THE future dead can rest assured. They will be evaporated by nuclear weapons developed for ‘peaceful’ purposes. ‘Peaceful’ is a deceptive euphemism. Like a sheathed sword, it masks a sinister dread.
Indian prime minister Mrs Indira Gandhi used it to describe India’s first nuclear test Pokhran-I (nicknamed ‘Smiling Buddha’) on May 18, 1974. When asked how she would use nuclear power for peaceful purposes, she replied artfully: “Oh, for expanding harbours, for instance.” The reporter was quick off the mark: “Did you have Karachi harbour in mind?”
On July 22, 2026, the US and Saudi Arabia signed the 123 Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. It takes its name from Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954. That covers “long-term, strategic civil nuclear partnerships globally”, controls “exports of US-origin nuclear material (e.g., nuclear reactor fuel) and equipment (e.g. nuclear reactors and major components)”. To date, the US has signed 26 such agreements with 50 countries, including China, Russia, India, and the UAE.
In May 2009, the US and the UAE signed an agreement for “the development of peaceful use of nuclear energy”. The UAE agreed “not to seek enrichment or process spent atomic fuel”. Unwilling to be left behind, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in 2018 told an American news channel: “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”
The nuclear club is no longer exclusive.
It appears that negotiations between Washington and Riyadh over a possible 123 agreement began during President Donald Trump’s first administration and continued into Joe Biden’s. Trump has consummated it in his second.
This latest 123 deal is ostensibly to allow the Saudis to meet their energy needs using nuclear power for electricity generation, thereby freeing oil for export. It is actually a Trojan horse parked by Washington in the desert. The 30-year agreement will in fact “expand American nuclear technology exports”, “create high-paying US jobs”, and allow American companies to exclude Chinese and Russian competitors.
The 123 Agreement comes at a price. One day after signature by the US energy secretary, Trump added a condition: Saudi Arabia must sign the Abraham Accords and normalise relations with Israel. The Israelis, despite having a formidable arsenal of nuclear weaponry, are unhappy. They feel uncomfortable at losing their monopoly in the region. They are also apprehensive that the Saudi crown prince may go the way of that earlier staunch ally of the US — the Shah of Iran.
For Pakistan, this 123 Agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia has implications. A year ago, on Sept 17, 2025, Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia. It committed both countries to treat any attack on one as an attack on both. Although the official text of the agreement has not been released, it has been reported that a Saudi official, when asked if it foresaw access to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, replied: “This is a comprehensive defensive agreement that encompasses all military means.”
Until now, Pakistan and India have been locked in a dangerous embrace. They are being joined by a scrum of nuclear ‘wanna-bes’, by those who have the bucks to pay for the bang.
The nuclear club is no longer exclusive. But like all clubs, it has rules. For example, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 requires all non-nuclear powers “to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency”. The IAEA can “monitor nuclear programmes” and “inspect nuclear facilities”.
A non-nuclear Sweden recognised the role of the IAEA. In 2005, the Nobel Committee awarded the Peace Prize to the IAEA and its administrative head Mohamed ElBaradei. They were rewarded “for their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way”. Like the UN Security Council, the IAEA’s bark is worse than its bite.
World War II ended when atomic bombs were dropped by the US on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese did not have the power to retaliate. They surrendered. Today, nuclear potency and its proliferation means that a nuclear war can be started by anyone, at any time, anywhere, with instant retaliation.
If any Pakistani should feel the need to discuss our nuclear strategies and commitments, it should not be construed as unpatriotic or a lapse into defeatism. In the 1970s, this nation supported the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s cry that we would go nuclear, even if it meant we had to “eat grass”. The outcome of any nuclear holocaust will not be survival of the fittest but of those who can survive by eating radioactive grass.
The writer is an author.
Published in Dawn, July 30th, 2026
