 2023. Bombings, assassinations and suicide attacks resumed with a vengeance amidst deteriorating ties with the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Once again, Pakistani security agencies, armed forces and civilians found themselves in the crosshairs of groups committed to various violent ideologies.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan bore the brunt of the bloodshed as terrorists and militants continued to strike with near impunity, marking nearly every month of the year with at least one major incident. January saw a series of attacks targeting security forces, concluding with the horrific bombing of a Peshawar mosque frequented by policemen and other security personnel.

The devastating attack claimed 84 lives and caused more than 200 injuries, setting the tone for the remainder of the year. Between the January mosque bombing and the Daraban police station massacre in December — which claimed 23 lives and led to 34 injuries — there was a series of terrorism-related incidents that varied in scale from roadside bombings to the brazen attempt to storm the Mianwali airbase.

Looking forward

With a new year, it is time to turn a new page. Though a general election is right around the corner, any hope for a turnaround seems remote. The national mood has lately seemed funereal; with crushing inflation robbing the people of their wealth and the state’s policies robbing them of hope, there seems very little to cheer about.

It was most unfortunate that, as 2023 drew to a close, the citizenry was still being treated to recurring displays of state excess. The last days of December saw the state unleash irrational violence on unarmed protesters, led by women, who had marched on Islamabad to demand the return of Baloch missing persons. Shortly thereafter, reports of police personnel harassing or abducting PTI candidates or snatching their nomination papers for the upcoming elections flooded the media.

It was difficult to ignore the message that was being broadcast: the will of the many matters little to the unaccountable few who run the country. One wonders what sort of ‘order’ this attitude will deliver in 2024. The silenced citizenry has sullenly borne its torments, hoping that it will still get a chance to be heard through the ballot box. What happens if this chance is denied is anyone’s guess. The omens seem dark. One can only hope for good sense to prevail.