A new charter

Published October 31, 2022
The writer teaches politics and sociology at Lums.
The writer teaches politics and sociology at Lums.

A MISTAKE that a section of the commentariat continues to make is to painstakingly separate factional/power competition from lofty, ideological politics as far as consequences for civilian supremacy are concerned. The reason why this separation is less relevant in the current moment is that both may lead to similar outcomes — a reduction in the military’s influence in the political domain.

Arguments that Imran Khan is not sufficiently ‘anti-establishment’ because he doesn’t believe in constitutional and parliamentary supremacy are important. But in a larger conversation about the health of Pakistan’s democracy, when it comes to the narrower domain of trying to limit the military’s influence in the present moment, this point becomes less relevant, as it was for Nawaz Sharif’s opposition in 2018-2019 or any previous leader in earlier periods

In any case, it is ironic that everyone fails the litmus test of ‘true democrat’, given that both the PPP and PML-N are currently happy to barter political survival for sustaining a coercive hybrid regime.

While there is much legitimate hand-wringing on political instability and polarisation, I also think the current moment opens up possibilities for greater political stability in the future. This is primarily due to widespread scepticism against the military’s role in politics among not just the current out-of-favour party, but also among voters of other parties. In some ways, we are in a moment similar to 2007.

Read more: Benazir, Nawaz sign Charter of Democracy in London

The Charter of Democracy from that period was a bargain between elites designed to undertake a transition back to civilian rule, while fixing constitutional perversions caused by the dictatorship. It was an imperfect arrangement, not least because of frequent violations by both main parties, but it remained a pressing requirement of that time.

Pakistan is in a phase when another bargain between political elites is both plausible and needed. There are three distinct points which this bargain or new charter needs to cover for it to lead to a more mature political dispensation: free and fair elections; a ‘de-judicialization’ of politics; and devolution that actually matters.

The first point is a fairly straightforward requirement of any functioning democracy. The timing of the election is less relevant at this point than is the notion of it being free from the malignant influence of the establishment. This means allowing parties the space to mobilise and to allow all candidates to freely contest on the party platform of their choosing.

Curated defections in south Punjab and midnight disqualifications on flimsy pretexts need to be done away with, and reversed where applicable. A case can be made for earlier and on-time elections, but the quality of this election is what remains crucial. A failure on this aspect will only lead to another sustained cycle of political instability, opening up the space for further arbitration by the establishment.

The second point is unique to the kind of politics that’s developed in this country over the last decade: an end to resolving political conflicts through the judiciary. This judicialization of politics has only led the populace to form an impression of partisanship in the superior judiciary and of acclaim-seeking behaviour in judges, as well as of continued ingress in domains beyond their remit such as management of the economy and urban planning.

Achieving this de-judicialisation would involve greater faith being placed in parliamentary commissions and inquiries, and multipartisan committees to steer through key reforms. There is precedence for this, such as the process of electoral reform between 2015 and 2018 and the 18th Amendment between 2008-2010. Asking the judiciary to intervene on issues of whether overseas Pakistanis should be granted the right to vote or whether EVMs should be used is a terrible way of diluting the authority of parliament itself.

Finally, the third point for a new charter would be a constitutional enhancement of local governments as a distinct third tier of government. The current Article 140-A has proved insufficient, as has pressure from the courts. All mainstream parties have either failed to hold elections, or, where these have been held, have seen the withholding of financial and administrative power from the third tier.

There are a number of reasons why mainstream parties are so reluctant to devolve beyond the provincial tier. Absence of party strength at the grassroots and the reliance on local government functions to win provincial and national assembly elections are two important reasons. But the best analysis of this comes from Aqil Sajjad who calls this reluctance a form of ‘class politics’.

The simplest explanation is that urban and rural upper classes that populate the MPA and MNA tier of politics have no desire to open up a democratic channel that would widen access of other socioeconomic groups.

This is precisely why a charter of democracy without actual devolution will fail to resolve the most central failing of Pakistan’s politics — its unrepresentative character.

The first two points mentioned above will provide us a stable bargain between elites, without necessarily improving citizen-led accountability of those elites. It is only through devolution that this accountability opens up in any meaningful way. The previous charter failed to do it, perhaps partly out of circumstance (a transition from a centralised dictatorship) and perhaps partly out of expedience (the interests of the political elite). The current moment offers a chance to rectify this mistake.

Each point of this proposed charter goes against the current politics of one party or another. Free and fair elections held early will be favored by an ascendant PTI, but unlikely to be in the present interest of the PDM coalition. The ‘de-judicialisation’ of politics and greater reliance on parliament forces the PTI to accept other parties as legitimate actors. And devolution is opposed by all parties to varying extents. Regardless, though, these are the costs of a more stable political future and they need to be borne by the mainstream parties.

The writer teaches politics and sociology at Lums.

Twitter: @umairjav

Published in Dawn, October 31st, 2022

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