The 1991 Indus Water Apportionment Accord was a landmark agreement designed to ensure the fair distribution of Pakistan’s most precious resource — water. However, over time, discussions around the accord have become narrowly focused on Clause 2, which deals with water apportionment, while neglecting the broader, forward-looking provisions aimed at securing Pakistan’s water future.

This agreement was never meant to be just a water distribution formula. It laid out a comprehensive vision for water management, addressing storage development, surplus distribution, ecological sustainability, provincial autonomy, and efficiency in water use. Unfortunately, delays in implementing key provisions — especially the construction of new reservoirs — have turned water allocation into a source of conflict rather than cooperation.

To truly understand the significance of the accord, we must go beyond Clause 2 and explore its holistic framework, clause by clause.

Clause 2 established the provincial water allocations from a total of 114.35 million acre-feet (MAF). These allocations were based on the demands and needs of the provinces. However, at the time of the accord, 102.73 MAF was already in use, creating a gap between existing usage and the newly allocated shares. The agreed allocations were as follows: 55.94 MAF for Punjab, 48.76 MAF for Sindh, 5.78 MAF for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and 3.87 MAF for Balochistan.

The 1991 Water Accord is a comprehensive solution for Pakistan’s water challenges, provided the state can look beyond a single distribution clause and prioritise the entire agreement

Despite being a cornerstone of the accord, Clause 2 was never meant to define the entire agreement. It was always intended to function alongside other key provisions, particularly those related to storage development (Clause 6), surplus distribution (Clause 4), ecological protection (Clause 7) and efficiency improvements (Clause 14). Unfortunately, failure to implement these provisions has led to recurring disputes over water shortages, overshadowing the broader vision of the accord.

To begin with, Clause 4 provided a mechanism for fairly distributing surplus water, particularly during the Kharif season, among the provinces, with Punjab’s allotted share at 37 per cent, Sindh also at 37pc, Balochistan at 12pc and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at 14pc. However, without adequate storage, this clause remains ineffective.

The accord envisioned that additional reservoirs would allow provinces to better manage seasonal surpluses and prevent wastage. Yet, because planned reservoirs were never built, surplus water often flows unused into the sea, while shortages continue to spark interprovincial disputes.

One of the most crucial but overlooked provisions of the accord, clause 6, explicitly recognised the need for new reservoirs: “The need for storages, wherever feasible on the Indus and other rivers, was admitted and recognised by the participants for planned future agricultural development.”

Had this clause been fully implemented, Pakistan would have been far better equipped to manage water distribution. Sindh, in particular, stood to gain the most from additional storage. Despite this intended increase, Sindh and other provinces remain water-stressed due to failure in building new storage facilities.

The accord also recognised the importance of minimum downstream water flows to prevent sea intrusion and protect Sindh’s delta as per Clause 7, which discusses ecological protection.

Sindh initially proposed a 10 MAF minimum flow, but further studies suggested a minimum annual release of 3.6 MAF, split evenly between Kharif and Rabi seasons, and an additional 25 MAF over five years to be released during Kharif.

The continued degradation of the delta region shows that this provision has not been effectively implemented, leaving coastal communities vulnerable.

The accord provided provinces the freedom to develop water resources within their allocated shares, including no restrictions on provinces undertaking new projects; unrestricted development of small irrigation schemes (under 5,000 acres); and special provisions for KP and Balochistan to develop Kurram, Gomal, and Kohat basins. Unfortunately, political conflicts have hindered the full utilisation of these provisions.

Moreover, until new reservoirs are constructed, Clause 14 provides temporary mechanisms to manage water, including equitable sharing of shortages and surpluses based on historical use (Clause 14b); prioritising irrigation over power generation (Clause 14c); allowing provinces to modify their allocations seasonally (Clause 14d); and encouraging efficiency to reduce wastage (Clause 14e). Had these provisions been strictly enforced, many current water disputes could have been avoided.

To conclude, the 1991 Water Accord was designed to promote cooperation and ensure long-term water security. However, its incomplete implementation has led to disputes rather than solutions. To realise the full potential of the accord, Pakistan must give the various clauses discussed above due priority and fast-track the construction of new reservoirs to meet growing water demands while ensuring fair surplus distribution by improving flood management and infrastructure.

The state must also strengthen ecological protection efforts and empower provinces to do so while developing their own water resources. Furthermore, agriculture must also be prioritised over hydropower to support food security.

The 1991 Accord is not outdated — it is an untapped solution for Pakistan’s water challenges. By shifting the focus from conflict to implementation, Pakistan can secure its water future for generations to come.

The writer is a former provincial finance minister for Punjab and former member of the national assembly

Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, March 17th, 2025