PRIME Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Manmohan Singh will likely meet in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session.

We have already been told that there won’t be any major breakthroughs.

That the meeting is taking place is said to be a big enough deal. But is it? Or will this go-slow approach force us to lose the most promising window of opportunity to make progress?

There is little doubt that Prime Minister Sharif is sincere in his overtures towards India and in his stated eagerness to patch up.

But Pakistanis feel that India is already in election mode and the relatively weak Manmohan Singh government would not be able to take any bold decisions over the next year. Indian colleagues tend to concur.

At the same time, as the recent tensions along the Line of Control have reminded us, neither prime minister seems to have control in terms of preventing such incidents or curtailing the jingoistic reactions that follow.

This equation does not augur well for the future of India-Pakistan ties. Hopes that the two sides will gain momentum gradually — read after the Indian elections — are premised on a misreading of the likely national and regional developments over the next year or so.

First, the Pakistani prime minister’s honeymoon period will long be over by the time we get past the Indian elections. Without any forward movement during the interim, voices opposed to rapprochement will find greater space to raise Sharif’s political costs for pushing ahead on the India front.

Already, there is a growing sense among government circles in Islamabad that the prime minister is being put on the back foot by what is perceived to be lack of enthusiasm on the Indian side.

Second, the Indian elections can easily throw up a dispensation that is far less inclined to show leniency towards Pakistan.

I have recently conducted interviews with members of the Indian intelligentsia and gained some insights on this question: virtually all say that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s personal obsession for improved India-Pakistan ties is unlikely to be replicated.

In fact, the election result may produce an outcome that is worse than just losing an ardent supporter of India-Pakistan peace.

Given that Congress’s position is weak, pundits are pointing to one of two outcomes as most likely: a Narendra Modi-led government; or a relatively weak third front with the backing of either the Bharatiya Janata Party or Congress.

Irrespective of how one sees Modi adapting to realities as his country’s leader, his rise to the top is certain to create obstacles on the bilateral front.

The reason: the perception of him as a deeply communal and anti-Muslim individual. The Islamist right in Pakistan will have a field day bashing any political government that ignores this reality.

Even if Modi moderates his views as prime minister, Islamabad will find it hard to be as forthcoming as it could be with a Congress government; and if his ultra-right rhetoric continues, Islamabad may even find it politically untenable to engage, period.

A weak third front, on the other hand, will present more of the present. We’ll hear that the Indian government is not strong enough to adopt a positive stance on Pakistan. The two sides will remain engaged and the positive rhetoric will continue but progress will be sluggish.

Add to this the impending regional scene. Most relevant to the discussion here is the India-Pakistan competition in Afghanistan.

The Pakistani security establishment remains wary of the Indian presence in southern and eastern Afghanistan. In the absence of any agreed arrangements for co-existence, an ugly proxy situation is all but certain.

The next year is the most obvious window to find common ground in Afghanistan.

With all its internal problems, Pakistan does not want another proxy war on its hands. India is rightly feeling vulnerable because it can’t compete with Pakistan in the absence of any hard security cover in Afghanistan — thus far provided by Isaf troops.

If the two sides could decipher each other’s red lines in talks between their intelligence communities, they may find acceptable arrangements for coexistence. Failing this, they’ll be thrust into an ugly competition, with its attendant negative implications for the bilateral relationship.

The forecast on terrorism is much the same. Over the past few years, the traditionally anti-India groups have either splintered to join the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan or have found an outlet to fight in Afghanistan.

More cohesive ones like the Lashkar-e-Taiba seem to be less active than they were previously but have most definitely not given up their designs to target India either.

Scary as this thought is, the most likely moment for a number of these outfits to consider reverting to their raison d’être will be in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

With the excuse of fighting the infidel forces gone, the role of Punjabi fighters in Afghanistan is certain to diminish. And if we accept the all too obvious reality that the Pakistani state no longer controls all these groups, we are in for major trouble.

Incidents of cross-border terrorism in India would all but ensure a regression in bilateral ties. India will ask that this be stopped. Pakistan will be unable to do so. We’ll be deadlocked on this issue yet again.

There is no better opportunity for India and Pakistan than the next 12-15 months to fast-track progress. In fact, it may well be the only realistic window available. Availing it, however, requires bold decisions on both sides.

India must match the Pakistani prime minister’s enthusiasm to strengthen his hand domestically. New Delhi must avoid making politics an excuse for lack of progress.

Pakistan must move on the MFN and also speed up the Mumbai investigations, legal impediments notwithstanding.

Meanwhile, both sides must sincerely and jointly interrogate all untoward incidents like the one on the LoC. Petty, tit-for-tat mindsets that dictate for now won’t cut it.

The writer is South Asia adviser at the US Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.