TO meet post 9/11 commitments, terrorism-affected states enacted counterterrorism policies and laws. CT came mainly under the centre; success depended on governance quality, LEAs’ adaptability, cooperation and federating units’ political ownership. Debate on kinetic options’ effectiveness and cost shifted attention from CT to preventing and countering violent extremism (PVE/CVE). Kinetic options could kill terrorists and dismantle their networks, but defeating ideology needed a different, long-term approach.

Uncertainty initially prevailed over the war on terror’s duration and global impact. Few states drafted policies to adequately meet the challenge; 25 years on, the focus is on persisting implementation gaps. Policies are usually drafted away from conflict zones by those who may lack knowledge of geography and sociopolitical dynamics.

Over-optimism in policy formation leads to weak implementation. Poor planner-implementer coordination weakens chances of success. Policies are hastily drafted after major events without clear timelines or resources. Implementation needs civil society support, but NGOs are often viewed with suspicion.

CT and CVE/PVE have concurrent jurisdiction. Internal security policies, ministries and agencies are federal. Implementation is largely provincial. Weak political ownership hinders institutional effectiveness. Federating units are limited by geographic boundaries, but terrorists are not. Federating units should view CT and PVE holistically, beyond geographical limits.

A limited reading of the 18th Amendment hinders provincial implementation of federal policies. The centre formulated NAP, NISP I and II and NSP — all post-18th Amendment. However, the provincial role in areas like curricula, madressah and police reforms, that need centre-province collaboration, remained weak.

Policy must be converted into practice.

Political instability and different governments (federal and provincial) impact CT and PVE efforts. Policies chiefly remain reactive, such as drafting NAP in response to the APS tragedy. Lack of parliamentary input gives room to bureaucratic sway. Time and quality of debate for such issues in parliament don’t keep pace with reality; provincial assemblies usually focus on policy’s political aspects.

Article 140A explains LGs’ creation. However, in practice, policy implementation is a matter between the centre and provinces; it leaves out LGs, which must be included. There’s also a structural gap in CVE policy implementation due to a security architecture designed for countering the war on terror, not peacebuilding. Policy must be converted into practice to move from fighting terrorism to preventing extremism.

A statistical approach isn’t enough; communities may prefer short-term needs to long-term interventions, such as extending taxes to Malakand and GB. Improved outreach and incentives are needed. Implementing departments may lack authority to adjust activities, budgets and timelines.

Coordination mechanisms often lack enforcement powers, leading to duplication, gaps or contradictory action. Weak inter-agency communication delays information flow and decision-making. Policies can appear as stagnant documents. Without real-time feedback, issues are identified only after the damage. Insecurity and unstable access increase operational constraints. Social fragmentation may obstruct implementation.

Low institutional trust also reduces im­­plementation space. Limited availability of reliable data leads to planning blind spots. Transparency and free information flow can improve implementation. Some oppose new policies as they thr­­eaten existing pow­er structures. For exa­mple, former Fata’s ma­­liks and Baloch­ist­an’s sardars respectively opposed Fata’s merger and B areas’ conversion into A areas. The reversal of A areas into B in 2008 weakened the rule of law in Balochistan; however, the state’s commitment vis-à-vis Fata’s merger into KP showed firmness.

Empowering and giving Nacta a provincial presence may help in implementing the National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines and NAP. District peace committees are needed for local peacebuilding. Gaps can be addressed by promoting peace education, removing hate material and instilling peace skills. A National CVE Index can standardise indicators.

The planning ministry recently launched the Peace and Development Unit to ensure that development projects strengthen social cohesion, reduce inequalities, provide real-time conflict situation analysis, identify conflict drivers, spoilers and enablers early, and promote joint planning and shared monitoring systems. It will engage local community leaders, women and youth groups, and civil society in the policy cycle and support participatory problem-solving platforms.

The article is based on a talk delivered by the writer, a published author, at the launch of the planning ministry’s Peace and Development Unit.

Published in Dawn, February 26th, 2026