Priority in Balochistan
BY REQUESTING the United Nations’ humanitarian intervention in Balochistan to save 84,000 internally displaced persons from a nutrition crisis, the Pakistan government has implicitly admitted that all is not well in its troubled province. The fact that such a large number of people, who include 59,000 women and children, have fled from their homes to take refuge in other places clearly indicates that the military operation in Balochistan continues unabated. This belies the claim made recently by the ruling party’s president, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, at a seminar in Islamabad that the situation in the province was improving.
Why should people want to leave the comfort of their hearth and home in the biting cold of winter and opt for the insecurity and discomfort of temporary shelters if they did not feel they were under threat? Worse still, Unicef estimates a shockingly high rate of under-nourishment and mortality among the displaced children under five. After this disclosure, the Pakistan government can no longer deny that a military operation is going on in Balochistan. Islamabad, it seems, has developed misplaced confidence in its Balochistan strategy after the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti when no backlash was experienced. But it is time it realised that the situation in the province is rapidly deteriorating. Hence its recourse to force. The government would do well to change its strategy even now and seek a negotiated settlement with the Baloch nationalists who are in the vanguard of the struggle in Balochistan. The immediate measures Islamabad should take to pave the way for a dialogue should be directed at improving the political climate. For instance, the government should release the political prisoners, those detained by the security agencies — said to be 4,000 by one count — should be allowed to go home, and an end to the use of force should be announced. All this should be done unconditionally with no conditions attached to an amnesty. It is then that talks should be held with all leaders who matter. It was being said since last month that a jirga was to be held to bring together the government side and the Baloch leaders. But this move appears to have fizzled out and nothing more has been heard of it lately.
In November 2005 the Mushahid Hussain parliamentary committee had made a number of recommendations after talking to various sections of Baloch opinion. These were designed to ease the crisis. A task force was to be constituted to ensure the implementation of these recommendations within 90 days. Instead of taking the path of conciliation, the government has chosen the road to confrontation. True, Islamabad has tried to pour in massive funds for development but that is not likely to have an immediate impact because the benefits of development will take a long time to trickle down to the people. The immediate need is a political dialogue for normalisation. Apart from the internal repercussions of a troubled Balochistan, it has also had an impact on the international relations of the region — be it the Taliban insurgency in the tribal areas and in Afghanistan, or the dynamics of global politics involving Iran, India and China, a destabilised Balochistan has been a key factor in all this. The key is in Pakistan’s hand. It can pre-empt new problems by adopting a strategy that brings peace, security and stability to Balochistan.


Musharraf’s new proposal
By Talat Masood
IN his recent interview to an independent New Delhi Television (NDTV), President Musharraf suggested that Pakistan would give up its claim on Kashmir if India would accept his four-point proposal of self-governance, demilitarisation and joint supervision for the disputed state. Although President Musharraf had made similar proposals in the past, this time he was more articulate and definitive.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, making a departure from the past practice, has broken his silence and come out with a positive, albeit guarded, response. Not surprisingly, in Pakistan, these remarks have created confusion and drawn a lot of criticism, especially by rightist and politico-religious parties despite repeated clarifications by the Foreign Office spokesperson that Pakistan’s position on Kashmir remains unchanged. The government’s stand is legally and technically correct that Pakistan never claimed Kashmir as an integral part of its territory.
The right of self-determination was promised to the Kashmiris by India, and when it decided to take up the matter to the UN, this pledge was reaffirmed by it through two Security Council resolutions — UNSCR 47 of 1948 and UNSCR 80 of 1950. It was presumed that the control of the state of Jammu and Kashmir by India was an interim arrangement and the ultimate fate of the state was to be decided by a free and impartial plebiscite to determine the wishes of the people and Pakistan will abide by its outcome.
But it is equally true that Pakistan has spent a life-time struggling to secure the release of Kashmir from the clutches of India. For Pakistan Kashmir was not just a territory or a disputed state; it became the ideological faultline between the two countries, characterised it has been by the “incomplete agenda of partition” and Pakistan’s “jugular vein”. Moreover, it has been the “core issue”, cause for years of hostility with India and prime basis of the 1948 and 1965 wars and several major skirmishes, including Kargil, between the two countries. Pakistan has made great sacrifices and supported the cause of Kashmir in every possible way — diplomatically, politically and by encouraging insurgency. Pakistan’s foreign, domestic and defence policies are significantly influenced by the Kashmir factor.
Western observers have described Kashmir as Pakistan’s obsession and military’s passion. When the people find the same military, which planned Kargil, prevented Benazir and Nawaz Sharif from making any peace overtures to India until Kashmir dispute was resolved, are now facilitators of peace, they are at a loss. It is no surprise that years of indoctrination have conditioned the national psyche to look at India through the Kashmir prism and any shift in substance, semantics and tone makes people feel confused.
It is also a reality that the global and regional geopolitical situation has changed dramatically in the last two decades. Indo-US nexus is now a hard fact, tilting the equilibrium of forces in the region heavily in favour of India. Both the United States and India are also status quo powers in the context of Kashmir. The European Union, Russia, Japan and even China are not disposed towards any territorial change in Jammu and Kashmir. India and Pakistan are overt nuclear powers and nuclearisation tends to freeze borders. The Impact of events of 9/11 on the region and Pakistan’s frontline role in the “war on terror” inhibits its ability to support the insurgency.
Furthermore, Kashmir casts a long shadow over the region by distorting priorities of the two major countries in terms of development and fighting poverty by diverting resources to defence. Globalisation demands cooperation and not confrontation and for Pakistan to sustain a high economic growth rate, it has to maintain peaceful borders. President Musharraf’s flexibility is thus driven by global and domestic compulsions and does not imply that Kashmir has lost its importance. On a personal level the President feels that he would gain enormous goodwill of the West, especially the US, by normalising relations with India. For India too the challenge of Kashmir is great. It prevents it from assuming a leadership role in the region and creates misgivings among the minorities, especially the Indian Muslims.
Human suffering in Kashmir is widespread, gross atrocities are committed by security forces and a large presence of the military and para-military forces approximating 600,000 to 700,000 enforce a coercive regime on the people. This creates a cycle of violence, emanating from the action- reaction syndrome. In reality, Kashmir remains a live, on-going, human problem and even if Pakistan were to totally withdraw and put the question of J&K at the back burner, insurgency will still continue. Just as the insurgency in Palestine would not fade away or the Northern Ireland violence would not cease until a resolution satisfactory to all major stakeholders was found.
A major card Pakistan has against India is the alienation of the Kashmiri people. India’s tactics of portraying Kashmir as a terrorism issue have not found resonance in the West and it would not work in the longer term.
What is needed is to create a climate of trust and understanding and move forward on the resolution of the dispute so that Kashmir from being the most divisive issue becomes a bridge for future partnership between India and Pakistan.
Pakistan is not prepared to accept the status quo as a permanent solution to the problem “because that is the problem and cannot be the solution”. It realises India’s constraints and sensitivities to any major territorial adjustments. As a compromise, “self-governance” has been suggested for Kashmir that would give the state of J&K a special status in the Indian constitution. Islamabad maintains that details of this proposal can be worked out in consultation with the resistance groups, represented by APHC and other elements in J&K and Pakistan. Talks are going on between the two sides both at the formal and back-channel levels, although the progress is slow.
Self-governance aims at devolution of maximum administrative, financial and executive powers to the state, while retaining only communications, defence and foreign affairs with India. This would give Kashmiris a sense of participation in running their affairs. Withdrawal of Indian military from Kashmir is another major precondition that Pakistan and the APHC are demanding for moving the peace process forward. India so far has been unwilling, as it does not want to loosen its authoritarian grip on the people.
Any viable solution to the Kashmir conflict will need to address not only the interests of India and Pakistan but more so of the Kashmiris. Their suffering and oppression will not go away until the Indian military is pulled back and security forces reduced in Kashmir. Bringing the militants into the political process at some stage would be necessary for ensuring durable peace. Pakistan would also have to further tighten control on cross-border movement of “Jihadist” elements.
Meanwhile, political, economic and social institutions in Kashmir should be developed for the benefit of the people and the two sides should be linked making “borders irrelevant”. For this, soft borders and easing of visa restrictions are essential. Coordination and linkages between the legislative assemblies of the two parts of Kashmir will strengthen political ties. Development of tourism, energy and infrastructural projects, accompanied by trading and cultural activities will place the peace process on a sound foundation and bring about an economic regeneration in the region.
There is a justifiable expectation among the people on both sides of Kashmir and between the people of India and Pakistan that the two governments would make substantive progress on the resolution of the Kashmir dispute and take effective measures to improve the lives of the people. Undoubtedly, the Kashmir problem is complex, but given political will and foresight, it is surely possible to arrive at a solution that satisfies the main stakeholders — India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris.
The writer is a retired lieutenant-general.

