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NAWAZ Sharif’s (now) controversial interview in this paper serves to bolster the confrontational positioning chosen by his faction within the party. In the absence of any detailed reasoning from his end, this is a perfectly valid assumption. Similarly, in the absence of any explanation for what they seek to gain from this positioning, one can assume that he sees his defined political goals being best served through a confrontation with the judiciary and the military.
In the debate following the remarks, some commentators have pointed out that Sharif’s democratic credentials appear to have surfaced only after his ouster from office. What did he do to expedite the Mumbai attack trial or limit the influence of the military while he was in office, they ask. What was done to strengthen parliament or the sanctity of the vote? Some (if not all) are valid critiques, and from the normative perspective of principled politics, stand on solid ground. What they do miss, however, is the occupational compulsion dictating the actions of any politician.
Winning and retaining office/influence remains the primary objective of a careerist politician. What they do in and outside of office flows from this objective. Applying this basic framework to Nawaz’s actions since July 2017 helps peg all the recent chaos to a means-ends yardstick.
That Nawaz’s personal political career is at a dead-end for the immediate future is more or less confirmed. The odds of him returning to elected office in any capacity are contingent on an unprecedented upheaval in electoral and party politics. Admittedly, the same was said when he was shipped off to exile during the Musharraf era, but the key difference this time around is that it’s happening within the bounds of a legal system that enjoys some manner of constitutional and political cover. It’s an ouster of a qualitatively different kind than the one seen last time.
If confrontation is Nawaz’s chosen route to retaining political influence, then defecting and staying in the establishment’s good books are means for retaining elected office for many in Punjab.
Given this context, his primary objective appears to be retaining outside influence through his daughter and their faction within the party. It’s not clear if this is a self-serving strategy or some form of paternal affection, or a combination of the two. What is safe to assume is that Nawaz’s political actions are in service of this particular end.
Here’s where it gets a little more complicated — politicians can be deeply committed to the means used to serve a particular end, but it’s far from given that they’ve picked the right ones. Political strategy is often clouded by poor feedback and echo chambers, hubris and ego trips, and a lack of information and a failure to understand the context. In this particular case, if the aim is to improve his faction’s standing within the party, and ensure that it does well in the general election, the means actually appear to be counterproductive.
The ‘theory’ introduced by Nawaz & co. is that a story of confrontation and victimisation works well internally in the party and with their core electorate. Getting people riled up about his encirclement by what he terms ‘khalai makhlooq’ is a way of consolidating support, and consequently, getting people within the party to fall in line behind his faction.
As highlighted by myself and several others on these pages, there is little empirical evidence of this actually happening. In a piece published in late February, I pointed to the lack of data that back Nawaz’s claim of enjoying a boost in popularity on the back of his narrative of victimisation. Since then, polling data published by Gallup shows the PML-N with its thinnest lead over the PTI in these past five years. Similarly, Nawaz’s favourability ratings as documented in a recent survey by Herald appear to have fallen, with a sizable segment of the sample holding strongly negative views.
Even if survey data is deemed insufficient, qualitative evidence through both history and recent events seem to point towards the counterproductive nature of Nawaz’s strategy. In most elections, ideological appeals have only worked with core urban voters, who are mobilised outside of conventional factional or patronage-based strategies. It is entirely possible that Nawaz’s narrative is resonating with PML-N supporters in the cities and towns of Punjab, but it is also an overriding truth that cities and towns of Punjab constitute a smaller fraction of the total electorate.
The electoral keys to the rest of the province lie with patricians and their brokers who’ve dominated this occupation for decades. A few months back, one particular point underscoring Nawaz’s narrative was that despite his ouster, the party was holding together. There were no large-scale defections, and his decision-making continued to reign supreme. Fast forward to the last few weeks, and this reality appears to be changing. Defections have gained steady pace, and dissolution of the assemblies will likely speed up the process. If confrontation is Nawaz’s chosen route to retaining political influence, then defecting and staying in the establishment’s good books are means for retaining elected office for many in Punjab.
It is a long-standing tragedy of Pakistani politics, and coincidentally of Nawaz’s present predicament, that ideational appeals hold little sway on the electoral map. The next three months will thus answer a riddle that lies at the heart of our recent political chaos: either Nawaz has read what many (including those defecting) have simply failed to read, which is that confrontation does work both in Punjab and within the party; or Nawaz has gotten it horribly wrong, and in the process, ruined his chance of retaining outside influence on the party, and the chances of his party actually doing well in the election. Going by recent trends, it increasingly looks like the latter will be the correct answer.
The writer is a freelance columnist.
Twitter: @umairjav
Published in Dawn, May 21st, 2018
