Afghanistan is the heart of Asia — Allama Iqbal

PAKISTAN was born into long-term hostility with its neighbour, India. Security was, accordingly, key to avoiding the peril of infant-nation mortality. Later, it needed to broaden its strategy to good governance including democracy, economic and human development, and rights protections. The Quaid departed before this essential transition could commence. The process has been aborted ever since despite fleeting periods of promise. The result has been the loss of the majority of Pakistan’s original population within its first 25 years, and no lessons learned during the next half century to ensure the viability of what was left of the country.

Praetorian elite capture has been primarily responsible for this tragedy. Undoing it will need a ‘whole of the nation’ undertaking. What needs to be done in terms of policies and institution building over a whole range of national endeavours is largely known. But the likelihood of much of it happening appears non-existent today because of the perversity of the prevailing political and power structures. Moreover, this grim prospect is being progressively internalised by ruling elites and the middle class intelligentsia whose attitudes and choices determine the fate of nations. A refusal to accept these realities is itself a form of complicity. The only view that is worse is the assumption that the nation will somehow survive, despite its wretched condition, because its nuclear weapons status guarantees the rest of the world has a stake in its survival!

This is the national context in which our Afgh­a­n­­istan policy should be considered. The Afghan people have a historical relationship with the people of Pakistan. Had the British adopted the Forw­ard Policy instead of Lawrence’s Non-interference Policy there may have been no Afghanistan today as the British and Russian Empires would have met along the Amu Darya instead of being separated by Afghanistan — which has since developed into a resilient nation. This is due to the wisdom and moderation of its rulers — with recent exceptions which have been the result of Russian and American invasions. Nevertheless, its ethnically diverse peoples have embraced their collective Afghan identity despite their rivalries.

Pakistan got off to a poor start in its relations with Afghanistan because of reasons most supposedly educated and informed Pakistanis know little about. The British drew the Durand Line after the Second Afghan War lopping off sizeable portions of Afghan territory and incorporating them into British India while acknowledging Ka­­bul’s continued interest in its lost peoples. Af­­ghanistan never formally recognised the legitimacy of a border forcibly demarcated by imperial aggression.

Instead of a Big Brother policy towards Afghanistan, Pakistan should consider a policy of Strategic Generosity.

This led to its vote against the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations, which it quickly reversed after making its legally dubious but historically and politically understandable point. Afghanistan realised the Pakhtun of the NWFP and Balochistan, after a century of living with fellow Muslims under British rule, preferred to become part of Pakistan while simultaneously owning an indissoluble kinship with their Afghan brethren. Later, the so-called Pakhtunistan issue arose which Afghan governments exploited for domestic political purposes (and also to counter Pakistan’s transit trade leverage) just as successive governments in Pakistan have often used the internationally recognised Kashmir dispute for domestic political purposes.

Nevertheless, two facts are incontrovertible: in practice, Kabul has treated the Durand Line as an international border, and during Pakistan’s several conflicts with India it has never had to worry about its western border. Moreover, Kabul has consistently acknowledged its debt to Pakistan for its critical assistance during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Even so, the Afghans pride themselves on resisting the mighty powers of the past and the present and, accordingly, resent Pakistan’s perceived attempts to impose ‘friendly governments’ in Kabul and control its foreign policy, especially towards India. They blame Pakistan for imposing Pakistan-based mujahideen and subsequently mediaeval Taliban rule in Afghanistan which has isolated it from the contemporary world, including Muslim countries. Both endeavours proved counterproductive for Pakistan but ruinous for Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan has no friends in Afghanistan today.

As for the TTP, the Afghans insist the overwhelming majority of its attacks originate from within Pakistan. Many in Pakistan concede there is a measure of truth in this allegation. Pakistan is, accordingly, following self-defeating Afghan and strategic policies. They are driving Afghanistan into the arms of India and setting up a dangerous ‘nutcracker’ (two-front) situation for itself just to distract domestic political attention from the grim state of affairs in the country. Despite Pakistan’s admirable performance in the recent conflict with India this situation is straining its domestic stability. Instead of a Big Brother policy towards Afghanistan it should consider a policy of Strategic Generosity much like the enlightened policy of Brazil towards its smaller neighbours — and indeed of China towards the Global South. In that case, the Durand Line would eventually evolve into a regular border that is fully recognised and respected by Afghanistan.

Such a far-sighted policy could go a long way towards recouping the irreparable loss of East Pakistan by finessing the current strategy of India towards Pakistan, and conceivably embarking upon the historic task of laying the foundations for a possible confederation with Afghanis­tan that would comprise approximately 300 million people. Progress in this endeavour could facilitate far broader and deeper strategic cooperation with China, Iran and Central Asia and effectively counter India’s hegemonic ambitions.

Countless challenges will lie in the path of such a historic endeavour that would answer to the vi­­sion of Allama Iqbal. But imagination, goodwill and persistence can render the seemingly impossible, possible. There is an affinity between the peo­ple of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which shou­­ld easily accommodate Pakhtun cross-border kinship. There is no room here for essential details. But if we truly rather than merely ritually believe in our future we should seriously explore such pos­­sibilities that are in fact survival imperatives.

The writer is a former ambassador to the US, India and China, and head of UN missions in Iraq and Sudan.

Published in Dawn, November 5th, 2025