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On the evening of December 15, 1971, General Niazi’s proposal became the centre of discussion in Islamabad, New Delhi and Bangladeshi government-in-exile in Calcutta. In New York, Bhutto was not prepared to comment on the proposal, nor was he ready to communicate it to India; therefore, United States passed it on to Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. India immediately began considering it from all aspects, as it was a great achievement for it.
General Niazi’s proposal stated: In order to save further loss of innocent human lives which would inevitably result from further hostilities in the major cities like Dacca, I request you to arrange for an immediate ceasefire under the following conditions: a) Regrouping of Pakistan’s armed forces in designated areas mutually agreed upon between the commanders of the opposing forces; b) to guarantee the safety of all military and paramilitary forces; c) safety of all those who had settled in East Pakistan after 1947; and d) no reprisals against those who had helped the administration since March 1971. Under these conditions Pakistan’s armed forces and paramilitary forces would immediately cease all military operations.
While Bhutto was busy in New York discussing the situation with Pakistanis and UN officials, it became obvious that General Niazi’s proposal would be accepted and would become the basis for a ceasefire and subsequent negotiations. In response, Indian Chief of Army Staff, General Manekshaw, said that he had assured General Farman Ali Khan, commander of Military police and senior military adviser, in two previous messages that he would guarantee the safety of all military and paramilitary forces who surrendered to him in Bangladesh. He also wrote that complete protection will be provided to foreign nationals, ethnic minorities and personnel of West Pakistan, no matter who they may be. He advised General Farman that since Niazi had desired to stop fighting he should issue orders to all forces under his control in Bangladesh to stop fighting immediately and surrender to Indian advancing forces wherever they are located.
General Manekshaw wrote to General Niazi that after getting a positive answer from him the Indian commander General Aurora and Bangladesh troops would be ordered to stop all air and ground action. As a token of goodwill, he wrote that orders had been issued to stop the bombing of Dhaka from 05:00pm (04:00pm PST) the same day (December 15).
Reports of Indian troops penetrating into the capital, Dhaka, were already pouring in; however, they were definitely in the outskirts of the town exchanging fire with Pakistani troops which continued till the morning of December 16. Cessation of bombing of Dhaka brought some respite.
In the aftermath of the fall of Dhaka, the role of General Niazi had been discussed quite at length. Only a day ago, as noted by Stanley Wolpert, he told newsmen: “What you fellows don’t know is our hidden strength. I tell you, things are going to happen very quickly, amazing things. By tomorrow or the next day the whole situation will have changed … It does not matter whether we have enough men to defend the city. If you stay around, you’ll see our men dying gloriously … We know what we are dying for… We shall give a good account of ourselves. Gentlemen, the great battle of Dhaka is about to begin.” But later the evidence revealed that he did not defend Dhaka for reasons better known to him. His letter to Islamabad describing the condition of the airport and the town was a deliberate attempt to ensure surrender and the four-point proposal sent to United States for onward transmission to Delhi.
In Islamabad, the night between December 15 and 16 was the night of anxiety. While the common people waited for good news, the President House had nothing to worry about. During the last days of united Pakistan, General Yahya had stopped visiting his office and attending official business. He even avoided attending routine engagements. This created an atmosphere of nervousness and was doomed to bring the division of Pakistan.
As the fall of Dhaka was drawing closer, Bhutto was trying to cultivate new ties with United States and see how his future Pakistan could be rebuilt to regain the past status. Unconcerned by how the historians would weigh his political career and role, he continued his meetings and extended his stay in New York for another two days after the fall of Dhaka until he was called back to Pakistan.
