Pakistan has been lucky to benefit from a rich heritage of probing journalism that delves into the murky geopolitical waters that fuel instability in our country. Arif Jamal certainly fits into that category, as demonstrated by his latest work Shadow War.

A labour of several years and not inconsiderable personal risk, the book traces the modern history of the Kashmir conflict, starting from its roots in British India and the partition of India and Pakistan and the subsequent escalation of militancy under the shadow of continued oppression.

At its heart, however, the book is an exposé of Pakistan's secret war against India, ostensibly focused on Kashmir. Jamal pulls no punches in this book, delivering in the process a revealing portrait of the devastating impact Pakistan's clandestine Kashmir policy has had on regional stability and prospects for a peaceful move towards greater freedom for Kashmiris.

He argues that, for Pakistan, the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan was the great trigger of everything that happened afterwards.

Military planners in Rawalpindi always meant the Afghan conflict to be an incubus for a new form of war they felt Pakistan must develop because past conventional military attempts had failed to wrest Kashmir from Indian hands.

Although Kashmiris themselves had long before taken to armed insurrection against Indian rule, and not without significant help from Pakistan, the secular character of their revolt was undermined by Pakistan's military establishment and its Islamist allies including the Jamaat-i-Islami.

To that end, US funds earmarked for the war in Afghanistan were channelled to Kashmiri militants. Although the September 11 attacks on the US may have forced Pakistan to re-evaluate its tactics, Jamal says that Pakistan decided to temper its support for militants fighting in Kashmir rather than terminate the relationship altogether.

Shadow War is required reading for anyone looking for a concise but detailed account of the Kashmir conflict, India and Pakistan's cynical manipulation of Kashmiri aspirations, and the dangerous if far from inexorable shift in Pakistan's support from secular Kashmiri freedom fighters to the Islamists.

I spoke to Arif Jamal about his new book

What motivated you to write this book?

Back in my university days [before the 1990s] I realised that people were in total denial about Pakistan's role in waging the Afghan jihad. When Pakistan started supporting jihad in Kashmir in 1988-89, the same smokescreen of secrecy covered Pakistan's role.

So these events inspired the book?

I originally planned a book on madressah education but, during the Kargil war, I decided to write on jihad in Kashmir. Madressahs do not give militant training. They do, however, create the mindset that is needed for it. I realised that the Kashmir conflict was at the root of Pakistan military's use of jihad as an instrument of defence policy.

How do you go about contacting militants and getting them comfortable enough to divulge the kind of details you mention in the book?
Most people think that it is very difficult to contact and speak to jihadis. This is not true. In the pre-9/11 period, they advertised their offices and camps, and openly invited people to get jihadi training and donate money for jihad. They also distributed flyers and published a large number of newspapers and magazines to advertise their jihad.

They feel they are fulfilling their religious duty by waging jihad and are not ashamed of it. After 9/11 it became more difficult to contact them [but] the sources I cultivated before 9/11 remained in touch. Many disappeared but those who remained on the surface helped me cultivate new ones. It was a risk I had to run as a journalist.

What traits would you say are common to the hundreds of militants you have interviewed?

They are all products of repressive and obscurantist social systems and come from unhappy personal backgrounds.

They are the products of societies where democracy failed. They are all committed to jihad, which empowers them.

They are ready to give their lives or take others' lives for the sake of their cause.

However, there are some glaring differences which distinguish one group from the other. For the Kashmiris from the Valley, their jihad is for liberating their land from India. Even the most fundamentalist of them, the Hizbul Mujahideen, do not practice global jihad although they believe in it. There is hardly any jihadi from the Valley who is part of the global jihad.

The same is true for the Afghans, including the Taliban. Although the Taliban gave sanctuary to Al Qaeda, they themselves have not gone out to fight elsewhere. However, the jihadis from Pakistan including what is known as Azad Kashmir are always ready to take part in global jihad. If they do not, it is because their leaders have them on the leash for tactical reasons. If they are ordered by their leaders, they would fan out in all directions.

At any one time how many militants are there in Kashmir?

We can only make an intelligent guess. There used to be 3,000 to 4,000 militants in Kashmir in the 1990s.

However, the level of militancy has been coming down since 9/11.

Because of western pressure?

First, western pressure on Pakistan to rein in militants. Second, India has made it more difficult for militants to cross the border by erecting a fence at the Line of Control (LoC). It is very costly to use other routes to reach Kashmir from Pakistan [but] the trend may be changing. Lashkar-i-Taiba sent hundreds of militants across the LoC in 2009.

More are expected this year.

How popular are the major Islamist militant outfits among ordinary Kashmiris?

Militant groups were fairly popular among the Muslims of Kashmir [but] their popularity has come down. Local Kashmiri boys are not as attracted to militancy anymore although they remain alienated from the Indian state.

Militants will have to depend on Pakistani recruits. Lashkar-i-Taiba has the capacity to push in a human wave and destabilise the entire region. But, that depends largely on Pakistan-India relations.

Is it incorrect to say that all the militancy in Indian-controlled Kashmir stems from Pakistan? If not, what are the differences between the Pakistan-supported militant groups and the others?

The Pakistan military has supported almost all the militant groups active or ready to fight in Kashmir, although in a controlled way. In that sense, all the militancy stems from Pakistan. However, in the early years, most of the militant groups fighting in Kashmir were indigenous. If the Pakistan military had not supported them, they would have fought against the Indian union anyway.

Is it still taboo to talk about Pakistan's support for Kashmiri militants?

I think it is the biggest taboo in Pakistan although some do understand the danger. Our media keeps propagating that India is behind what is happening in Pakistan and even Hindus are carrying out subversion in Pakistan. Few dare to note that all the known militants are Pakistanis.

Shadow War The untold story of jihad in Kashmir
(militancy)
By Arif Jamal
Melville House, New York
ISBN 978-1-933633-59-6
352pp. Rs2,290