DEMOCRACY is a process for governance by popular consent and the peaceful transfer of power. Periodic elections are its instrument. These can, however, at times produce unwelcome consequences.

The ongoing elections in Afghanistan and India are likely to bring to power Abdullah Abdullah and Narendra Modi respectively, whose assumption of office may exacerbate the already difficult regional security environment. The past proclivities of both have been hostile to Pakistan.

Abdullah was a close associate of Tajik warlord Ahmed Shah Masood and an important member of the so-called Northern Alliance which fought Afghanistan’s last civil war against Mullah Omar’s Taliban regime and was used in 2001 by the US as an auxiliary force to oust that regime. During the last and current Afghan presidential elections, Abdullah has sought to broaden his relationship with Pakhtun groups. His support base nevertheless remains the Tajik-led Northern Alliance.

Abdullah has consistently echoed the Kabul refrain that Afghanistan’s internal conflict is the consequence of Pakistan’s support of the Afghan Taliban. Given his roots and legacy, Abdullah will be closer to the Afghan National Army and the National Directorate of Intelligence — both composed largely of Northern Alliance elements. Making peace with Abdullah may prove more difficult than with the erratic Karzai.

Whether Pakistan’s ISI and army have supported the Afghan Taliban — a charge they deny — is now almost irrelevant. The powers in Kabul have acted on their accusations and, as reported recently in the New York Times, openly admit that Afghan intelligence is supporting the TTP’s war against the Pakistani state. The TTP’s nominal leader, Fazlullah, is in a safe haven in Afghanistan’s Kunar province. Regular cross border raids continue against Pakistan’s border posts.

Unless this ends, Pakistan will have no alternative but to reciprocate and openly support the Afghan Taliban and other Pakhtun groups hostile to the Kabul regime. With the departure of most US-Nato forces from Afghanistan, the cross-border proxy war is likely to escalate.

However, the electoral outcome in India could complicate Pakistan’s security calculations on its western and eastern borders. Pakistan cannot harbour any illusions about Modi. He is not the cultured Vajpayee, not even the more adversarial Advani. Modi’s antipathy towards Pakistan is visceral; it springs from the hate against Muslims and Pakistan propounded by the RSS from where Modi joined the BJP. The worst epithet in the BJP’s current lexicon is to call someone pro-Pakistan. The BJP’s manifesto commits Modi to building the Ram temple on the site of the destroyed Babri Mosque and rescinding Article 370 of the Indian constitution which accords autonomous status to Kashmir.

A Modi government will continue, if not enlarge, the long-standing operations of India’s intelligence agencies to promote the BLA’s insurgency in Balochistan from Afghanistan and to work with Afghan intelligence to support the TTP’s war against Pakistan. Those in Islamabad who do not see this mischief are burying their heads in the sand.

As the gloves come off, Pakistan’s security forces may be fighting with one hand tied behind their back. Some of Pakistan’s most vocal ‘democrats’ seem to take pride in denigrating their own country’s armed forces while remaining silent or ignorant about the actions of Pakistan’s adversaries. The differences between the civilian and military leadership are out in the open. Most serious among these differences is the divergence on policy towards the TTP.

An agreement is not possible with the disparate amalgam of extremists operating under the TTP umbrella, at least not one that upholds the Constitution or is acceptable to the majority of Pakistanis. How can a deal be made when it is clear that large elements of the TTP are acting as the instrument of Pakistan’s external enemies? Some commentators have conjectured that the insistence on talking to the TTP is motivated by fear of its revenge or political affiliations with its Punjabi components. Both are insufficient cause to compromise national interest.

In the challenging environment emerging in the region, Pakistan needs to evolve a clear plan to preserve its security and safeguard its interests.

The first priority is to militarily defeat and politically divide the TTP and make peace only on terms that respect Pakistan’s Constitution, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Both the Afghan Taliban and the Americans should be asked to support this effort or get out of the way.

Second, Pakistan should seek peace with and within Afghanistan. This can be achieved only from a position of strength. Kabul should be asked to end its support for the TTP and the BLA. Pakistan may need to demonstrate its influence with the Afghan Taliban to secure Kabul’s cooperation. Meanwhile, opening a dialogue with the Northern Alliance could lay the ground for a future deal.

Third, the intercession of the US, China and Russia should be sought to build a regional consensus, incorporating Iran and Saudi Arabia, for peace within and around Afghanistan. Despite their escalating rivalries in Europe and East Asia, each of them has an interest in pacifying Afghanistan, not least to counter global terrorism.

Finally Pakistan’s difficult relationship with India will need to be managed through a combination of deterrence and diplomacy. The major powers also have a stake in preventing a major crisis between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. They can be persuaded to temper Modi’s anticipated belligerence.

The success of such a plan can be assured only if Pakistan’s political leaders, security forces and diplomats work cooperatively to realise these national objectives.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.