NEGOTIATING ‘peace’ with the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, the extremist organisation responsible for murdering tens of thousands of people, was always going to be an uphill task, if not an entirely doomed undertaking. On Thursday, the militant group declared an end to its month-long ceasefire with the government, accusing it of reneging on confidence-building measures agreed upon as a prelude to more formal talks.

One of its demands was the release of around 100 low-level militants detained at deradicalisation centres. So far, the first batch of 12 such ‘foot soldiers’ have been released, with more to follow in the coming weeks — a pace not acceptable to the TTP. The group has also alleged that security forces, contrary to the terms of the agreement, have carried out raids in parts of KP and killed or captured militants. Some delay in the government’s formation of its negotiating committee has been cited by the TTP as another reason for terminating the ceasefire.

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That said, these appear to be pressure tactics stemming from divisions within the umbrella grouping of militant outfits over how to deal with the government’s peace overtures. The Afghan Taliban, who are playing the role of mediators, may also be urging both sides to conclude an agreement soon because of their apprehensions, which would be shared by the TTP, that slow-moving negotiations and coercive measures instead of persuasion may lead to TTP elements breaking away and joining the militant Islamic State group.

The real roadblocks ahead, if talks resume, would be the red lines on which, as the government has already communicated to the TTP, there is no room for compromise. These include the TTP agreeing to abide by the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land, and backing down from its insistence on the enforcement of its version of Sharia and the restoration of the tribal districts to their pre-merger status.

Read: Making peace with militants

That is a tall order. Peace deals with militants have a long, inglorious history in Pakistan. None of them, starting with the Shakai agreement in 2004 and the many others that followed, were sustainable. On the contrary, they have allowed militants to regroup, and strike back with even more force. In fact, the Swat agreement of 2008 resulted in the de facto surrender of the scenic valley to the Mullah Fazlullah-led TTP, enabling the latter to cement a brutal regime that made a mockery of the constitutionally protected rights that were still applicable in the area.

Each time, a military campaign has had to be conducted to dislodge the militants and wrest control from them. Expecting a different outcome this time around is unrealistic. Any ‘peace’ that would result would be a tenuous and transient one. The only practical course of action appears to be to revisit the National Action Plan, strengthen internal security and tackle the TTP according to the law of the land.

Published in Dawn, December 11th, 2021