April 6, 2005 Classified By: Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) Summary

The International Committee of the Red Cross – which communicates its findings only to governments and shuns publicity – briefed American diplomats on widespread severe torture in Indian prisons in Kashmir between 2002 and 2004. The humanitarian organisation argued that the Indian government “condoned” the mistreatment but pointed nonetheless to some signs of progress otherwise. 1. (S) Summary: In a April 1 confidential briefing on GOI detention centres in Kashmir, ICRC described to D/Polcouns torture methods and relatively stable trend lines of prisoner abuses by Indian security forces, based on data derived from 1491 interviews with detainees during 2002-2004. The continued ill-treatment of detainees, despite longstanding ICRC-GOI dialogue, have led the ICRC to conclude that the New Delhi condones torture. The MEA/MHA recently protested ICRC presence and activities in J&K, and keeps the organisation in legal limbo, but allows their operations to continue. Security forces in J&K are open to ICRC seminars in international humanitarian law (IHL). ICRC stressed that it was not asking for USG action, but may seek to mobilize support in the future, if its relations with the GOI do not improve. Separately, the media reported that COAS LTG JJ Singh put human rights issues at the center of an April 4 conference of army commanders.

TEXT

ICRC gave us a confidential briefing on the ICRC Kashmir programme, the first such detailed and organised presentation Embassy has received in a number of years. The ICRC has limited the information they have exchanged with us to general comments on the human rights situation in Kashmir and the Northeast “in order to respect their confidentiality agreement with the GOI,” with which relations have been strained. It intimated that the reason he was departing from this practice was ICRC annoyance with the GOI, and his view that the USG would be an ally in ICRC attempts to regularize its status in India. The UK, Holland, and France would receive the same briefing, he stated.

Interaction

3. (S) ICRC has been active in India for 23 years, but signed its first and only MOU in 1995, it said. Since the last ministerial in 1998, contacts have been at periodic Roundtables with the MEA and MHA, led on the Indian side by a Joint Secretary (A/S equivalent). The atmosphere at these meetings has usually been testy, with GOI interlocutors singling out some ICRC activities as “not part of the MOU,” and occasionally claiming that data presented are “not specific enough” (even going to far as to call some of them “lies”). At recent Roundtables, ICRC has provided thick books to the GOI, which has over time raised fewer questions about the data and focused more on activities that were not carefully delineated in the MOU. Between these meetings, ICRC contact is kept to the Deputy Secretary level (the second lowest in protocol terms). Thus far, ICRC staff had not had problems with visas, he stated. (Note: The MOU was facilitated by the Embassy in the early 1990s and resulted from extensive interaction between the Mission Front Office and ICRC.)

4. (S) According to it, a MEA Note Verbale from January 30 stated that the GOI values its relations with the ICRC, and also its instruction in international humanitarian law (IHL) to security forces. However, he said the MEA also protested the ICRC’s presence in Srinagar, asking it to “wind up” its operations, advising that its “public activities must stop” (believed to be a reference to a seminar ICRC staff held at Kashmir University on IHL in 2004), and warning against “unauthorized contacts with separatist elements” (which ICRC acknowledges have taken place). (Comment: This GOI request to “wind up” operations in Srinagar seems more like a warning to keep to the letter of the MOU than a real threat to close down there.)

Detention center visits

5. (S) ICRC staff made 177 visits to detention centers in J&K and elsewhere (primarily the Northeast) between 2002-2004, meeting with 1491 detainees, 1296 of which were private interviews. It considered this group a representative sample of detainees in Kashmir, but stressed that they had not been allowed access to all detainees. In 852 cases, detainees reported what ICRC refers to as “IT” (ill-treatment): 171 persons were beaten, the remaining 681 subjected to one or more of six forms of torture: electricity (498 cases), suspension from ceiling (381), “roller” (a round metal object put on the thighs of sitting person, which prison personnel then sit on, crushing muscles — 294); stretching (legs split 180 degrees — 181), water (various forms — 234), or sexual (302). Numbers add up to more than 681, as many detainees were subjected to more than one form of IT. ICRC stressed that all the branches of the security forces used these forms of IT and torture.

GOI points to improvements

6. (S) It reported that during recent ICRC interactions with the GOI, officials have maintained that the human rights situation in Kashmir is “much better than it was in the 1990s,” a view he also agreed with. Security forces no longer roused entire villages in the middle of the night and detained inhabitants indiscriminately, as they had as recently as the late 1990s. There is “more openness from medical doctors and the police,” who have conceded that 95 per cent of the information on particular cases is accurate. Ten years ago, there were some 300 detention centres; now there are “a lot fewer,” he stated.

General observations

7. (S) While acknowledging these improvements, it made a number of additional observations based on ICRC experience in Kashmir that indicate persistent problems:

— There is a regular and widespread use of IT and torture by the security forces during interrogation; — This always takes place in the presence of officers; — ICRC has raised these issues with the GOI for more than 10 years; — Because practice continues, ICRC is forced to conclude that GOI condones torture; — Dialogue on prison conditions is OK, dialogue on treatment of detainees is not; — Security forces were rougher on detainees in the past; — Detainees were rarely militants (they are routinely killed), but persons connected to or believed to have information about the insurgency; — ICRC has never obtained access to the “Cargo Building,” the most notorious detention centre in Srinagar; and — Current practices continue because “security forces need promotions,” while for militants, “the insurgency has become a business.”

Trend lines constant

8. (S) It showed us two graphs depicting data obtained from interviews conducted during the past two years, with lines and bars tracing the various kinds of ill-treatment. All the lines were zig-zag in nature, but within bands and largely horizontal. There were no clear trend lines, up or down. The lines at the end of 2004 were in an order of magnitude roughly comparable to 2002. He did not attribute the spikes up or down to particular policies in place at particular times, but called them “ad hoc changes.”

Next steps

9. (S) The ICRC official indicated that his organization would seek another Roundtable with the MEA and MHA between April and June. The ICRC New Delhi office also wants its President to visit India, to raise these and other issues in a meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. It considered this “very important,” although stressed that it was not agreed. After 23 years of activities in country, the ICRC also wants to regularize its status by concluding a formal agreement with the GOI like that enjoyed by UN agencies. Most importantly, ICRC seeks a “purposive, rather than restrictive” interpretation of its existing MOU and and end to IT and torture.

COAS: velvet glove, iron fist

11. (C) In a separate but related development, the media reported that COAS LTG JJ Singh made military discipline issues the centre point of a conference for army commanders April 5, following reports that Defence Minister Mukherjee was disturbed by continued reports of human rights violations by the security forces. Addressing the conference, Mukherkee observed that “we must realize that while dealing with insurgents, we are operating within our own territory and allegations of human rights violations will not only sully the image of the army, but also reduce our effectiveness in tackling militancy.” As part of his “velvet glove, iron fist” approach, Singh has repeatedly stipulated that his officers should use “minimum force” and avoid “collateral damage” in their units in order to reverse declining standards in discipline.

MULFORD

—Dawn-Guardian News Service