ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court on Wednesday asked the counsel for Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) leader Hanif Abbasi how a legal act, i.e. the creation of a trust abroad, could lead to disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution.

“How can we impute dishonesty when everything has been done in a legal manner?” Chief Justice Mian Saqib Nisar asked the petitioner’s counsel, alluding to the money transferred through banking channels for the creation of a trust fund by Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) secretary general Jahangir Khan Tareen.

The chief justice was heading a three-judge Supreme Court bench hearing a petition seeking the disqualification of Imran Khan and Mr Tareen.

On Oct 24, Advocate Sikander Bashir Mohmand, who represents the PTI leader, informed the apex court that Shiny View Limited — his client’s offshore company — owned a 12-acre property outside London, but Mr Tareen was not the beneficial owner of the property.

On Wednesday, Advocate Aizid Nafees concluded his arguments, while Mr Mohmand only clarified the term “discretionary beneficiary” used in the trust deed he had earlier submitted to the court.

On Thursday (today), the attorney general is expected to advance arguments on sections 15-A and 15-B of the Securities and Exchange Commission Ordinance 1969, the vires of which had been challenged by Mr Tareen.

In case the AG cannot make it as he is also busy with another case, Akram Sheikh and Naeem Bokhari would argue for the petitioner and Imran Khan, respectively.

On Wednesday, Mr Nafees told the court that Mr Tareen had allegedly hidden his wealth in an offshore company that was not in his name. This was done so that tax authorities could not come after him, he said, adding that there would be no need for such a camouflage if everything was legal.

The counsel insisted that not only was Mr Tareen was the sole lifetime beneficiary of the property in his capacity as “settlor” of the trust, he had not disclosed this in his nomination papers and was hence liable to be disqualified.

“Like all roads lead to the clock tower in Faisalabad, everything is vested with the settlor in this case,” the counsel argued.

The court, however, repeatedly asked him to explain how the settlor became the owner of the property owned by a trust.

But the counsel contended that the transaction should have been mentioned in the relevant section of the nomination papers.

During proceedings, Justice Umar Ata Bandial asked the counsel to identify what beneficial interest was the issue in the July 28 Panama Papers verdict.

At this, Akram Sheikh explained that the Avenfield properties were the issue in Panamagate because the petitioner had alleged that the properties were purchased to hide ill-gotten wealth.

The property was, in fact, the settlement of an investment made by the father of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, he explained.

The court recalled, however, that the real issue was the money trail for the funds used to purchase the upscale properties in London. The question in that case was where the money had come from, the chief justice observed.

The question in the present case, however, was whether the asset created by the trust was owned by the settlor, the chief justice observed.

When the court asked the counsel again to explain whether Mr Tareen was bound to declare the property in his nomination papers, the advocate emphasised that the property had never been transferred from the settlor to any other beneficiary.

Under Section 12 (2)(f) of the Representation of Peoples Act (Ropa) 1973, Mr Tareen was bound to disclose the assets of his wife in his nomination papers and highlight that she was also the beneficiary of the trust fund. The counsel also pointed out that Mr Tareen’s wife did not have an independent source of income.

Mr Nafees argued that in the Panama Papers case, the Supreme Court had not ascertained whether the former PM’s omission was intended or un-intended.

Thus, the SC judgment had made it easier to reach a conclusion about the dishonesty of an individual.

When Justice Bandial reminded the counsel that the verdict held that disqualification cannot be awarded on moral grounds, and had also differentiated between disqualification under Ropa and Article 62(1)(f), the counsel claimed that parliamentarian could become a member of the cabinet, and if they had violated their fiduciary duty, this should be sufficient grounds for disqualification.

Published in Dawn, November 9th, 2017