AS opposed to much more recent problems with ‘jihadi’ militancy, the state has been battling the monster of sectarian terrorism since at least the 1980s. Regrettably, it is also true that both the military and civilian leaderships have played ball with the political facilitators of sectarian militants whenever the need has emerged.

But the scenario may finally be changing, especially in the aftermath of the APS tragedy in Peshawar, as the state has begun to take visible action against sectarian militants.

For example, in his media briefing in Karachi on Friday, DG ISPR Lt-Gen Asim Bajwa announced that amongst 97 arrested militants were three ‘most-wanted’ leaders of banned outfits. This included Naeem Bukhari, a dreaded Karachi-based militant associated with Lashkar-i-Jhangvi.

On the same day, the Punjab Counter-Terrorism Department said it had apprehended nine militants in Lahore, again associated with various militant outfits.

And 2015 was marked by the killings of Malik Ishaq and Usman Saifullah Kurd, in separate ‘encounters’; both men were associated with LJ and were notorious for perpetrating sectarian violence.

For there to be effective and long-lasting action in Pakistan against sectarian militant groups, two things must be considered. Firstly, it appears as if the establishment is continuing with its ‘good militant, bad militant’ policy.

For instance, while the ‘bad’ militants are being pounded in Fata and rounded up in the cities, the ‘good’ ones — especially Kashmir-centric fighters — are hardly being touched. The authorities must know that sectarian outfits and jihadi groups have a symbiotic relationship. In many cases, they share ideologies, while also providing each other with manpower.

For example, Naeem Bukhari, the LJ leader, has been described as being instrumental in bringing his concern closer to Al Qaeda.

The criteria must be simple: any group espousing or condoning violence against innocent people — whether in the name of religion, sect or ethnicity — must be dismantled. Unless action is taken against all militant groups, efforts against sectarian concerns will not prove effective.

Secondly, while the state pursues counterterrorism activities, there is a lack of movement on countering extremism and sectarian tendencies within society, which are arguably high.

Taking out sectarian killers will not be helpful in the long run unless the factors contributing to sectarian intolerance in society are addressed. Of course, communal violence in the Middle East has done much to fuel sectarian feelings in Pakistan.

And while there is little the state can do to shield the country from what is happening in Syria or Iraq, or the effects of the Saudi-Iranian spat, it is entirely possible to at least mitigate the effects of these situations.

A credible counter-narrative is needed which stresses that while doctrinal differences and various interpretations of Muslim history have always existed, in today’s Pakistan such differences must be tolerated and accepted. This message must particularly resonate within the mosque, madressah and curriculum.

Published in Dawn, February 14th, 2016