CHINA last week issued a statement on the Israel-Palestine war, calling, noncommittally, for restraint on all sides and an end to hostilities. There was no condemnation of Hamas’s atrocities or of Israel’s response against Gaza’s civilian population. This is the latest example of Chinese non-interference and a manifestation of its Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI), Beijing’s latest strategic push that could in the long run have more influence on its allies, including Pakistan, than the much-touted BRI.

China has in the past called for Palestinian statehood, and even in last week’s statements evoked the two-state solution as the only way out of the Israel-Palestine quagmire. At the same time, Israel and China have in recent years deepened economic and political ties, with China in 2021-22 replacing the US as Israel’s main source of imports. China’s role in the diplomatic rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia also had a bearing on Israeli political calculations vis-à-vis Beijing: it had manoeuvred itself into a position to influence Israeli security.

China’s forays into the Middle East may have been part of its Global Security Initiative, launched in 2022, in an effort to rebalance the international world order, tipping power away from the US and other Western countries towards China and Russia. But Beijing’s choice not to speak out forcefully against either Hamas or Israel is a reflection of its GCI, introduced in March this year, which privileges state-defined values over those — such as human rights — that have been posited in global governance as universal.

The GCI is a direct critique of Western efforts to implement a world order according to Westernised norms, particularly the absolutism around human rights and democracy. The GCI instead acknowledges “peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom” as “common aspirations” rather than fundamental rights. China argues that these issues and the way they are embedded in states and societies are ‘relative’, rooted in local history and culture, and cannot be universally mandated. In a dig against the US in particular, which for years tried to impose its values of democracy and human rights — forcefully, if necessary, despite the ironies — the Chinese do not believe in imposing one country’s models on another.

GCI focuses more on ‘common aspirations’ than fundamental rights.

Many international observers have understood the GCI as a way for the Chinese government to justify why it won’t condemn or attempt to stop bad behaviour, whether that be human rights violations within or beyond its borders or state conduct in conflict scenarios. The idea of relativism offers Beijing a way out: a conceptually and strategically grounded ability to dismiss egregious acts as culturally and contextually rooted, and therefore indigenous and worthy of respect rather than disruption. And so despite the challenges of balancing engagement in the Middle East context, China will try, its GSI and GCI flags waving over its effort.

These initiatives are unlikely to get centre stage at the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation taking place in Beijing. This meeting will laud the achievements of the Belt and Road Initiative, of which CPEC was a major pillar, and which is celebrating its 10th anniversary. The gathering is expected to look ahead to a new era for BRI, which is more green, more inclusive, and more sustainable from a debt perspective for recipients of projects.

But many have described this week’s BRI forum as a swan song for a project that never reached its lofty ambitions. A 2021 study conducted by resea­rch lab AidData found that 35 per cent of BRI projects have been plagued by controversies such as corruption, excessive debt and labour exploitation. The Global South’s call for BRI investment has in recent years been replaced with calls for debt forgiveness, as it transpired that the lending terms were burdensome. Many projects, including numerous SEZs planned as part of CPEC, remain unbuilt, incomplete or underutilised.

The petering out of the initiative would not mean that the era of Chinese influence is waning, however. Beijing’s current strategies, including the GCI, may have a more lasting impact on Pakistan’s state and society than infrastructure investment ever could. While China itself pursues its balancing act in the Middle East, it can reconcile with a Pakistan that supports Gaza, but does not criticise China’s treatment of its Uighur population, or introspect about the plight of its own religious minorities. A new global order that hesitates to challenge states’ worst instincts will be equally, if not more, oppressive than the one that came before.

The writer is a political and integrity risk analyst.
X (formerly Twitter): @humayusuf

Published in Dawn, October 16th, 2023