ONE year has passed since India decided to hold the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance. Pakistan’s National Security Council issued a warning, shortly after the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security’s decision, that any attempt to divert water flows will be regarded as an “act of war”. A year later, there are no visible signs towards the treaty’s restoration, and it remains essentially paralysed.

India has expedited development on a number of controversial hydropower projects by revising completion deadlines and making more rigorous funding arrangements. New Delhi has also approved design modifications in order to improve operational flexibility in managing water flows on several projects. Similarly, India has enhanced diversion measures at the Kishanganga project.

The Indian National Register of Large (Specified) Dams lists 15 large (specified) dams in occupied Jammu and Kashmir. The Kiru, Kwar and Pakal Dul are among the projects that India has expanded on the Chenab tributaries.

Additionally, India has upgraded local storage systems and canals while increasing irrigation planning and intra-basin water use. These actions will likely lead to a progressive decrease in downstream water availability and an increase in upstream demand. Since April 2025, all of New Delhi’s initiatives are meant to bring a change from a project-based approach to a water control strategy at the system level. Due to ongoing hydroelectric projects, India’s western river storage capacity could increase two to three times, which will greatly enhance its ability to manipulate water flows.

India has expedited development on a number of controversial hydropower projects.

The majority of these projects are anticipated to be completed between 2030 and 2032. To counter the Indian decision of suspending the IWT, Islamabad had to make a strategic decision: either persuade New Delhi to change its mind or force it to do so. Islamabad has so far preferred a multi-layered legal and diplomatic approach to apply pressure on India.

First, it has sought to utilise the procedural framework of the treaty by formally raising concerns over irregular water flows and the suspension of data exchange through correspondence between its Indus Waters Commissioner and the latter’s Indian counterpart.

Second, Islamabad has continued to advance disputes related to projects such as Ratle and Kishanganga before the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration. Last year in August, the PCA issued a binding award on the interpretation of the IWT. However, New Delhi has brushed aside the court’s decision.

Third, Islamabad has attached hopes to the World Bank for intervention in this issue to ensure that New Delhi restores the treaty.

Pakistan has also explored broader international legal avenues. Islamabad has signalled the possibility of further legal action by framing India’s conduct as a violation of international law, particularly the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Diplomatically, Islamabad has raised the issue at the UN Security Council and several other multilateral forums, and characterised India’s actions as the “weaponisation of water”. Concurrently, Pakistan has systematically documented violations, including the suspension of hydrological data and irregular flows in the Chenab.

However, at this point, Islamabad needs a reality check. The aforementioned efforts may help establish an evidentiary record for future legal or diplomatic purposes but cannot pressurise New Delhi into reversing its decision on the treaty. The World Bank’s president Ajay Banga has already clarified that the bank has no role to play beyond facilitation. After one year, Islamabad needs to reassess its plans and actions with strategic clarity on whether and how to compel or convince India to halt its controversial projects and reinstate the treaty.

For Pakistan, there are three strategic policy options. First, Islamabad’s declaration that any diversion of water would constitute an “act of war” remains deliberately ambiguous. While such ambiguity preserves deterrence by keeping the threshold undefined, it also creates space for misinterpretation and exploitation of the treaty by New Delhi. Pakistan has already announced that since August 2025, India has manipulated water flows on multiple occasions. To mitigate this, Pakistan could articulate a clearer doctrinal position by publicly defining specific triggers or thresholds that would qualify as an act of war. However, formalising these red lines risks locking the leadership into a commitment trap, which could limit policy flexibility during crises and may raise the stakes of escalation if those thresholds are crossed.

Second, Pakistan could pursue renegotiation of the IWT with a precondition of its engagement on India halting controversial hydro projects until a revised framework is finalised. This option, however, could introduce practical and political challenges. Renegotiation of the treaty will demand a high degree of technical expertise, legal preparedness and institutional coordination. In fact, these are the areas where Pakistan currently faces capacity constraints. Moreover, the proposal of renegotiations would likely require discreet back-channel diplomacy. However, India remains unwilling to normalise bilateral relations. Any overt or covert engagement could also impose domestic political costs on the Pakistani leadership, particularly in a polarised political environment.

Third, Islamabad may continue its existing multi-layered strategy, ie, a combination of legal recourse and diplomatic outreach. While this approach avoids immediate escalation, it suffers from structural limitations. Legal mechanisms under the treaty framework are time-consuming and often yield non-binding outcomes, diluting their effectiveness. Utilisation of diplomatic channels could bring awareness of the gravity of the issue, but keeping in view the international environment, it is highly unlikely that the world community would compel India to undo its decision of a year ago to hold the treaty in abeyance.

Time is not on Pakistan’s side. The capacity to rely on treaty-based restrictions will gradually decrease as India’s water projects approach completion. The longer the delay in restoring the treaty, the greater the advantage New Delhi will gain. Given the strategic options available, how Pakistan secures its water future will depend on the decisions it makes now — which constitute some very hard choices indeed.

The writer is a strategic analyst of international security. The views expressed are his own.

X: @itskhurramabbas

Published in Dawn, May 6th, 2026