On October 13, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement submitted to the National Assembly Secretariat a bill seeking resumption of large landholdings by the state and their subsequent redistribution among small and landless farmers. The draft bill is a follow-up of the resolution unanimously passed by the National Assembly on September 3, calling for legal and constitutional steps to eliminate feudalism. It said that “the present feudal system, if allowed to continue, will prove detrimental to the interest of the people of Pakistan and as such all legal and constitutional steps be taken to rectify the situation”.
The initiative by the Karachi-based political party comes at a time when there exist least prospects of its being adopted by parliament, much less being implemented. Firstly, the government and the civil society are busy grappling with the effects of the flood havoc and also meeting the monumental challenge of post-flood reconstruction and rehabilitation. Most of these areas are known for being in the feudal grip with ugly consequences. The return to normalcy will not be complete before three years. In other words, no land reform is possible in areas which need them badly.
Second, the current parliament is dominated by the feudal elite, and so are the provincial assemblies. The landlords are well entrenched in state structure and share power and influence with bureaucracy and military. It is obvious that they cannot favour a law that writes an obituary of the system that blesses them with unlimited power and wealth. And how confident of the futility of the MQM's legislative exercise they are, is evident from the fact that they allowed smooth passage of the September 3 resolution which calls for an end to feudalism.
Third, no campaign for elimination of feudalism can succeed unless it is backed and participated by the majority of peasants. One reason for the failure of earlier attempts - by Ayub Khan in 1959, by Bhutto in 1972 and 1977 - was that these were basically administrative measures initiated from the top lacking active participation of the country's peasantry. The MQM initiative suffers from a similar setback. The party is essentially an urban-based middle class group having little or no grass roots base in the peasantry for whom it wants to stage a revolution.
While MQM's land reforms project may appear to be a populist campaign rather than a pragmatic effort, the fact remains that the need for these reforms can hardly be denied. The sooner they are undertaken, the better it is for the country. If our political leaders really wish to get rid of the stagnant socio-economic structure and take a route for speedy modern-day development of agriculture and industry, land reforms are sine qua non.
Land reform was on top of the political agenda in the decades of 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Since then it is a forgotten subject. Globally, it is again in focus, but in a much subdued form, under the auspices of the World Bank which is now advocating policies that provide access to land for rural communities. The World Bank, having changed its approach on global poverty, now talks of the need for “redistributing individualised property rights” to the poor farmer in a manner it does not work against markets.
The MQM draft bill restricts ownership of land to 36 acres for irrigated and 54 acres for un-irrigated land. This is the lowest ceiling ever. In Ayub Khan's reforms, minimum holdings were 500 acres for irrigated and 1,000 acres for un-irrigated lands. In addition, the 1959 regulation provided for security of tenants as well as prevented further sub-division of land holdings.
Z.A. Bhutto, a populist leader, was keen to break the power of feudal lords. He carried out two major land reforms. The first set of reforms carried out in 1972 restricted individual holdings to 150 acres of irrigated land or 300 of un-irrigated land. His second, the 1977 land reforms, were passed by an elected parliament. These reforms further reduced minimum holdings to 100 acres of irrigated land or 200 acres of un-irrigated land.
Bhutto also ended the exemption of agricultural income from taxation. Governments in the 1980s and 1990s did not feel inclined towards land reform, because they drew much of their support from the landowning class. In a sense, the end of the Bhutto era also signalled the end of the era of land reforms.
Ziaul Haq, soon after his coup, restored the exemption of agricultural income from taxation. An ordinance in 1979 declared that where the provincial government had decided to lease out surrendered land, the person who surrendered it would have first priority. Land reforms were declared to be un-Islamic by the superior courts during Zia era.
Afan Khan, writing in this newspaper recently, refers to an interesting case that came before the Supreme Court. It was the case of Qazalbash Waqf v Chief Land Commissioner in which Bhutto's 1972 land reform regulations were attacked as being against Islamic injunctions and hence unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed. Of the 1972 regulations, the Supreme Court declared that seven paragraphs were unconstitutional as being against Islamic injunctions. The striking down of paragraphs eight and 18 overturned the main reforms achieved.
Similarly in the same case, the Supreme Court overturned the entire eight sections and consequently sections 11-17 of the 1977 act as being unconstitutional and against Islamic injunctions. The striking down of sections 3 and 17 undid the main reforms promulgated in the act. The laws stated to be unconstitutional ceased to have effect on March 23, 1990. This took Pakistan back to 1947 level in respect of land reforms.
Afan Khan says that to make a fresh attempt to introduce land reforms a constitutional amendment is needed which allows parliament to enact such a legislation.






























