PAKISTAN’S climate challenge is a test of whether a decentralised but politically fragmented federation can govern collective risks. Climate-induced disasters do not stop at provincial boundaries. Yet institutions responsible for responding remain divided by federal-provincial tensions and ethnic and regional competition within provinces. The 18th Amendment is often portrayed as a source of fragmentation. That interpretation is incomplete. The amendment was primarily a response to excessive centralisation and provincial grievances. Its paradox is that, while it reduced vertical tensions between the centre and provinces, it did not ensure that power would travel further downward to districts and communities.
The 18th Amendment addressed the imbalance by abolishing the Concurrent Legislative List. The seventh NFC Award raised the provincial share of the divisible pool from 45 to 57.5 per cent. The difficulty emerged at the next level. Provincial autonomy did not automatically produce meaningful local autonomy. Article 140A requires provinces to establish local governments (LGs) and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority to elected representatives. In practice provincial political elites have often retained control over resources and decision-making. Authority has moved away from the centre without necessarily moving close enough to citizens, who experience climate risks most directly.
This matters because climate governance depends on coordination at multiple levels that requires national forecasting and financing, provincial planning and district-level preparedness. Without empowered local institutions, climate policy remains concentrated in provincial capitals, where political priorities may compete and implementation capacity is weakest at the point of delivery.
Intra-provincial tensions add another layer of difficulty. In Sindh, concentration of political and administrative authority in Karachi and the PPP’s dominance have contributed to a sharp urban-rural divide. In Punjab, perceptions of financial and administrative dominance by Lahore have sustained grievances in the Seraiki belt with demands for a separate south Punjab province. In KP, the renaming of the province as part of the 18th Amendment settlement generated resistance in the Hindko-speaking Hazara region and renewed demands for a separate province. These conflicts shape who controls development funds, infrastructure, public services and political representation — all central to climate resilience.
Climate change demands more than a simple division of federal powers.
The centre also faces constraints. Federal policymakers have argued that the post-18th Amendment fiscal settlement limits resources available for national responsibilities. Provinces, in turn, regard attempts to dilute their fiscal or legislative autonomy as a threat to constitutional guarantees. Pakistan needs national standards, shared data, coordinated disaster response, climate finance, international reporting and the capacity to meet commitments under global climate agreements. Provinces need meaningful authority over sectors affecting adaptation and resilience.
Climate change, therefore, exposes the limits of treating federalism as a simple division of powers. Pakistan requires a system in which autonomy and coordination reinforce each other. The 18th Amendment should not be blamed for ethnic polarisation; rather, its unfinished devolution agenda should be addressed. Provincial governments need to make Article 140A meaningful by transferring predictable finances, administrative authority, and decision-making powers to elected LGs. Federal and provincial institutions also need permanent mechanisms for joint climate planning, shared information, disaster preparedness, and financing, while en-suring that vulnerable regions and communities have a genuine voice.
The 18th Amendment is not the primary driver of ethnic divisions. However, the failure of regional ruling parties to pass these fruits down via local body governance has transformed old centre-province animosities into localised, intra-provincial ethnic fracturing.
The root causes of the recent developments in KP can partly be linked to 16 years of uneven development exacerbated by political miscalculations and exploited by vested interest groups. This trend can lead to deeper alienation without local body governance.
The real challenge is to prevent decentralisation from ending at provincial capitals. Climate adaptation cannot remain trapped in federal-provincial bargaining or intra-provincial ethnic competition. A resilient federation must combine autonomy with empowered LGs, cooperation and equitable access to climate resources for all its citizens.
The writer is a climate policy analyst.
Published in Dawn, October 19th, 2026
