When Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Field Marshal Asim Munir and Türkiye’s intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin sat down in Tehran on Monday with President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Mohsen Rezaei, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, they turned a defence alliance into a channel for peace. Riyadh said the visit was meant to open channels to “prevent the return of military escalation”. That is the right use of the new Muslim defence architecture, and Pakistan should insist that meeting jaw to jaw is better than war.

My argument is simple. The Saudi-Pakistan and Makkah defence agreements are shields for the Kingdom, not swords against any neighbour. Pakistan should keep them that way, honour its commitment to Saudi security, and invest its diplomatic capital in a regional non-aggression framework that includes Iran. A defence pact earns its keep when its clauses never have to be tested.

Between the lines

Consider the texts. In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, whose published summary states that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both”. Pakistan’s Foreign Office said at the time that it was “defensive in nature and not directed against any third country”. Islamabad has been equally clear that its nuclear deterrent is India-specific; the agreement does not change Pakistan’s doctrine.

The second instrument, the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on 7 August 2026, is more detailed. Article 2 provides that “an externally originating armed attack against any of the ‘Parties’ shall be considered an attack against all”, but the parties “shall determine the scope and nature of the support to be provided following an objective assessment” and act “within the limits of their available resources”. Article 12 preserves obligations under earlier treaties. These are the clauses of a prudent alliance: solidarity in principle, judgement in practice.

Neither text names an adversary, and the only invocation shows what the alliance is for. On October 5, after Houthi strikes on the Kingdom, the partners agreed to “activate collective deterrence measures … in response to the attacks and all those responsible for them”. The threat is the missile and the drone fired at Saudi cities and infrastructure.

On Monday, as the delegations met in Tehran, the Houthis claimed fresh strikes on Riyadh airport and the East-West pipeline — claims Saudi Arabia had not confirmed and which remain unverified. Egypt’s parliament the same day authorised military support for the Kingdom.

Washington has raised no objection. Asked about Turkish and Pakistani deployments, President Donald Trump said: “I think they want to help Saudi Arabia, and I think that’s good.” An alliance that reassures Riyadh without alarming Washington or provoking Tehran has room to do diplomacy, and the Tehran visit was that room being used.

Iran’s position

Iran’s posture is the other half of the equation. In August, Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said: “We have not received a formal invitation [to join the alliance], but proposals have been raised for dialogue with these countries on matters related to collective security in the region.” Formal membership is not realistic: Tehran’s preference for “security originating from within the region” implies an order without American forces, which the signatories do not necessarily share. But structured dialogue is realistic, and it is precisely what Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye carried to Tehran.

The diplomatic gap between Washington and Tehran remains wide. The US wants enrichment curbed and IAEA inspectors back; Iran wants the naval blockade lifted and a return to the June memorandum of understanding. An Iranian official told Iran International that nuclear issues would not be discussed until Tehran’s demands were met. Two unnamed US officials said that forces could strike “within 96 hours” of an order. The US midterm elections fall on November 3. The window for diplomacy is narrow, and it is closing.

That is why the Tehran meeting deserves more credit than its modest outcome, an agreement to keep talking, suggests. A senior Pakistani security official said the aim was “a regional non-aggression network.” Pakistan brought Riyadh, Ankara and Tehran to the same table at a moment of acute danger. Bridging the US-Iran divide will take more than one meeting.

What next?

What should follow? First, the alliance should define itself publicly by its defensive tasks: air and missile defence, intelligence sharing and rotational presence to protect the Kingdom from attacks by non-state actors. Egypt, whose foreign minister says accession is under “serious consideration”, should be welcomed on the same terms.

Second, a non-aggression track with Iran should run beside the alliance, not inside it. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Qatar are well placed to act as its guarantors and facilitators. Regular contact among defence and security chiefs would lower the risk of miscalculation in the Gulf and in Yemen.

Third, Pakistan should keep its mediation credible in both capitals. Its value to Washington and to Tehran lies in being trusted by each, and its commitment to Saudi Arabia rests on the Kingdom’s security against aggression, made amply clear by explicit official statements. Pakistan shares a long border with Iran and a deep bond with the Gulf; it cannot afford a regional conflagration which will be detrimental to its security and economic interests.

Islamabad’s course, then, is to ensure that its treaty commitments lead to a regional security architecture and stable Middle East, while strengthening the confidence of Riyadh and Ankara and the security of Pakistan’s western frontier.

That is what Field Marshal Munir sought in Tehran: to make war less likely. For Pakistan, mediation is not idealism but strategy at its most disciplined. The lasting measure of power is not the wars a state can fight, but the wars its judgement prevents.