MANY op-ed columnists and journalists use the term ‘elite’ loosely. Almost always, it is a code to mark a social problem and rebuke the privileged, powerful or ruling classes. But the broad scope weakens the criticism. A lazy and sweeping reference does not establish how various elite groups operate as engines of inequality.

To put this in perspective, consider the absurd habit of those Pakistanis who try to claim privilege by asking some low-ranking official, ‘Don’t you know who I am?’ A negative question, likely to be met with a blank stare. The more precise inquiry should be, ‘Don’t you know what I can do to/for you?’ To make sense, elite power must hold some transferable value.

The economic, social, knowledge, political, and military elite may own or have disproportionate access to resources, but their possessions or skills must carry social value. The context defines the value. In capitalist societies, money defines status but in some societies football players can be elites. Where the premium is on knowledge, scholars and philosophers would be elites.

Elitism has become a commodity in itself.

Such is the fluidity of international elitism that it has become a commodity in itself. Today, Middle Eastern elites can add value to their status by purchasing a Spanish football team or even individual players.

Another misleading term is ‘state elite’, as if all state officials across institutions are equally resourceful or powerful. Control over resources and political power has for decades empowered Pakistan’s military elite at the cost of civilians. To protect its expansive economic interests, the military leadership has appointed itself as the moral guardian of the religious asset of Pakistan. Their dominance relies on the social consensus that the country must be protected, not only from foreign threats but from its morally corrupt populist civilians.

Democratic competition between political parties makes seizure of power easy for the ambitious military with its organisational strength, clear hierarchy and institutional memory of ruling. Each time the democratic process gains momentum, we are told danger is impending, at the end of which is a ballot box filled with social crisis, financial disaster and moral collapse. Only oligarchies can save us from making a silly civilian democratic mistake. This has become the unwritten social contract between social and military elites, at the cost of political non-elites.

Neither India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, nor the Dalit leader and president, Ram Nath Kovind, are hereditary elites. Their rule may not subvert caste politics, or redistribute wealth, or make equality rain down on minorities. But their inclusion into India’s political club suggests there is room for more non-elites. It’s how democracies evolve. Non-elites are not necessarily progressive or pleasant; this scares the social elite.

In Pakistan, intellectuals worry about a correlation between local elitism, the West and the English language. Ironically, they find Western superiority offensive but continue to value the endorsement and opinions of white male elites and institutions. MNCs are highly respected and coveted. Western journalists and columnists are eagerly carried by our press and celebrated for any Orientalist praise they may shower on talented Pakistani youth, our cricket team, our hospitable working classes.

We hate Malala for promoting girls education but love Greg Mortenson (of Three Cups of Tea fame) for doing the same. We hate Asma Jahangir for criticising Jamaatud Dawa and celebrating women’s right to dance and participate in national politics, but love foreign correspondents for offering the same opinion in Pakistan’s, not Britain’s newspapers.

Although the division between the public and private sectors is a key driver of inequality, elite capture is considered a linguistic rather than a class issue. Instead of demanding revision of the content, politics and class orientation of education systems, the prescribed solution is that knowledge should be spread in the vernacular. In any case, conspiracy theories, disinformation and fake news circulate damagingly in any language without disturbing the elite equilibrium.

Maintaining elite power does increase in proportion to social class. Nepotism and tax evasion is rampant across all classes but the upper classes disguise it with more sophistication. They loathe corrupt politicians but consider their own charity donations a worthy substitute for tax dodging. They condemn dynastic politics but maintain the practice by ensuring their children attend elite schools, intermarry, get contracts through social networking and property through inheritance. They praise and promote affable and compliant friends rather than recognise the merit of controversial, challenging strangers.

While the elite will always have the means of production and each other’s backs, the only resource that non-elites have is the logic of democracy.

The writer is a Karachi-based researcher and author of the forthcoming Faith and Feminism in Pakistan.

Published in Dawn, August 27th, 2017