FOR many militant commanders of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan who operate from Fata, reconciliation with the government appears to have become a priority.

Some analysts see these overtures of peace as a ruse to extract concessions from the government. However, there is a feeling that one is witnessing the beginning of the end of the TTP, which is losing its clout by turning religious militancy into gangsterism.

The rot began in South Waziristan, the nerve centre of the TTP, where the government launched a military operation in the Taliban-controlled Mehsud area in March 2009. Unlike the past, this time the security establishment did not sign any peace deals with the extremists. The TTP strength was whittled down as the operation continued.

Half a million Mehsuds were forced out of the area and most saw their homes demolished. The treatment was shocking but effective nonetheless — and aimed at sending a message to all players in the tribal war theatre that the government meant business this time, at least in dealing with the TTP.

Surrounded by the rival Ahmadzai Wazir tribe, the TTP's powerbase has become its Achilles heel. Its central leadership was aware of their less than strategic location. Therefore, it always tried to avoid internal dissent and cobbled together political alliances to overcome external threats.

This blend of power and diplomacy helped the TTP to secure its base in South Waziristan. As long as its late chief Baitullah Mehsud was alive, the policy was instrumental in helping the TTP outsource militancy as a profitable enterprise to adjoining districts and down country.

In the post-Baitullah scenario, however, the TTP leadership failed to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses. A firebrand Hakimullah avoided a direct tussle with his distant Waziri cousins but did not extend any friendly gesture to them either.

Resultantly, in an agency where militancy is largely organised on the basis of tribal affinities, a lukewarm TTP approach towards local tribal politics has had a negative impact on the Mehsud clan as a whole. The outlawed TTP is considered a Mehsud enterprise as its central leadership and foot soldiers come mainly from the same tribe.

In a recent visit to Tank and Dera Ismail Khan, I saw thousands of hapless Mehsuds living miserably in camps with no care from the government to help them bear the biting winter cold. Complaining they had lost almost everything, they blamed the government for treating them all as militants.

The plight of the TTP foot soldiers is not different from that of their displaced fellow tribesmen. In tribal tradition, extending shelter to another tribe requires the seeker to follow the rules and customs set by the benefactor. If a tribe is ousted from its territory, it loses its freedom too.

Following the military operation, the homeless Mehsud militants took refuge with pro-government commanders Maulvi Nazir in South Waziristan and Gul Bahadar in North Waziristan. But availing this facility has made them all spineless. They are bound to do their host's bidding. Otherwise, expulsion faces them. This factor has cut down the TTP strength by rendering ineffective a sizable portion of Mehsud foot soldiers.

Some analysts, however, say that the loss of home turf is not more destructive for the TTP as the opening of multiple fronts outside the agency.

After the release of a video showing TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud along with a Jordanian suicide bomber responsible for the death of eight Americans at a military base in eastern Afghanistan, the TTP is now wanted by the US more than ever.

Ever since then, the media-savvy militant has been living underground. Already battered and bruised, the TTP leadership is left with no space to operate from South Waziristan due to incessant drone attacks during the last two years.

In fact, the Mehsuds are for the TTP as Arabs for Al Qaeda. The organisation has lost its fangs after its Mehsud workforce was neutralised. At the same time, it has reasonably decentralised tribal chapters of the TTP operating outside Waziristan. The same ideological strength, which made the TTP the only tribal venture representing militants of all hues, became its major weakness. It reveals that tribal militants are driven less by ideology and more by monetary benefits.

Fazal Saeed Haqqani, ex-TTP commander for lower Kurram, was the first to raise the flag of rebellion by forcing Mehsud militants out of his area. He set up his own Tehrik-i-Taliban Islamic (TTI) to escape the ongoing military operation in Kurrum Agency.

The tone and tenor of Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, the TTP deputy amir from Bajaur, has changed after the government announced its willingness to hold a dialogue with militants. Unconfirmed reports say that the TTP's top leadership is not happy with Maulvi Faqir's recent media statements. So, possibly Fazlullah of Swat is expected to replace him.

Similarly, Omar Khalid, the TTP chief for Mohmand Agency, has already announced in an interview with the BBC that they are free to negotiate a ceasefire on their own with the government.

The present fissure in TTP ranks can be attributed to four factors. First, the non-Mehsud franchises of the TTP have realised that affiliation with the officially despised TTP central command will make them hard to survive the present generation of military operations.

Secondly, reconciliation is important to retain or maintain control over lucrative trade and smuggling routes.

Thirdly, winter in the snowy bordering terrains usually restricts militants' movement.

Last but not the least, reconciliation with the government is indispensable for the already demoralised militant groups. They see in the peace overtures a chance to reinvigorate themselves. This urgency has compelled a few militant commanders to announce unconditional ceasefire a couple of months back.

Under the circumstances, if a TTP defeat in South Waziristan has brought some respite for the security forces, breakaway tendencies in the organisation carry ominous prospects of gangsterism. Militant groups have already unleashed a reign of terror by supervising criminal elements, patronising kidnapping networks, collecting toll tax and controlling trade and smuggling routes.

If one could believe the militants' claim regarding peace talks with the government, the anti-Taliban lashkar and peace committee members are going to be the main losers. Earlier, they were raised to serve as a bulwark against militancy in the tribal belt and the settled districts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. But now reconciliation with the militants will leave them on their own.

The government needs to work on plan B before initiating any move on the issue of militancy. Otherwise, the militants' dwindling power will get a new, steady footing. This will cause another wave of displacement and further destabilise the settled districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The writer teaches at the University of Peshawar.

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