Lifestyle liberals, even those who aren’t necessarily fans of Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), have been lamenting the arrest of Khadija Shah.

Shah is a fashion designer and the granddaughter of a former military chief. She was arrested, along with hundreds of other PTI supporters, after being accused of instigating violence against the military and attacking state property on May 9 this year. 

On the other hand, certain conservative and right-wing media personnel, many of whom are quite vocal about their dislike of Khan, were seen going out on a limb to eulogise PTI member Ali Muhammad Khan, who has been in jail for similar charges as Shah. The media folk in this context praised Ali for ‘braving’ the onslaught of the military and the current government against the PTI and, therefore, demonstrating his loyalty towards his party’s besieged leader. 

If one looks closely, the laments for Shah and eulogies for Ali are largely coming from a particular social class. This segment is an urban cluster made up of urban middle and upper-middle income groups. This cluster has lifestyle liberals in it as well as social conservatives, so-called ‘progressives’, as well as Islamists. Many among these supported PTI, especially in urban and semi-urban areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), central and northern Punjab, and in Sindh’s metropolitan capital Karachi. 

The bourgeoisie, who had similar economic interests but different political and social orientations, were presented with PTI as a viable alternative by state elites. Given the failure of that experiment, a return to the old status quo is now on the cards

Many among these also support Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). But in Sindh, outside of Karachi, the Sindhi-speaking variant of this segment often supports the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), even though studies show that most middle and upper-middle class Sindhis settled in Karachi opted to vote for PTI in 2018. 

This cluster is a collection of people who have similar economic interests and ambitions, but different political and social orientations. Over the decades, this cluster has continued to grow as a bourgeois elite. It has more access to capital and wealth compared to the economic classes below.

But it has been looking to gain political power as well, so that it can accumulate influence to use the wealth owned by the state. To achieve this, it leans towards centre-right parties such as the PML-N or the PTI, or allies itself with the direct rule of state elites, such as the military. 

Interestingly, it is the centre-left PPP that has been most successful in moulding and delivering such an arrangement in Sindh. However, the same arrangement in Pakistan’s largest province Punjab devised by the PML-N began to be perceived as a threat by the state elites. The PML-N’s path in this context was blocked by the state elites and a more manageable alternative was concocted in the shape of the PTI. 

The project, which began in earnest from 2010 onwards, formulated superficial ‘ideological’ and cultural divisions within the cluster. The roots of this can be seen in the manner the Gen Pervez Musharraf dictatorship (1999-2008) looked to describe its bourgeoise support as ‘enlightened’ and ‘moderate’, and the other half of this cluster — that was inclined to support the PML-N — as corrupt, anti-modern and myopic. 

The fact is that the cluster shares similar economic interests and also has a history of teaming up with state elites and with political parties who oppose welfare programmes, land reforms and ‘pro-poor’ policies. One saw this when the liberal, conservative and even leftist currents within this cluster united to oust the government of ZA Bhutto in 1977. 

It accused Bhutto of being dictatorial and morally bankrupt. But, as the late scholar KB Sayeed, in his 1980 book The Nature and Direction of Change, and the sociologist Riaz Hassan in the 1985 issue of Middle Eastern Studies demonstrated, the threat of Bhutto’s authoritarian demeanour was secondary. The primary threats for the cluster were the regime’s policy of nationalisation and its populist pro-poor rhetoric. 

The cluster benefitted from the economic policies of Gen Zia’s dictatorship (1977-88), even though the regime magnified the social divisions within the cluster by eulogising the conservative currents within the cluster. Nevertheless, the lifestyle liberals in the cluster were not persecuted because they largely supported the dictatorship due to economic reasons. 

As mentioned, the divisions were further magnified by the Musharraf dictatorship. But this time the lifestyle liberals were complimented more, even though the cluster as a whole was a prominent benefactor of the regime’s neoliberal economic initiatives. This is why these divisions are superficial. 

However, when resources began to dwindle and routes to economic influence narrowed, the divisions became politicised, especially during the Musharraf regime’s last few turbulent years. An intra-class conflict started to take shape and various segments within the cluster began to compete against each other for resources and political power. 

State elites such as the military and a loud private electronic media dominated by members of this cluster became part of this intra-class conflict. In its bid to wean away members of the cluster that were still invested in the politics of the PML-N, the military bolstered the PTI as an alternative. To do this, it cultivated support from the media and the higher judiciary. 

Meanwhile, the PTI tried to usurp all social currents present in the cluster. The party seamlessly moved from right to left and back again — from Islamism to postmodern-liberalism, from neoliberalism to socialism, and back to Islamism. This is why one saw the presence of lifestyle liberals, Islamists, and even ‘leftists’ among its support base. But the fact remained that they were all members of the same cluster with similar economic interests. 

In theory, this should have completely eroded the bourgeois chunk of the PML-N’s support base, especially in Punjab. But, mainly due to the Khan regime’s disastrous economic performance, the intra-class conflict within the cluster intensified.

Alarmed by this development, the military, which recognises this cluster as an important economic component, changed tactics to revive the cluster’s cohesiveness, which was once delicately balanced on a troika of the armed forces, the PPP and the PML-N. The riotous May 9 events were the manifestation of the superficial divisions within the cluster that were magnified and then got politicised, badly disrupting the cohesiveness of the cluster.

A return to the old troika is now on the cards and the cosmetic divisions in the cluster will return to being mere topics of cultural debates.

Published in Dawn, EOS, July 9th, 2023