THE ongoing economic transformational processes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly known as North Korea, appear to be similar to those of the modernisation of Russian economy during President Vladimir Putin’s first two presidential terms (2000-08). In the case of DPRK, however, the place of Russian oil and gas has been taken by weaponry, ammunition and military technology as well as by military personnel and a well-educated workforce.

The adoption of the Russian economic model has exposed DPRK to the potential risk of the ‘Dutch disease’ that Russia experienced in the late 2000s. Judging by recent politico-economic moves, such as efforts to diversify exports into Russian markets and deepening DPRK’s bilateral ties with Eurasian Economic Union countries, Pyongyang appears to be trying to avoid repeating the mistakes that Moscow committed.

As part of an economic policy aimed at reducing vulnerability to external shocks, DPRK has lately revitalised its economic relations with China, which, in just the first two months of 2026, amounted to a trade volume of $427 million, marking the highest level in nine years.

As DPRK continues to incorporate itself in the Russian markets and actively develop its ties with the Russian industrial sector, only time will tell if Pyongyang will end up simply being an appendage of the Russian economy, or if it will be able to preserve its fragile economic independence with the help of allies from socialist and non-aligned countries.

Eljanos Kasaj
Wroclaw, Poland

Published in Dawn, June 15th, 2026