THE debate on creating new provinces is often seen through the lens of ethnicity, history and political identity, and projected as being in the public interest. Not only is this misleading, it is also designed to preserve the existing power str­ucture. It diverts attention from the real issue of governance failure and replaces it with emotional narratives. Pakistan does not suffer from a shortage of identities; it suffers from a deficit of equitable governance and basic administrative needs.

Across South Asia, the trajectory is unmistakable. To improve governance, India has expanded from about 14 states at independence to 28 and eight union territories (it has included occupied Jammu & Kashmir in the latter category). Bangladesh has moved from four to eight administrative divisions, while Nepal has transitioned from a unitary system to seven provinces. Even Afghanistan has increased its administrative units from fewer than 20 to 34 provinces. In contrast, Pakistan, despite significant population growth and increasing governance complexity, continues to operate with only four provinces, reflecting a deeper resistance to redistributing power.

Pakistan’s ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity is a strength to be preserved and encouraged. However, when administrative systems fail to ensure the fair distribution of development and opportunity, identity turns into grievance, which is then used politically to resist reform, protect entrenched interests, and maintain control over resources. The debate is thus confined to identity while deprivation remains unaddressed.

Across the country, particularly in the larger provinces, islands of prosperity are surrounded by vast regions of neglect. South Punjab, interior Sindh, peripheral KP districts and much of Balochistan reflect this structural imbalance, despite the increased fiscal space following the 18th Constitutional Amendment. Resources exist, but their distribution is skewed and guided by elite priorities.

Smaller units create a closer alignment between decision-making and ground realities.

All four provinces have become unwieldy administrative units. As scale expands, administrative reach weakens, and instead of improving local institutional arrangements, decision-making becomes more centralised and distant. Political attention remains disproportionately focused on a few urban centres, where visibility is high and political and economic returns are immediate. This creates a cycle where select areas benefit from development while vast areas remain trapped in neglect.

The government, instead of addressing this weakness at a structural level, has resorted to interventions such as setting up complaint cells, facilitation centres and digital portals, which merely create an illusion of responsiveness while actually further weakening the administrative machinery.

Pakistan has well-defined institutional systems of inspection, supervision and accountability within its departments. These systems have eroded due to political interference, a lack of autonomy and the pressures of governing oversized administrative units. Rather than rehabilitating these systems, successive governments have created additional structures, resulting in duplication, confusion and conflict, and a governance model driven by optics rather than outcomes.

At the heart of this dysfunction is an entrenched elite culture and dynastic politics. Pakistan’s political system, though formally democratic, has come to assume the characteristics of a closed, hereditary order where power in the provinces is concentrated within a narrow circle of families that exercise influence over politics, administration and economic resources. Even electoral competition is largely confined within this elite ecosystem. The result is a controlled political marketplace where new aspirants to leadership face barriers almost impossible to surmount. Authority is inherited and influence preserved across generations.

In such a system, administrative boundaries are instruments of control. Larger provinces can provide the resources for consolidating political dominance, managing patronage networks and limiting the emergence of new leadership centres, and development priorities are shaped by the imperative to sustain this dominance. Creating smaller provinces is then more than administrative reform; it is a structural intervention in the political economy of power. Smaller provinces reduce the scale that creates new political spaces, lower barriers to entry and allow leadership to emerge from regions that have historically not been given a role in decision-making. They also weaken the grip of elites while creating openings for a more representative political order. Administratively manageable, they create a closer alignment between decision-making and ground realities. Resource allocation becomes more responsive and development priorities better align with local needs.

Critics often raise concerns about administrative capacity. Pakistan has a well-established cadre of civil servants trained to operate across diverse administrative contexts. Capacity exists; what has been lacking is an enabling structure and political will. Another concern is that new provinces may deepen ethnic divisions. This risk arises only when provinces are conceptualised along narrow ethnic lines. If, instead, they are designed on the basis of administrative, economic, and geographic considerations, they can mitigate tensions by addressing the root causes of perceived injustice.

The constitutional promise of local government was intended to serve a similar purpose and ensure that governance remained responsive and accountable at the grassroots. In practice, however, provincial governments have resisted genuine devolution. LGs remain underfunded, politically constrained or altogether absent. To silence demand, LG polls are scheduled and then postponed on technical grounds or under the familiar pretext of being ‘in the public interest’. Hence, reliance on LG reform alone is insufficient. Structural change at the provincial level is necessary.

A republic cannot function if power is concentrated in a few hands, political mobility is restricted and governance serves to perpetuate privilege. It requires dispersion of authority, renewal of leadership and systems that ensure fair access to opportunity. Most of Pakistan’s population, largely excluded from decision-making yet bearing the burden of sustaining the state, deserves a governance model that serves rather than rules.

A stronger Pakistani identity will only emerge when citizens across all regions feel that the state treats them with fairness, dignity, and equity. Smaller provinces, if designed with care and implemented through consensus, offer a way forward. They are not a fragmentation of Pakistan, but a necessary calibration, one that can shift the country away from elite capture and towards a more functional, inclusive and genuinely democratic republic.

The writer is a former IGP Sindh.

Published in Dawn, April 24th, 2026