The Indo-US nuclear deal

LAST week, the US Congress completed the legislative consideration of the administration-sponsored bill known as the Henry Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Cooperation Act of 2006 or popularly known as the 123 Agreement. With President Bush having signed it earlier this week, it has now become law. It is an important event in the history of nuclear cooperation for the message that it conveys to the rest of the world about how the US and India visualise their ties in the coming years.

Its impact is likely to be global, for it not only goes against the letter and spirit of earlier US non-proliferation laws, but also against the well-established norms of conduct between an internationally recognised nuclear weapon state and one that has pursued its nuclear programme outside the ambit of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In fact, immediately after India’s nuclear tests (followed by Pakistan’s), the UN Security Council had passed a resolution expressing its profound displeasure and threatening severe reprisals in the form of sanctions against India and Pakistan.

It would be recalled, however, that even at that point in time, there were elements in the US who believed that the West’s displeasure against India was both unmerited and shortsighted. I am convinced that had Pakistan not chosen to follow the Indian example and carry out its own tests when it did, neither the US nor the UN would have expressed their anger with India in such strong terms. US sanctions, at best, would have been a mere formality. It was the decision of the Pakistani civilian leadership to defy the West and, in particular, the US and UK, notwithstanding tremendous pressure from them, that queered the pitch for India.

It was, therefore, no surprise to see the speed and enthusiasm with which the US sought to dilute the scope and effectiveness of its sanctions. Even as early as President Clinton’s visit to Delhi in March 2000, it was obvious that far from ostracising India, the US had already formulated a comprehensive plan to engage it in a web of agreements that would change the whole context of US-India ties.

The US desire to enhance its strategic ties with India became far more urgent and desirable after 9/11 when the Vajpayee government offered to the US, with indecent haste, its facilities to assist the US invasion of Afghanistan. Delhi’s offer was not taken up then, primarily because Pakistan was even more enthusiastic about working with the US. Washington, nevertheless, recognised immediately that it was now entering into a long, unconventional war with “radical” Islam, in which India could play a critical role in promoting their common interests.

While it is not the purpose here to carry out a technical evaluation of the agreement, suffice it to state that both the US and India are convinced that it represents a major victory for both countries that will benefit them in more ways than apparent. It is true, nevertheless, that critics of the Manmohan Singh government, especially those in the opposition BJP, were able to raise a number of technical issues that they claimed represented serious shortcomings in the agreement.

The critics were peeved by the fact that some of the concerns raised by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his speech to the Indian parliament on August 17, 2006, were ignored by the US Congress. They are upset that the deal may not provide India with “full civil nuclear energy and access to American enrichment and reprocessing technologies”. There is also some concern on issues referred to as a “reciprocity and sequencing”. While the July 18, 2005, agreement had spoken of India and the US taking reciprocal steps to complete their obligations, the final text would require India to finalise its safeguard agreement with the IAEA, (though not to actually sign it), before the US president made his determination of Indian compliance.

The issue of certification had also upset many Indians who opposed the requirement that the US president make annual reports to Congress, including providing a certificate that India was in full compliance with its non-proliferation and other requirements. The US Congress has finessed this issue by using the word “assessment”, rather than “certification”, meaning that the US president provide his “assessment” of whether India is working with the US on issues such as Iran’s nuclear programme. But there is no reference to the imposition of penalty in case of a negative assessment.

The Indians had also wanted a clear assurance of uninterrupted fuel supply over the lifetime of imported reactors in exchange for placing its civilian reactors under in-perpetuity safeguards so that India could build up strategic reserves of nuclear fuel over the lifetime of its reactors. The act, however, enjoins the US government to oppose the stockpiling of nuclear fuel beyond a small reserve.

Other concerns raised by Indian scientists relate more to technicalities than to the wider picture and concern issues such as India’s adherence to international arrangements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement as well as the controversial Proliferation Security Initiative. The Indians are not happy either at the provision that were India to detonate a nuclear explosive device, the US would have the right to end further cooperation with India. Officials in both countries have defended staunchly the provisions of the Indo-US agreement, claiming that in its final form, the US legislation does not impose any additional burden on India beyond those agreed to by New Delhi in the July 18, 2005, joint statement and the March 2, 2006, separation plan.

However, as happens with any piece of legislation that goes through months of debate, discussion, and bargaining, the 123 Agreement contains redundancies. For instance, certain provisions of this bill are already present in various existing US laws. Indian commentators have rightly pointed out that since this is a piece of domestic US legislation, not requiring any Indian action, New Delhi should quietly take advantage of the benefits flowing from it and not focus on inconsequential details which have little bearing on Indian core interests.

True, the agreement does not give India nuclear power status, but it does enable India to keep eight of its nuclear plants secret for military purposes, while opening the other 14 and all future civilian nuclear power plants to international inspection. The US and other nuclear supplier nations will provide fuel and technology for India’s existing and future civil facilities. There are reports to the effect that India is expected to spend more than $100 billion on producing nuclear energy during the next 10 years, with US companies expecting to get the lion’s share of these contracts. An American mining company has already signed an agreement to sell 500 metric tons of uranium a year to India.

This explains why a powerful coalition of influential lobbies played a critical role in convincing key legislators to extend their support to the administration’s decision to enter into this deal with India. In this effort, the large American business houses were ably assisted by the political action groups established by wealthy Indians, who spent millions of dollars to mount a slick and effective campaign in favour of the bill.

This contains a lesson for all those desirous of extending their influence in the United States. But what is of greater relevance is to see the “deal” beyond the mere confines of its text. Its message is loud and clear. The administration was certainly able to take advantage of the growing, domestic admiration and appreciation of India, not only in terms of what this huge, economically growing secular democracy represents, but what its potential is likely to be in the coming years. Only such strategic considerations could have convinced experienced and mature politicians as Senators Richard Lugar and Joseph Biden, to set aside their lifelong opposition to nuclear proliferation and spearhead the campaign in favour of the bill.

Not surprisingly, US and Indian officials were exultant at the completion of what both rightly claimed was a historic endeavour that reached fruition in less than a year and a half. Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon described the deal as a “stand alone arrangement” which recognises India’s responsible role as a global player. Under Secretary Nicholas Burns waxed lyrical calling it “a unique agreement for a unique country”.

Global developments over the past years, particularly in the Middle East, have increased India’s importance in the calculus of the US foreign policy establishment. Nothing represents the current predicament of the US as starkly as Iraq. Its dream of worldwide domination, underpinned by the neocon philosophy of this administration, lies in ruins on the banks of the Euphrates.

Iraq’s invasion, in defiance of international public opinion, was meant to establish a docile client state, with its vast oil resources at America’s disposal. And in the bargain, Israel’s last remaining potential threat would also be destroyed. Instead, Iraq has become a graveyard littered with gruesome specimens of America’s follies. Consequently, the US failure to achieve any of its declared objectives has raised questions not only about the moral compass of this great country, but also its ability to sustain its global ambitions.

To the Bush administration’s horror, Iran, isolated and under threat of international sanctions all these years, may have to be co-opted in the effort to bring peace to Iraq. On the other flank, Israel’s much vaunted military prowess has suffered a humiliating setback when challenged by a genuine people’s movement calling into question America’s strategic reliance on Israel. Hostility towards America is no longer confined to any one country, or one community. It is deep and it is widespread. Even such establishment figures as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Richard Haass have been warning of declining American influence, especially in critical areas, such as the Middle East and Central Asia. Some of these commentators are expressing the fear that a half-century of American domination may be coming to an end.

In such a scenario, India’s willingness “to play ball” — of course on its own terms — is a major positive development for the US, and American planners intend to take full advantage of it. This explains the importance Washington has been attaching to India over the past years and more so after 9/11.

In fact, with the realisation that the US may be entering into a long, sustained confrontation with the world of “radical” Islam, countries such as India, Australia, Japan and to some degree Vietnam, are being looked upon increasingly not only to promote American interests, but to participate in the American-led effort to “contain China” as well. While this does not mean that India will follow Washington’s dictates, it will certainly not hesitate to promote American interests, especially when and where they coincide with its own.

The writer is a former ambassador.

A toothless accord

BEFORE I take up the India-US nuclear deal, I would like to say that there is a case for destroying all nuclear weapons, whether in the US, India or elsewhere. India, which won independence through non-violence, should have taken the lead and worked towards a nuclear weapon-free world.

Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru would have done that. They would not have allowed the country to possess the bomb. But today’s India is diametrically opposed to their thinking.

The nuclear competition in South Asia is India’s doing. Had it not exploded the bomb, Pakistan would not have done so. True, New Delhi has sought America’s assistance only to augment civil energy. But it is nuclear, not conventional. And one should not be oblivious to the danger that nuclear plants have posed throughout the world. Still, we wanted energy so badly that we compromised a lot. Whatever our stand, we gave the content in exchange for phraseology.

After haggling for 15 months, India has gained only a bit. Sanctions have been lifted and we can buy nuclear technology and fuel from anywhere. But in the process we conceded too much. It has been humiliating at times. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh rang up the US Senate majority leader to seek support. I do not know who advised him. I wish he had not done so because it was not Manmohan Singh who was phoning but India’s prime minister.

Even then the result has been far from satisfactory. What America has given with one hand, it has taken back with the other. The act itself is not so bad. But the background note which is part of the act is the unkindest cut. It is restrictive or “extraneous” (the word used by New Delhi) and it impinges on India’s dignity, if not sovereignty. Maybe, the bilateral agreement which is to follow the act will lessen the damage. Manmohan Singh said in the very beginning that India would not settle for anything less than the resumption of “full civil energy cooperation.”

The act comes nowhere near that. It does not open “full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.” If the US really wanted to have full energy cooperation, the US Congress could have enacted a simple, straight bill to assure that. Instead, there are too many vague points. Several cooks, from the US Congress and the State Department, came together to spoil the broth. The bill was expanded from three pages to 41, many harsh amendments finding place in the background note.

New Delhi’s main objection pertains to three parts: end-use monitoring by the US of Indian nuclear imports, an annual presidential verification and the ban on reprocessing, enrichment and heavy water technology.

All three parts are there in the act in one shape or the other, although America has tried to cover them up through clever wording. Take the monitoring part. The act does not say anything on it. There is no assurance. The ban on reprocessing or enrichment is relaxed through the act. But the background note attached to the legislation makes it clear that no relaxation is going to take place.

Section 105 directs the executive to “work with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, individually and collectively to further restrict the transfers” of reprocessing, enrichment and heavy water technologies to India. It would become worse if America were to terminate its exports. As regards presidential verification, the word, “certification” has been replaced by “assessment”. The US president is still obliged to report every year his assessment of India’s compliance with its non-proliferation and other commitments.

It is obvious that New Delhi has accepted the nuclear deal, with all its limitations, because it has welcomed the “outcome” of the joint Congress-Senate conference. It has thanked President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. India may argue that the act would be discussed with the State Department to ensure that it is within the contours of the statement made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George Bush last August.

The fact is that the act is a watered down version of what was stated again and again, even in parliament. We have compromised on our stand. Maybe, it was pragmatic to do so. Maybe, India had no alternative if it wanted to step out of nuclear isolation. If it is so, let the nation know about it. Transparency is important, particularly when there are serious doubts over the deal.

In any case, America should stop shouting about its “confidence” in democratic India. Had that been the case, New Delhi would not have been suspect in the eyes of US congressmen and senators. They would not have dawdled over the bill for such a long time and passed an act which does not attend to India’s main concerns.

America always does things without grace. Within a few years of independence, we faced a food shortage. America’s PL-480 brought wheat to India. But the debate in the US Congress was so belittling for India that the entire goodwill was lost. Moreover, the cost of freight which India had to pay was higher than the food price. What type of democracy is America when a country which is the largest democracy is treated by it in a nonchalant manner?

Still, anti-American feeling in India is very limited. The deal, as the details unfold themselves, may make people wonder how sincere America is towards them. Washington should have given the impression of a friend, not one who wants to extract whatever advantage it can.

The Cold War is over. The distance between the two countries should have been spanned by this time. But America continues to pursue the Dulles policy of those who are not with it are against it. Take Iran. India too does not want another nuclear power in its neighbourhood. But it has its own foreign policy. It too would like to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear device. New Delhi wants to do in its own way. Still, the deal wants the US president to “assess” whether New Delhi is working with Washington to “contain or restrain” Iran.

Now that the deal is through, America should seriously attend to what it can do in the economic field. That alone will strengthen democracy in India. By insisting on opening every field to US cartels or ensure special economic zones for them may get America the best financial terms, but not the people’s goodwill.

Democracy is weakened when people see the system helping the rich and the “haves” and that too at the expense of the lower half. America would not like people in India to compare it with the erstwhile East India Company which left traces of exploitation and imperialist rule.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

An evil dictator

AUGUSTO PINOCHET, who died on Sunday at the age of 91, has been vilified for three decades in and outside of Chile, the South American country he ruled for 17 years. For some he was the epitome of an evil dictator.

That was partly because he helped to overthrow, with US support, an elected president considered saintly by the international left: socialist Salvador Allende, whose responsibility for creating the conditions for the 1973 coup is usually overlooked. Mr Pinochet was brutal: More than 3,000 people were killed by his government and tens of thousands tortured, mostly in his first three years. Thousands of others spent years in exile.

One prominent opponent, Orlando Letelier, was assassinated by a car bomb on Washington’s Sheridan Circle in 1976 — one of the most notable acts of terrorism in this city’s history. Mr Pinochet, meanwhile, enriched himself, stashing millions in foreign bank accounts — including Riggs Bank, a Washington institution that was brought down, in part, by the revelation of that business. His death forestalled a belated but richly deserved trial in Chile.

It’s hard not to notice, however, that the evil dictator leaves behind the most successful country in Latin America. In the past 15 years, Chile’s economy has grown at twice the regional average, and its poverty rate has been halved. It’s leaving behind the developing world, where all of its neighbours remain mired. Earlier this year it elected another socialist president, Michelle Bachelet, who suffered persecution during the Pinochet years.

—The Washington Post