INDIA remains thoroughly non-aligned, even after its civil nuclear deal with Washington. Pakistan, in contrast, needs patrons, and has succeeded in having two powerful ones — Washington and Beijing — to counterbalance India, a significant diplomatic accomplishment.

No other country has managed to draw significant, concurrent support from both Washington and Beijing, both before and after these powerhouses started speaking to each other.

Afghanistan is a trivial pursuit in geopolitical terms. This poor, unfortunate state matters most in geopolitical terms as the locus of follies conducted by others within its borders. Afghanistan matters far less than the demise of the US-Pakistan partnership. A complete split would constitute a loss for both parties, but Pakistan, the weaker party, will suffer far more for losing a patron.

The United States and Pakistan have been partners since the 1950s. Pakistan's perceived utility to the United States extended long after John Foster Dulles' regional alliances to contain the Soviet Union — Cento and Seato — dissolved.

Paradoxically, the rise and revitalisation of the Taliban, with Rawalpindi's support, created conditions whereby Pakistan could initially renew and then jeopardise its partnership with the United States. In June 2004, Washington declared Pakistan to be a major non-Nato ally. It's been a downhill ride ever since. Reversing this slide will take a good long while, especially if the Taliban retake Kabul with Rawalpindi's help.

China, Pakistan's other powerful patron, is an 'all weather' friend, providing significant support for Pakistan's ballistic missile and nuclear weapon programmes in the past.

After the Bush administration gifted New Delhi with a qualified exemption to the rules of nuclear commerce, Beijing consented to repeated Pakistani requests for nuclear power plants at concessionary rates — reactors that may no longer be built on Chinese soil.

Islamabad is increasingly looking to Beijing for investment and infrastructure development, but big steps forward are hindered by Pakistan's internal security problems.

In a stunning blow to Pakistani economic development plans, the China Kingho Group pulled out of a $19bn deal to build coal mines, power and chemical plants in Sindh because Beijing feels that Karachi is not safe to invest or reside in. Beijing has also called out Pakistan — a very unusual move — because of unrest in China's western border areas stoked allegedly by militants trained in Pakistan. Islamabad has pledged to deal with the issues causing Chinese discontent, and seeks to get investment back on track.

During crises with India in 1990, 1999 and 2001-02, Pakistani civilian and military leaders made beelines to Beijing seeking backup.

They received polite but unmistakable advice to resolve their difficulties with New Delhi without major new weapon shipments or shrill public warnings against Indian military adventurism. Beijing helped the United States, South Asia's essential crisis manager, more than it helped Pakistan during these three crises.

During the millennial flood of 2010, the United States provided $550m to help Pakistanis in great distress, including $62m in seeds and agricultural implements so that farmers could produce a bumper wheat crop after the waters receded. After prodding by US officials, China reportedly added $200m in flood-related assistance to its initial offering of $47m. Pakistani government leaders have tried to strengthen their partnership with China in tangible ways as ties with the United States fray. One method of dealing with Washington's growing disaffection is by characterising security assurances purportedly made in private by Chinese officials in ways that Beijing has notably refrained from reaffirming.

For example, during Defence Minister Ahmed Mukhtar's trip to China in May 2011, he spoke appreciatively of Chinese construction of the Gwadar port, while expressing an interest in Chinese construction of “a naval base” there. When asked about this request, a senior Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson replied, “I have not heard about it.”

This odd exchange took place around the same time as a meeting in Beijing between Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Pakistani media outlets dutifully reported a Pakistani foreign ministry press release that, “China has warned in unequivocal terms that any attack on Pakistan would be construed as an attack on China. Beijing has advised Washington to respect Pakistan's sovereignty and solidarity… The Chinese leadership was extremely forthcoming in assuring unprecedented support to Pakistan for its national cause and security.” Chinese media outlets did not report this assurance.

Similarly, after Adm Mike Mullen vocalised his assessment about Rawalpindi's ties with the Haqqani network before leaving his post as chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, Prime Minister Gilani asserted the following week, during a visit by Vice Premier Meng Jianzhu, China's minister of public safety, that China “categorically supports Pakistan's efforts to uphold its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity”. Again, Chinese media reports did not use this formulation.

Pakistan's military will increasingly rely on Chinese equipment. But the track record of China-Pakistan relations — especially during natural disasters and crises with India — suggests a relationship in which Pakistan asks for much and Beijing is circumspect about giving.

The writer is co-founder of the Stimson Centre in Washington, D.C.