“THE transition in Afghanistan is moving forward and our troops are finally coming home,” thus spoke President Barack Obama in the White House briefing room in October 2011. A year later, he ran for re-election on the promise that he would bring a responsible end to the war in Afghanistan which was begun by his predecessor.

He pledged to end, by 2014, a conflict that has cost the US thousands of lives and more than a trillion dollars in treasure. Although his plan to bring home all military personnel fell by the wayside, he announced in Decem­ber 2014 an end to the combat mission.

Once again, that decision was reversed in 2015 when Kunduz city collapsed like a pack of cards, highlighting the fragile security situation in the north and other parts of the country. The US military fought alongside the Afghans to recapture the strategically important town.

Recently, a perplexed POTUS took another U-turn by approving broader military operations in Afghanistan. The move, however viewed, runs counter to his oft-repeated commitment to ending America’s troubled mission, characterised by broken promises and missed timelines.

By loosening restrictions on air strikes and ground combat in support of Afghan forces, the US leader has, for all practical purposes, given his soldiers carte blanche to battle the Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda remnants and fighters of the militant Islamic State group directly.

The new rules of engagement authorise commanders to use air power and join conventional Afghan-led counterinsurgency offensives — as and when they deem fit. Even before the guidelines went into effect, America’s Special Operations forces actively battled the militants in different provinces.

Obama’s inconsistent Afghan policy has confused Americans.

The presidential decision indicates the plummeting security across Afghanistan, where the Taliban control or contest more territory than they have at any time since 2001. Worse still, US and Afghan troops are bracing themselves for a fierce fighting season this summer. The announcement shows the war is going badly and the US needs to do more to keep the situation from deteriorating further.

The bulk of the 9,800 US troops kept in Afghanistan after 2014 were supposed to focus on training and building institutional capacity of the local security establishment. But much to Obama’s frustration, that modest goal also remains elusive. And on the battlefield, the Taliban have outgunned the Afghan forces, as the government struggles to enforce its writ outside of Kabul.

One fails to comprehend America’s self-defence rationale that has been stretched to its limits with disturbing frequency. This weird logic came into play last month when a US drone killed Taliban’s supreme leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in Balochistan.

Whatever value it may have in vanquishing the insurgency, the raid has dampened prospects for peace negotiations with the militant movement in the foreseeable future — an objective Washington has supported over the years.

Additionally, the attack also strained US relations with Pakistan, which has reason to protest the violation of its sovereignty. Islamabad, praised as a valuable ally in the anti-terror fight, has never been trusted with sensitive intelligence by Washington.

The White House’s argument, that the expanded powers will enable US forces to support their local partners more proactively, is tantamount to a clean confession that the Pentagon’s assessment of the ground situation in Afghanistan has been flawed.

Before it decides on future troop levels, the US will have to work hard to keep Nato allies involved in the training mission, which has been a mixed bag. As the war refuses to wind down, the overall security environment has changed for the worse.

The country’s slide into uncertainty has given rise to fears of extremist groups with global ambitions coming back to Afghan­istan. No one can disregard the fact that stability there re­­mains central to the global campaign against terror.

If it really believes that Afghanistan’s future must be decided by the Afghans themselves, the US should prioritise jump-starting peace talks. Pursuing a military settlement has proved a wild goose chase over the past 15 years and cannot succeed in bringing peace.

Despite flip-flopping on the Afghan conundrum, Obama may not bring US troops home before his term runs out seven months from now. Odds are that he will push back the additional withdrawal of US forces again, leaving it for his successor.

Thus, he will be bequeathing a not-so-enviable legacy to the next president. It is largely because of his inconsistent policy that the war has become confusing to most Americans — as indeed ordinary Afghans.

In almost all key addresses throughout his presidency, Obama touted his pullout plans but demonstrated weak wartime leadership to translate them into action. One can safely conclude that all his strategies — surge and drawdown options included — have turned out to be non-starters.

The writer is a freelance journalist based in Peshawar.

Published in Dawn, June 19th, 2016