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PRIME Minister Modi’s election in India has spurred interesting conversations between Indian and Pakistani political pundits. In my interactions, most recently at a well-established track-II dialogue, three threads stand out as potential sticking points that governments in India and Pakistan should be aware of as they seek forward movement.
Indian experts are visibly irked if Modi’s past is brought up.
The Indian view is that it should be irrelevant to Pakistan’s approach towards him. Even those Indian experts who were quite openly concerned about the baggage Modi carried in the pre-election period seem converted on this point.
The Pakistani view is not entirely reconciled. No one is questioning Modi’s legitimacy, of course. Pakistanis have absolutely no business grudging his rise. But equally, his controversial past does strike a very strong emotive chord in Pakistan for obvious reasons. Rightful or not, he is not seen as just another prime minister.
The perception of Modi, especially among the Pakistani right, makes him a much easier target of a politically motivated campaign that seeks to malign the Pakistani leadership. He is undoubtedly a higher-cost option for any Pakistani leader to engage with than, say, a Manmohan Singh or even a Vajpayee was.
What will it take to achieve a paradigm shift in India-Pakistan relations?
As a Pakistani prime minister looking to fend off political rivals, then, you want Modi to go the extra mile to prove his skeptics in Pakistan wrong. Forward movement almost necessitates the Indian prime minister playing big brother and putting something out of the ordinary on the table — some tangible concession or incentive that would show his commitment.
I’d go a step further by saying that mere words won’t do. It will have to be tangible action — whether in the economic realm or something like reviving and prioritising a backchannel on Kashmir.
The disconnect is that Indian colleagues see no need for anything extraordinary. A senior Indian expert summed up what I find to be the majority sentiment: “The ball is still squarely in Pakistan’s court as far as India is concerned.”
On the Pakistani side, two issues must be taken head on.
First, Indians continue to worry about and question the merits of dealing with a Pakistani civilian government that is unable to carry the military along. Every time this is brought up in expert discussions, Pakistanis quickly react to say that this is an internal matter and that New Delhi should focus on working with whichever government occupies office in Islamabad irrespective of its strength.
The Pakistani contention is diplomatically correct of course. But just like with Modi’s past, there is a history here that you can’t ignore.
Indians have the right to remember Vajpayee’s 1999 overtures and what came thereafter — especially Modi, since his domestic constituencies are likely to be much more skeptical about any approaches to Pakistan.
If Modi is to stick his neck out, he must know that Islamabad’s end of the deal will be held up. And just like mere words won’t satisfy Pakistanis about Modi, verbal assurances from Nawaz Sharif on this count won’t mean much. The latter will have to get his military to publicly back his overtures and to signal overtly that it will not play the spoiler. The all too obvious civil-military tensions at the moment make this even more important.
Second, the ‘T’ word will be more important for this Indian government than any other.
No matter how you see Mr Modi and his relationship to his domestic political constituencies, this BJP dispensation will not be able to play softball on terrorism. The message is loud and clear no matter which segment of the Indian expert community you talk to. Equally, there is a consensus that Modi will be far more susceptible to a muscular response in case of any provocation linked directly or indirectly to Pakistan than other recent Indian leaders.
Simply put, if Pakistan is unable to control jihadis from creating trouble in India, a rupture in ties is all but guaranteed.
Also, the concern is not only about the future. Mr Modi’s cache will remain limited unless he can show his people that Pakistan has delivered something on the pending Mumbai trials. We can say all we want about the lacunas in our legal system — and we all know there are many — but the Indians, and for that matter the world, ain’t buying the argument that the Mumbai trials are held up because of that. Modi needs Pakistan to do something on terrorism. Otherwise, his followers, fed only one message about Pakistan and its links to terrorism, will force his hand to hold back. Delhi will still continue talking but that is about it.
I remain skeptical that either side will be able to do what it is going to take to achieve a paradigm shift in India-Pakistan relations. We’ll most likely be stuck with minor gains susceptible to quick reversals. Business as usual, that is.
The writer is a foreign policy expert based in Washington D.C.
Published in Dawn, June 24th, 2014
